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Abstract 
Arab Palestinians in Israel live under highly complex circumstances. In 1948, when they became Israeli 
citizens, they found themselves facing challenges at different levels: national, social, political, financial, 
educational, as well as the very challenge of existence. The Palestinian community in Israel underwent various 
stages of development and witnessed major events under the new Israeli rule, bringing about fundamental 
changes in their lives, their attitudes, and consequently, their rhetoric. Arab politicians, particularly those who 
represent Arab Palestinians in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), often find themselves compelled to adjust 
the approach and rhetoric they use to address the Arab public. They do it not only to satisfy the Arab public’s 
expectations, but also to adapt to the ever-changing Israeli political atmosphere and to avoid conflict with the 
Jewish public, the majority of whom, as polls indicate, are not happy about Arab representation in the Israeli 
Knesset. 
Discussion of the rhetoric used by the Arab parties in Israel that represent the Palestinian people who before 
1948 were a majority and after that year became a minority that suffers inequality, oppression, and 
discrimination, is important in order to understand how argumentation and methods of persuasion are 
influenced by the kind of circumstances that national minorities like Palestinians in Israel experience.  
This thesis will examine the rhetoric used by the main Arab political movements in Israel when addressing 
several key issues that are currently the subject of heated debate and are expected to have remarkable effects 
on Arabs and their lives as non-Jews in the Israeli state. These issues are: Arab representation in the Israeli 
Parliament, recognition of Israel as a “Jewish State”, and National Service for Arabs. The largest part of the 
research will focus on the Arab representation in the Knesset, being the most controversial topic among the 
Arab minority in Israel, and which also determines to a great extent the positions of the parties on other issues. 
After reviewing the position of each party/political movement on each of these topics, I intend to analyze the 
rhetoric each of them uses to defend their position or promote it to gain the support of the public, especially 
during parliamentary elections. Is the rhetoric of Arab parties in Israel coherent and harmonious as it 
represents a Palestinian minority dealing with Israeli policies as a collective entity, or does each of the parties 
have a unique rhetoric of its own, based on its ideology and agendas? What are the arguments that these 
parties use to justify their views, and how do they present these arguments? Are the arguments used by each 
party from the deliberative branch of rhetoric, the forensic, or the epideictic? Do Arab politicians mostly use 
ethos, pathos, or logos to persuade the audience and gain their support?  
This thesis will answer these questions by analyzing the parties’ publications and official statements and 
political charters, and it will show that the positions, the rhetoric, and the argumentation of the different Arab 
parties are far from being homogeneous, and are highly influenced by their ideological background. 
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1. Introduction
This research covers the period from 1948 up until August 2013 and uses data from that period only. 
Despite being citizens of Israel and holding Israeli passports, most Arabs in Israel consider themselves 
Palestinian rather than Israeli. For Arab politicians, particularly those who are members of the Israeli 
parliament (the Knesset), this is a sensitive issue when standing before the other members of the Knesset, who 
are mostly Jews, and speaking about even more sensitive topics, such as discrimination against Arabs in the 
Jewish state. Are they thus Palestinians, and if they are, how can they sit as members in the Israeli Knesset, 
and how can a Palestinian address members of the Israeli parliament? If they are not, how can they claim they 
are Palestinians when addressing the Arab Palestinian public? The conflicting components of the identity of 
Arabs in Israel and the complex reality in which they live gives rise to differences in their attitudes and 
positions on different issues that affect them directly, consequently resulting in differences in the rhetoric used 
by the different Arab political parties that do not share the same ideological background or aspirations. The 
sensitivity is therefore not limited merely to speeches Arab members of parliament (MPs) have to give in the 
Knesset, but is applicable to the whole range of rhetorical devices and approaches each political party / 
movement adopts in its dealings with the public and the government.  
Discussing this topic is interesting as it sheds some light on the rhetoric used in one of the world’s most 
volatile hotspots. Rhetoric has been a major player in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in recent years as 
each side invests huge efforts to attempt to win the support of the international community and the people of 
other countries. Winning the world’s sympathy could create pressure resulting in a change that military action 
might not be able to achieve; the apartheid regime in South Africa, which ended after international pressure 
and isolation, is a good example of that.  
Following a thorough examination, I have found no research of investigation into this topic. It is therefore 
essential to survey the political rhetoric of Palestinians in Israel and the way rhetoric is used and persuasion 
achieved; this topic is both complex and fraught with ambiguities. It is important to study the rhetoric that is 
used to persuade a non-supportive audience, as well as an audience that considers the speaker an enemy who 
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should be expelled from the country. Many right-wing Jewish politicians, like Effi Eitam, have explicitly said 
that Arab Palestinians in Israel are “a cancer and a ticking bomb."1 
It is therefore interesting to investigate how and by what means Arab politicians present themselves and their 
ideas in a way that can appeal to the audience, and how they rhetorically formulate and demonstrate their 
attitudes regarding the issues of debate they address in public speeches, interviews, and articles.  
My argument is that the position of the political Arab parties in Israel and the general Arab public regarding 
the various key issues that affect their present and shape their future is far from coherent, and that each party or 
political movement positions itself in relation to these issues based on its ideology and political agenda. I also 
argue that all parties, under different circumstances and for different reasons, utilize all of Aristotle’s different 
rhetorical appeals, and do not exclusively use one or two of them. Furthermore, and due to the complexity of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and it being an ongoing struggle with implications extending from the past to the 
future, I claim that with respect to the rhetorical domains - forensic, deliberative, and epideictic - Arab parties 
in Israel tend to use arguments from all the domains and not focus only on one of them. 
List of abbreviations: 
NIM: Northern Islamic Movement 
SIM: Southern Islamic Movement  
DFPE: Democratic Front for Peace and Equality 
NDA: National Democratic Assembly 
CPI: Communist Party of Israel 
UAL: United Arab List 
NCL: New Communist List 
ADP: Arab Democratic Party 
PLP: Progressive List for Peace 
ILP: Israeli Labor Party 
1 Shavit, A. (2002, March 20)."Dear God, this is Effi", Haaretz. Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/dear-god-this-is-effi-
1.49866. Accessed on 15.7.2013. 
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1.1 Thesis structure 
Section Two –historical and political review. In this section I will summarize the modern history of 
Palestine and the current conditions of Palestinian Arabs who became citizens of Israel following the 
Israeli occupation in 1948. 
Section Three - Arab political movements/parties in Israel. This section will survey the Arab parties 
in Israel, their origins, ideologies, different stages of development, and current position in the political 
balance of power. A distinction will be made between parties that participate in the Israeli parliamentary 
elections, and those that abstain, for various reasons, the main one being ideological.   
Section Four – The rhetoric of Arab political parties in Israel. Section four constitutes the bulk of this 
thesis, and it includes analysis of the rhetoric of each political movement / party and their homogeneous or 
heterogeneous attitudes on several key issues that affect the Arab minority in Israel. These issues are: Arab 
representation in the Knesset (Israeli parliament), the recognition of Israel as a “Jewish State”, and the 
incorporation of Arabs in the National Service . It will also include an analysis of written, audio, and visual 
content produced by these parties, their representatives, and their media wings in an attempt to unveil their 
rhetoric and the approach behind it. Content analyzed will consist of general periodical publications such as 
party newspapers, as well as public private or partisan newspapers and internet news websites.  
Section five is the last section and it will contain the final remarks and conclusions. 
1.2 Methodology 
My analysis of the rhetoric, arguments and method of argumentation of each party is largely based on 
Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals: ethos, pathos, and logos. Through analysis of the arguments, I intend to 
draw conclusions on whether or not a party that adopts a specific ideology has a tendency to use one of 
these specific appeals as its primary tool of argument. Does each party tend to focus on one particular 
appeal in argumentation, or does it use them selectively depending on the context? 
Each party’s set of arguments will then be discussed in light of Aristotle’s three branches or registers of 
rhetoric:  
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1. Judicial (or "forensic") oratory;
2. Epideictic ("ceremonial" or "demonstrative") oratory; and
3. Deliberative (or "legislative") oratory.
Classifying the arguments in relation to these three categories helps us acquire a better understanding of 
the parties, their rhetoric, and how their ideologies or religious affiliations shape their arguments and 
methods of argumentation. It is true that other classifications exist, such as the Five Canons of Rhetoric 
by Cierco and Quintilian2. However, Aristotle’s division is helpful to the analysis of the rhetoric of 
Palestinian parties and political rhetoric in general, as it focuses on persuasion and the art of effective 
argumentation, which is what politics is about.  
Data that will be used in this thesis consists of: 
• Video recordings collected from websites affiliated to politicians or their political parties; the website
of the Knesset; the Israeli Broadcasting Authority; and other video sharing services like YouTube.
• Audio: from radio interviews taken from Hebrew radio stations or from the (only) Arabic radio station
“Al-Shams”.
• Print articles and newspaper interviews will also be used, taken from party periodicals or other
independent media publications.
2  Richard Nordquist. "What Are the Five Canons of Rhetoric?". <http://grammar.about.com/od/qaaboutrhetoric/f/What-Are-
The-Five-Canons-Of-Rhetoric.htm>. Accessed: 14.5.2012. 
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2 Historical Background 
Palestine is surrounded by Arab countries: Lebanon and Syria to the north, Jordan to the east, Egypt to 
the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. The location of Palestine is unique in that not only is it 
the birthplace of Judaism and Christianity and where Prophet Muhammad ascended to meet his Creator, 
but it also connects Africa, Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula, and has throughout history been a key venue 
for commerce, religions and politics. 
This is why Palestine was –and still is- the center of conflict between empires, nations, and religions. It 
was conquered numerous times by different peoples including the Canaanites, Ancient Israelites, 
Babylonians, Assyrians, Greeks, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Muslim Arabs, Crusaders, Ayyubids, 
Ottomans, the British and recently Zionist Israelis. 
Brief history of Palestine 
The following summary of the modern history of Palestine is based on an extensive encyclopedic entry 
entitled “Modern Palestine” in Microsoft Student 20083. 
Muslim armies from Arabia conquered Palestine in the first half of the seventh century. By the end of the 
seventh century, most people in Palestine had embraced Islam and a strong process of Arabization, 
linguistically and culturally, was underway. In 1099, Crusaders from Western Europe captured Jerusalem 
and established a Christian kingdom there, but a century later it was recaptured by the Muslim leader 
Saladin, whose rule of Palestine was succeeded by the Muslim Mamluks. In 1517, the Ottomans 
conquered Palestine as well as the whole Levantine area; Palestine remained within the Ottoman Empire 
until the end of World War I, during which the Ottomans allied with Germany and Austria, and were 
eventually defeated. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, allowing Britain to control Palestine under a 
“mandate”, a provision of the newly-formed League of Nations. As previously promised in the Balfour 
Declaration in which Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, promised Jews a national home in 
Palestine, on May 15, 1948 the last British troops sailed out of Haifa, one day after Zionist leaders 
proclaimed the establishment of an Israeli state in Palestine. This resulted in wide-scale attacks by the 
heavily-armed Zionist Haganah and Stern militias against Palestinians who, having nothing but a few old 
3 “Palestine”. Microsoft Encarta Student, [DVD], 2007. 
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rifles could not fight back. At the peak of the Palestinian Cataclysm (‘Nakba’), the massacres, such as the 
slaughter of 256 unarmed civilians in Deir Yassin in April 1948, as well as the systematic cleansing and 
demolition of villages and towns, left tens of thousands dead and a whole nation of civilians terrorized. 
Forcible expulsion caused 700,000 Palestinians to flee to other parts of Palestine or to neighboring Arab 
countries. At the end of the war, Israel controlled more than three-quarters of the land area of Palestine, 
and only 160,000 Palestinian Arabs remained in the Israeli-held area. They were later called “Arab 
Israelis” by the Israeli government. They were given Israeli passports and plans were set up to Judaize 
them linguistically and culturally.  
Despite the Palestinians’ status as citizens, they were subject to martial law between 1948 and 1966. 
During this period, they were persecuted, huge areas of their lands annexed, and massacres were 
committed against them, such as the Kafr Qasim massacre: On October 29, 1956, forty-eight unarmed 
farmers - men, women, and children - returned to the village of Kafr Qasim, unaware of a curfew that had 
been imposed that afternoon. They were shot to death near the village4. After martial law ended, Arab 
Palestinians in Israel were able to communicate with other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Their 
living conditions improved and, despite still being subject to the security system that controlled the 
country, new opportunities were available to them and they could seek higher education, better jobs, and 
stronger political involvement. Arabs started to occupy important positions, such as the head of the local 
council, and even as members of parliament. Yet the Israeli state’s attitude towards Arab citizens was 
still largely influenced by the anti-Arab mentality, and Arabs were considered an enemy that must be 
treated as such, as stated in the now declassified Israel King Document of 1976.5 This attitude led to 
clashes between the state and its Arab citizens who defied discrimination and oppression. On March 30, 
1976, Israeli security forces killed six Arab citizens after protests against the demolition of Arab houses, 
and the expropriation of what remained of their land. Palestinians annually commemorate 30th of March 
as the Land Day.  
In 1982, a new High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel was founded, which is an extra-
parliamentary organization in which all Arab political parties are represented. The members of the 
Committee, which facilitates deliberations on matters of general concern to the Arab public, also include 
 
4 Abu Jabir, I. (2006). Palestinian Society in Israel. Centre for Contemporary Studies, p. 11. 
5 Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 13.  
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Arab Knesset members, mayors of Arab towns, and representatives of other bodies concerned with 
preserving the Arab identity, culture, heritage, as well as Arab lands and properties6.  
Although during the First Intifada in 1987, Palestinians in Israel showed great sympathy and support for 
Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories, the Second Intifada (“Intifadat al-Aqsa” - the uprising for the 
Aqsa Mosque) marked a turning point in the relationship between Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli state. 
On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, leader of the right-wing Likud Party, and his 1000-strong force 
provocatively marched on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the holiest Muslim site in Palestine and 
third holiest for all Muslims. This triggered protests across all Palestinian cities and towns, and all Arab 
towns inside Israel. Israeli security forces used live ammunition to repel the protests, which led to the 
deaths of over three thousand Palestinians, including thirteen citizens of Israel7. The Arab community in 
Israel felt stunned, not only because of the state’s suppressive treatment of the peaceful protests, but also 
because none of the policemen who were responsible for the killing were indicted, which the Arab public 
considered an endorsement of the use of lethal force against unarmed peaceful Arab protesters8. These 
developments led to a very high and unprecedented boycott rate in the 2001 Knesset elections, when 
approximately 82% of the total Arab voters abstained from participating in the elections9.  
Today, Palestinian citizens of Israel are much more aware of their past, their present and their future. 
Their relationship with the state is largely dominated and shaped by clashes of all types: political, 
cultural, religious, demographic, and linguistic.   
  
 
6 Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 13. 
7 Btselem: 
<http://old.btselem.org/statistics/english/Casualties.asp?sD=29&sM=09&sY=2000&eD=15&eM=1&eY=2005&filterby=even
t&oferet_stat=before> Accessed: 14.11.2012. 
8 Adalah. Summary of the Findings and Conclusions of Adalah’s  'The Accused' Report, 2006, 
<http://adalah.org/features/october2000/accused-s-en.pdf >. Accessed: 04.12.2012. 
9 Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 18. 
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3 Arab political parties in Israel 
 
Arab society in Israel is a mixture of people of different faiths, and of different origins. Therefore, any 
discussion of the key issues among the Arab public, and especially among the political and intellectual 
elite, must take into consideration the ideological (and sometimes religious) affiliations of each of the 
political movements. Before listing the Arab parties active in Israel today, it should be pointed out that 
researchers (like Ghanim & Mustafa 2009) divide the history of Arab political activism in Israel into 
three stages: before the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 (under the British Mandate); after the 
establishment of Israel in 1948 where Palestinians remained under martial law; and the period since 
martial law ended in 1966 until the present. This thesis is concerned with the period after martial law, 
because under it Arab political organization was illegal. The Land Movement, a nationalist movement 
that sought to form a political body to represent Arabs and their nationalist aspirations, was outlawed and 
its members were imprisoned. The only party that was active under martial law was the Communist 
Party, mainly because it was formed by Israeli Jews, some of whom had actually fought against Arabs in 
the 1948 war, such as Ephraim Sneh who was a member of the Haganah (a Zionist militia before 1948), 
and later the commander of an Elite Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) unit in 197810. 
In the current post-martial law era, it is easy to recognize four main Arab political movements active in 
Israel: (1) the Communist Arab-Jewish movement, (2) Islamic movement, (3) the nationalist movement, 
and (4) the Arab-Israeli movement. The history, ideology and current position in the balance of power of 
each movement will be discussed in detail in the following pages.  
It is also important to mention that the three main movements differ from each other not only in their 
ideology but also in their view on the relationship with the Israeli state. So Lotfi, for instance, explains 
that the Islamic Movement emphasizes the Arab community’s need for self-reliance in the form of a civil 
society that independently meets its cultural, social, religious, and linguistic needs as far as is possible, 
without relying on the state and its various organs. The Communist Party holds a completely different 
view, and it advocates merging with the Israeli community while seeking justice and equal rights for all 
citizens, Arabs and Jews. The National Democratic Assembly NDA calls for it to be “a state for all its 
 
10 See http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/sneh.html 
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citizens”, where Arabs enjoy equal and full citizenship rights while still having the right to preserve their 
cultural and social identity.  
The fourth movement refers to Arab politicians who are members of Zionist parties in Israel, who usually 
consider themselves more Israeli than Arab. These are mostly Druze Arabs (however, not the Syrian 
Druze from the Golan Heights) who serve in the Israeli Army. Their concerns differ to those of the 
general Arab Palestinian public in Israel. Additionally, due to the very small size of this group (thus the 
invalidity of the term “movement” here) and its insignificance in a discussion about Arab Palestinian 
rhetoric in Israel, it will be excluded in this research insofar as the issue is the rhetoric of the Arab public 
and their political parties, not Arabs in Zionist parties. 
Political representation is a tool to present citizens’ interests and demands in the public sphere. It is what 
gives people the ability to influence the policies that govern the country they live in, and the polity that 
rules it. Under normal circumstances, political parties give the people access to the political process and 
allow them to be a part of policymaking. If people are denied such access (as in the case under dictatorial 
regimes), a feeling of resentment will prevail, that may develop into disorder and insurgency. This is why 
political representation and mobilization are important for the proper functioning of democratic states. 
As Arab Palestinians in Israel are a national minority, they have sought to fulfil their aspirations in 
parliament through national minority parties. However, due to the historical context in which the Israeli 
state was created, namely, the wars it fought with Arab nations before and after it was established, Arabs 
in Israel are looked on as part of the “enemy”, and therefore the social, political, and cultural conditions 
in the country are influenced by this serious national cleavage.  
For this reason, in the case of the Arab minority in Israel, people are divided on whether or not they 
should have a representation in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. This topic will be discussed in detail 
in the following chapters. However, one of the reasons why many Arab Palestinians in Israel boycott the 
elections and the Knesset is that participating in the elections and the representation of some Arab parties 
in the Knesset gives the impression that the Israeli government gives Arabs political access and allows 
them to take part in the political process. However, these Arab MPs have for decades failed to achieve 
any significant influence, not only on foreign policy, but also, as research shows, even in internal affairs, 
including the conditions of Arabs as an ethnic minority facing many serious threats from the Zionist 
majority. The Political Observer by the Mada Research Centre, in its 11th edition (2011), summarizes 
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many new racist laws that target the Arab minority, and concludes that the Arab blocs in the Knesset 
have failed to abort even one of these laws11. 
In the following chapters, the rhetoric of the different Arab political movements will be analyzed. I will 
draw comparisons between them and their attitudes and views, their rhetoric, arguments, and the way 
they present these arguments. But before that, I shall first introduce these parties, review their history, 
and summarize their views and achievements.  
3.1 The Arab-Jewish Communist movement in Israel 
 
Communist ideology in Israel is represented by the Communist Party of Israel (CPI - abbreviated as 
“Maki” in Hebrew( and Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality-DFPE) which is CPI's 
parliamentary party12 and thus the two names would be used interchangeable throughout. CPI/DFPE is 
one of the three major political movements representing Arabs in Israel today. The Communists, as is 
evident from their principles which I shall present later on, consider Zionism the primary reason for 
inequality towards Arab citizens. They demand the recognition of Arabs as a national minority and seek 
to achieve change and fulfil the interests of the Arab public through partnership and joint action with 
Jewish activists or movements that support the Arab struggle. For this reason, Communists do not agree 
with Arabs being organized into Arab-only blocs for fear of that being seen as an anti-Jewish approach, 
which may harm the interests of Arabs. One very recent example is the famous Communist singer Amal 
Morkus, who openly rejected the call for Palestinians to build their own institutions in Israel as a means 
of cultural independence in a television debate with nationalists, stating: “but we already have institutions 
in Israel, do you want to create a state inside the state?”13 Leaders of this movement do not see a 
contradiction between being Palestinian in nationality, and Israeli in citizenship. Communists support 




11 Shhadi, M. (2011, December). Israel and the Palestinian Minority. Mada elcarrmel. Retrieved from<http://mada-
research.org/blog/2012/05/19/pmr-issue-16-2011/ 
12 DFPE when first established included other parties alongside CPI, but today DFPE is composed solely of CPI. 




History of the Communist Party of Israel (CPI) and Hadash 
 The Communist Party of Israel was founded in 1948, following the recognition of the new Israeli state 
by the Soviet Union immediately after its establishment was declared14. Later on, disagreements within 
the CPI emerged between the mainly Jewish faction, which was pro-Zionist, and the primarily Arab 
faction, which opposed Zionism and saw it as a nationalistic movement serving imperialist interests. 
Additionally, the pro-Zionist faction supported the Six Day War in 1967 that Israel initiated against 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, while the other faction considered it an unprovoked attack15. The result was a 
division in CPI/Maki, where the anti-Zionist division split and formed a new party called the “New 
Communist List” (NCL- abbreviated as “Rakach” in Hebrew), which included Arab Knesset members  
and Jewish anti-Zionist Knesset member Meir Valner. CPI became weaker especially after it did not win 
any seats in the seventh parliamentary elections in 196916, and its supporters shifted their support to the 
NCL especially after the latter formed Hadash in 1977. The NCL, on the other hand, managed to expand 
its supporters base and many Arab Palestinians joined the party, which adopted their national aspirations 
and raised the banner of equal rights and the anti-Zionist struggle.  
3.1.1 Hadash 
On March 15, 1977, the NCL parliamentary group was named “Hadash – Democratic Front for Peace and 
Equality” (DFPE), in preparation for the 1977 Knesset elections17. Other groups and individual activists, 
including some members of the Israeli Black Panthers, who all opposed martial law and the annexation of 
Arab lands and sought equal rights for all, joined the new Hadash umbrella party. Since then, the NCL has 
run for election under Hadash, and many consider the two as one body, as the NCL is actually the creator 
and backbone of Hadash. On its website, NCL (today renamed CPI, after the original CPI of 1948 ended) 
states:  
We offer a common way, on the basis of a minimalist platform, for all Israelis who would agree to 
walk with us part of the way. This was our intention in establishing, in 1977, the Democratic 
Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE - "Hadash"/"Aljabha"), which we view as a true Jewish-
 
14 Israeli Knesset website.(n.d). Israel Communist Party (Maki). Retrieved from 
<http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=72.  >.   
15 Ibid. 
16 Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 91. 
17 DFPE's page in Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadash>. Accessed: 05.12.2013 
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Arabic political partnership. We put our efforts for it to be strengthened, developed and 
expanded18. 
NCL, especially under Hadash, gained remarkable support in the elections in the following years, in the 
eighth, ninth, and tenth Knesset elections in 1973, 1977, and 1981 respectively, when it won the majority 
of Arab votes. In the eleventh elections, more than half of the total Arab votes went to the Hadash 
Party19. The success of the New Communist List in the public sphere was a result of it being represented 
in the Knesset on the one hand, and being in the opposition, where it was able to counter Israeli domestic 
and foreign policies, and demand justice and equality for Palestinians. It also called for Palestinian 
refugees to be granted the right of return, a halt to the annexation of Palestinian lands, making peace with 
neighboring Arab countries, and the implementation of the second part of the UN 1947 Partition plan, 
which stipulated the establishment of an independent Palestinian state20. Hadash attracted Arab 
academics in Arab villages and cities and managed to win people’s support in local elections. It achieved 
remarkable success in the city of Nazareth where the city council has been controlled by representatives 
of the party since 1975. This was one of the reasons that gave rise to Hadash, as leaders of the Party 
interpreted success in local elections as a potential success at the regional level too, including the Knesset 
elections. Another reason that motivated the establishment of Hadash, according to Benyamin Neuberger, 
was the Party’s need to expand its supporters base among Arabs. This could be accomplished not through 
the activism of the NCL which was more popular among Jews, but through a new body with an Arab 
nationalist approach similar to that of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, who was very popular and won the 
sympathy of Palestinians and all Arab nations during the 1970s21. In 1989, NCL (Rakach) changed its 
name back to the name of the original Communist Party it split from (CPI – Maki), after that party ceased 
to exist22. This meant that the old NCL, the new CPI, is henceforth the only Communist party in Israel, 
and has remained a part of Hadash. 
However, parties and movements that were a part of the Democratic Front alongside the CPI left Hadash 
under the claim that “the Party [CPI] imposes its agendas and plans on the Front” 23. Other reasons were 
 
18 CPI official website: http://maki.org.il/en/documents/11096-the-founding-principles-of-the-communist-party-of-israel 
19 Ghanim, A. &  Mohannad, M. (2009). Palestinians in Israel: Indigenous Group Politics in the Jewish State . Ramallah: 
Madar. (in Arabic) 
20 Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 88.  
21 Neuberger 1998, in Abu Jabir, 2006, p. 89.  
22 Israeli Knesset website. Israel Communist Party (Maki). Retrieved from  
http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=72> 
23 Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 93.  
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the claim that the CPI was pushing towards entering coalitions with other rival Arab parties, which was 
interpreted by Jewish components of the Front, such as the Black Panthers, as a nationalist-based 
coalition. According to Abu Jabir, these developments raised questions and debates among the 
Communists about the Jewish-Arab partnership that was once considered the core of the Democratic 
Front Party for Peace and Equality and about its advantages; especially that following the departure of 
the Black Panthers and Shasi movements, the CPI was left as the sole constituent of the Front. This 
practice of singling-out other parties led to the resignation of many of the Front’s members and leaders 
alike who objected to this practice, and those who did not resign were dismissed by both the CPI and the 
Front. The result was an increasingly weak Front and Party, which was reflected in the 1992 Knesset 
elections when its share of the parliament seats dropped to 3 seats compared to 4 in the 1988 elections. 
This forced the CPI to unite with other parties in the following elections to stay in the Knesset, like Balad 
(the National Democratic Assembly – NDA) and the Arabic Movement for Change. Clearly, the 
emergence of these Arab political parties who competed with the Front for Arab votes meant a further 
decrease in the latter’s power and popularity. 
 The rank of the Front in the partisan balance of power has been relatively stable over the past decade. In 
the most recent Knesset elections held on January 22, 2013, the Front won 113,610 votes which is 
approximately 25% of the total Arab vote (448,920 votes)24, noting that some communist and left-wing 
Jews vote for the Front too, as opposed to the two other Arab parties whose votes come exclusively from 
Arab voters.  
In conclusion, it can be said that Hadash and the Communist Party of Israel are strongly interconnected, 
with many “shared” leaders.  
Before delving into the rhetoric used by Hadash, I shall first present the party’s principles. The following 
excerpts are from Hadash’s official English page25: 
The basic principles of Hadash as a broad leftist movement included the unique demand for the 
evacuation of all the territories which were occupied in June 1967 and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state alongside Israel – a claim that other movements began supporting only in later 
years. The principles stressed subjects such as workers' rights, social justice, opposition to 
 
24 Ghanadri,S. (2013, February 12). Summary of the Arab Parties’ Achievements in the 19th Elections. Panet news website.  
Retrieved from <http://www.panet.co.il/online/articles/63/68/S-643967,63,68.html> 
25 DFPE's website: <http://hadash.org.il/english/>. Accessed on: 5.5.2013. 
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privatization, democratic liberties and human rights, equality for the Arab minority, ethnic 
groups, women, and the protection of the environment and the disarmament of mass destruction 
weapons. In the present elections there is still no other party which presents all these demands in 
its platform.  
 It was (and still is) a socialist movement in a capitalist state; a movement which fights against 
every manifestation of racism and discrimination; a movement which supports women's rights in 
a patriarchal male chauvinist society; a peace movement which objects to the occupation and 
fights for a just peace which will prevent wars; a movement of environmental justice in an area 
which is being polluted by real estate moguls who gradually take control over it; the only 
movement which demands the demilitarization  of Israel and the whole Middle East and the 
abolition of nuclear and chemical weapons. 
From the above lines, it can be inferred that Hadash’s focus is mainly on social justice, human and 
workers’ rights, equality for Arabs in Israel and Arab women in Arab communities. Hadash seems to be 
concerned about the environment as well, unlike Communist parties in the Arab world. However, other 
than environmental activism, and despite the differences in the political objectives that vary according to 
the political situation in each country, Hadash’s charter and objectives are similar to those of all 
Communist movements in the Arab world. The charter of the Iraqi Communist Party, for instance, states:  
The Iraqi Communist Party has stood, and will always stand, against all forms of tyrannical 
ruling, political authoritarianism, ethnic, religious, or sectarian discrimination, discrimination 
against women, and depravation of individuals or public rights26. 
The discussions in section 3 will review the actual political practice and rhetoric that CPI and Hadash 
apply in light of these views and principles. 
  
 
26 Iraqi Communist Party’s website: <http://www.iraqicp.com/2010-12-30-11-06-41/19795-2012-06-11-18-10-09.html> 
Accessed on: 5.5.2013. 
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3.2 The Islamic Movement 
 
Historical Background: Roots of the Islamic Movement in Historic Palestine: 
In practice, the term "Islamic Movement" or "Islamic Awakening" is associated with the birth of Islam 
and emergence of the Islamic Dawa (Call). It is a movement that maintains Islam as a religion and wants 
to establish this religion in people's hearts.  
Palestine experienced a religious revival in response to Jewish migration. In the pages of  Al-Manar, 
Rashid Reda, the student of Mohamed Abdu warned his people against the imminent Zionist threat to 
Palestine, which seeks to occupy it27. The Public Islamic Conference was held in Jerusalem in 1931 and 
approved the construction of the Al-Aqsa Islamic University and the establishment of a large economic 
company to save Palestine28. We can say that the conflict that emerged early over the land of Palestine 
between the Zionist plan and the Palestinian people was led by proponents of the Islamic awakening. 
Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who led the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), and played a significant role in 
rallying the crowds, may have been obsessed with the complete defense of the Palestinian territories. 
Mosques played a major role in confrontations and were a starting point for many of the anti-Zionists' 
activities. 29 
The middle class and elite were severely hampered as a result of the 1948 Nakba (“Catastrophe” in 
Arabic), leading to the destruction of the civil sphere for the Palestinian community and a cultural and 
intellectual decline as well as the destruction of the economic structure of the Palestinian people30.  
As a result of this new situation, endowments, sacred sites, mosques and Sufi lodges were destroyed and 
scholars, teachers, Quran tutors, Sharia judges and all those who played an important role in people's 
lives migrated or were killed31. Things became even worse when the Arab minority came under military 
rule between 1961 and 1965. During military rule, the Arab minority, and Muslims in particular, were 
detached from the global Islamic body. No Islamic institution or group was established during this 
 
27 Sakhnini, Palestine State, page 80. 
28 Tayseer Jabara, Jame'at al-Najah (University of Success) magazine, 1 (31), 2000, p.147.  
29 Al-Shanqiti. K. (1940, January 27). Role of the Palestinian Civil Resistance. Al-Karmil newspaper. P. 35. 
30 Maher, A.S. (1988).  Socioeconomic History of Palestine. Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1st edition, pp. 115-116. 




period, except for the Sufi movements that continued to exist in Arab villages and cities such as Nazareth 
and mixed cities such as Acre. Followers maintained mosques and continued prayers.  
Post-1967 Islamic Movement: 
After the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 196732, communication and exploration of the 
other side of Palestinian society took place for the first time since 1948, and Palestinians who remained 
in Israel could now communicate with other Palestinian people. Islamic books appeared in Arab markets 
in 1969 and the 1970s, which constituted the beginnings of an Islamic revival in Arab towns. Signs of a 
return to the Islamic religion started to emerge among some workers who mingled at work in Israeli cities 
with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, some educated young people would 
attend prayers, especially the Friday prayer, and would listen to lessons and sermons in Palestinian cities 
near Arab villages such as Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jenin, and seek to learn their religion. People became 
familiar with some of the Islamic personalities who would visit Arab villages and towns to preach and 
communicate with the people33. In this period, the name of Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish emerged as 
a preacher and speaker around whom many enthusiastic young men gathered who sought to serve Islam 
through their understanding of Islam at the time as a religion and way of life34. In the 1970s, the Islamic 
Movement emerged under the name Usrat al-Jihad ("The Family of Jihad"). This was considered the 
first stage of the Islamic Movement’s existence. This stage ended with the arrests of all Family of Jihad 
members led by Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish. It is a stage better described as one of political 
immaturity, characterized by spontaneous action, a divergence in judgment and denial of other methods. 
After this period and once they were released from prison, the Islamic Movement emerged as the 
“Muslim Youth”. This stage was characterized by social activism and care for the concerns of society, 
hence the emergence of Zakat (a form of charity paid for specific properties and livestock) committees, 
charity foundations and voluntary Islamic camps as well as theatre, Islamic song troupes and Islamic art 
festivals. It became clear that the Islamic Movement in its new form was penetrating the inner parts of 
Palestinian society throughout the entire country. The Movement had campaigns and tours in Negev, in 
southern Palestine, Lower Galilee and Galilee, and during this period, it built hundreds of mosques in 
different towns35. This mosque renaissance largely helped the growth and spread of the Islamic message 
 
32 The military rule was lifted off the Arab villages in 1966 and the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied in 1967 where a 
military rule took over. 
33 "The Islamic women work in Umm al-Fahim city", Um-Al-Fahim, Center for Contemporary Studies, (No date), p. 4. 
34 The Islamic Movement inside the Green Line, International Affairs, Um-Al-Fahim, Center for Contemporary Studies, 1995. 




and formed the spearhead of the Da’wah (Islamic preaching) that helped to establish Islamic thought in 
people's hearts and minds. During this period, a national leadership was formed that led the Islamic work 
march in the country and played the role of the main guide of this work. In some towns, work 
transformed into a systematic work while it just starting to take shape in other regions. This stage lasted 
until the arrests at the beginning of the 1990s when disputes started occurring within the Islamic 
Movement with regard its participation in the parliamentary elections. The Oslo Agreement was one of 
the issues that accelerated the dispute in addition to the role played by the Israeli media and research 
centers in emphasizing this dispute and portraying there to be two wings to the Islamic Movement, a 
conservative wing and a moderate one36. This in turn escalated the crisis within the Islamic Movement 
which started to surface in the early 1990s. These disputes tackled dimensions that were more profound 
than the Knesset issue, which is considered the straw that broke the camel's back. Therefore, we can 
describe the evolution of the Islamic Movement within the Green Line since 1967 until the schism as 
having two phases: the first phase is the emergence and advancement that started in 1969 and took shape 
between 1972 and1973,  becoming institutionalized in the mid-1970s. This movement was characterized 
at the time by spontaneous activity and practical immaturity and ended, as mentioned, with the arrest of 
Family of Jihad members in the early 1980s. The second phase followed the arrests in 1981 and 
continued until the early 1990s. This phase can be divided into two sections so that the first stage formed 
what was known as the “Muslim Youth”, marked by the presence of some Islamic leaders in prisons and 
detention center, and the end of the Family of Jihad stage when many of this organization's affiliates 
abandoned the logic of force and jihad and continued civil society work through the establishment of 
associations, foundations and committees and focused on the religious affairs of Muslims in the country. 
It can be said that this stage, labelled by some as the Muslim Youth period, between 1981-1985, followed 
by the released from prison of some leaders when the early organization of the Islamic Movement started 
to crystallize, succeeded in forcing its presence quickly onto the local scene. This led to its success 
making Muslims regain confidence in their religion and recover trust and support for Islam. It also raised 
the level of the sense and awareness of being Muslim and a part of the Muslim community worldwide37. 
Evidence of the success of the Islamic Movement’s boost to Islam among Muslims since its emergence is 
provided in the Journal of the New East (in Hebrew: “המזרח החדש”) in its 1965 edition, which stated that 
it conducted a survey among Muslims to examine religious practice (the relationship between Muslims 
 
36 Rekhes, E. (2003) . Islamic Fundamentalism beyond the Green Line: relationship between the Islamic movements in Israel 
and the Islamic movements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, translation, Political 
Perspective Center for Studies and Investments,. 
37 Shafie, B. M. (1993).  Towards Mature Islamic Movement,. Edition 1/1993, Wahbi Bookstore. pp 30-32, 
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and their religion, page 85). In a survey it conducted in 1963, it found that about 5-15% of Muslim Arab 
youth at the time observed Friday prayers, whereas other surveys conducted years later showed that 
Muslim observation of the Friday prayer was closer to 42-62%. This of course is mainly attributed to the 
positive role of the Islamic Movement. 
 The third phase stretches from the mid-1980s until the schism in 1996. This stage was characterized by 
the expanding scale of institutional work, the spread of Islamic organizations, entry into local politics and 
the start of divergent statements made by Islamic Movement leaders about local political issues, and 
especially in relation to parliamentary participation. This led to the division of the Islamic Movement. 
The beginning of the fourth stage of the Islamic Movement’s evolution was March 29, 1996, with a split 
between the first group which continued to call itself the Islamic Movement and affirmed this name in its 
statements and notices; the second group which called itself the Shura Council which aimed at achieving 
constitutional status and legality (Shura means consultation, and the Shura Council is tantamount to the 
Islamic Movement’s parliament). This division was ultimately and fundamentally escalated by Hammad 
Abu D’aabes’ charter describing the other branch of the Islamic Movement led by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah 
and Sheikh Kamal Khatib as the "corrective turnabout (االنقالبية التصحيحية)" movement38. In return, Sheikh 
Kamal Khatib wrote a series of articles titled "Rectification of Methodology" in June and July 1996 
meaning that the division in the Islamic Movement was finalized in mid-1996, giving way to two 
movements. The first, we mentioned, held to the title of the Shura Council and the second was under the 
name of the Islamic Movement. 
That year witnessed the beginning of the Israeli crackdown on the Islamic Movement led by Sheikh 
Ra'ed Salah with its Islamic Relief and Orphan and Prisoner associations shut down on April 11, 199639, 
i.e. nearly one month before the parliamentary elections. The Supreme Court ruled to keep the relief 
association closed40. This shutting down was preceded by a heavy investigation of the director of the 
relief committee, Dr. Sulaiman Ahmad, former president of Umm al-Fahm municipality41. The Israeli 
police recommended putting the relief work leaders on trial.42 
 
38 Abu- Daabes, H. (n.d), Our case between boldness of the incitation invokers and politeness of right owners. Almethak 
newspaper, P.3 No date , 
39[Editor], Kul al-Arab newspaper, 13/4/1996. 
40 [Editor], Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom), 16/8/1996. 
41 Ibid, 23/8/1996. 
42 [Editor], Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, 13/8/1996. 
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Since its emergence, the Islamic current represented by the Islamic Movement proposed crystallized 
stances towards matters relating to Palestinians in Israel. The Islamic movement is similar to the other 
movements in several aspects but also retains its own unique features. The main features that distinguish 
it are: 
1) Religious Arab-Muslim Based Organization: Advocates of the movement support a national 
Arab organization and favor organization based on Islamic principles. They are divided among 
themselves with regard to participation in Knesset elections.  
2) Islamic Identity as a Central Goal: In tackling the subject of Palestinian identity in Israel, the 
Islamic movement stresses the Islamic component of this identity and believes that enhancing and 
focusing on this identity as a central goal should be naturally sought after without ignoring the 
components of Palestinian identity in Israel in light of them also being Palestinian Arabs and 
nationals of Israel.  
3) Hard line: This movement that matured in the mid-1980semerged in light of the new reality of 
Palestinians in Israel, which allowed its spokespeople to put forth their requests to the Jewish 
authorities and majority in an inflexible tone that was uncompromising in many cases on issues 
relating to Palestinians in Israel, both domestic and foreign issues. Moreover, they did not hesitate 
to demand that Palestinians do not compromise in working for their future and they sought to put 
that into action.  
In the following pages we will survey the evolution of both branches of the Islamic Movement. For easier 
reference, the term "parliamentary branch" will be used to refer to the Southern Islamic Movement (SIM) 
that participates in the Israeli parliament; while the term "extra-parliamentary branch" will be used to 
refer to the Northern Islamic Movement (NIM) that does not participate in the Israeli parliament, and 
boycotts its elections. 
3.2.1 Northern (extra-parliamentary) Branch of the Islamic Movement 
In the period that followed the split of the Islamic Movement in 1996, several features that distinguished 
the extra-parliamentary Islamic Movement can be identified that made it expand continuously in size, 
beginning with the rejection of many of its followers of participation in the 1996 elections43. Perhaps the 
 
43 [Editor], Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom), Interview with Sheikh Kamal Khateeb, 1/4/1996. 
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“Al-Aqsa in Danger” )مهرجان األقصى( mass rally in 1996 and the rectification of methodology initiative in 
the preaching and institutionalized work helped primarily on reinforcing the Islamic Movement among 
the Muslim public in the country and constituted a fertile land for progress. 
The main dimensions of this work were: 
1- Restructuring how preaching was carried out the various towns, especially after the Consolidated List 
which included the Movement gained four seats (despite that opinion polls gave the Islamic Movement 
alone 4-5 seats44, confirming that a large section of the Movement’s members respected the decision not 
to participate). This pushed the Islamic Movement to set up practical plans to enhance and promote the 
Islamic preaching work in the towns and enhance the organizational work. 
 Later, the Shura Council established a group of institutions such as the Regional Relief Association, the 
Islamic Endowment Development Association, Regional Student Committee and the al-Mithaq (the 
Charter) newspaper. After that, they called themselves “the Islamic Movement inside the Green Line” 
(pre-1948)45. 
2- Building a relationship with the various sectors of the society and political parties through its 
representative agencies and charity associations. This communication has resulted in an understanding of 
the people's concerns which has led the Islamic Movement to put its words into actions and making its 
propositions a reality, such as: 1. The Da'wah and Tableegh Department (reminding people of the 
importance of practicing religion and applying it in daily life); 2. The People's Action and Gain 
Department (in the Islamic camps and Islamic endowment camps and voluntary work); 3. The Social and 
Behavioral Action Department (family reform committees, Zakat committees to aid needy families, 
medical clinics and media branches such as Ishraqa women’s magazine); 4. Economic Action 
Department (projects encouraging economic independence and business development projects based on 
the notion of a self-reliant society that was introduced by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and implemented by the 
Movement); 5. The Institutional Action Department; 6. Political Action Department(46) (local political 
work in the local authorities and regional departments such as the High Follow-up Committee 
representing all the Arab parties, and other political movements that share the social, educational and 
cultural aspirations of the movement, reinforcing national Palestinian identity and Arab-Islamic identity). 
 
44 [Editor], Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom), 26/1/1996. 
45 See "About Us at" at <http://www.almithaq.com>. Accessed: 02.4.2012. 
46 Reality of Literature of the Islamic Movement (unpublished), Center for Contemporary Studies, 2000. 
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Since its second launch, the Islamic Movement considered the need to penetrate social groups and 
regarded the abovementioned departments as mechanisms that could connect it to the public and as the 
best tool to present Islam.  
It appears that this success of the Islamic Movement was met with suspicion by the Israeli authorities and 
the media alike. Consequently, it was not long until the vilification of the Islamic Movement began in the 
mass media and by political and security figures like Alec Ron, Gideon Ezra, Yisrael Katz and many 
others from the left and right wings alike. Some ministers invoked considerable incitement against the 
Islamic Movement and its president Sheikh Ra'ed Salah. The official and media incitement machine 
against the Islamic Movement did not stop, and its leadership headed by Sheikh Salah became convinced 
that it would only be a matter of time before the Movement's leaders were arrested and its organizations 
shut down47. 
The government’s crackdown on the Islamic Movement and the incitement against it, which began rising 
steadily in 1996, aimed to pressurize it to make compromises and ease its tone on fundamental issues. 
For the Movement, it meant that each step taken against it was not a step backward but rather political 
and methodological lessons for what was to come48. 
This provocation campaign was a preamble to the arrest of the Islamic Movement's leaders. It aimed to 
make the Arab masses feel vulnerable and targeted, hence, they had to leave or avoid the Islamic 
Movement49. That is why Israel waited for the right moment to arrest Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and the 
Movement's members. It used international, regional and local circumstances to make the arrest with the 
aim of concealing his political role and his movement's firm stances concerning the Al-Aqsa Mosque and 
its continuous stress that the Al-Aqsa is in danger. Even the Hebrew press and the Shabak (the Israeli 
internal intelligence service) stressed that50. It led the Movement to carry out projects to revive the 
Islamic waqf (endowment), the social charter project and the self-reliant society project, demonstrating 
an interest in and addressing the day-to-day life and concerns of the Arab minority. Clearly, the Islamic 
Movement did not stop its march because of the arrest of its leaders and did not change its media rhetoric 
 
47 Interview with Sheikh Ra'ed Salah on IslamOnline on 19/1/2003. 
48 Prospective Future of the Islamic Movement Between Government Planning and Internal Perceptiveness, Center for 
Contemporary Studies, 2000, p. 4. 
49 Methodology of Confronting the Islamic Movement reaching unlawfulness, page 4. Center for Contemporary Studies. 
50 See Haaretz newspaper, Thursday 1.1.2004. 
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or religious discourse. On the contrary, it is clear that its standing among the public improved because of 
the communication of its leaders with the Arab community leaders in general51. 
Conclusion 
The Islamic Movement has undergone several stages in its formation as with any other political 
movement. With each stage, it has gained more experience and has used this experience to the benefit of 
its core beliefs, as well as benefiting from the experiences of others. The Islamic Movement has worked 
and progressed keeping its religious/lawful vision in sight. By setting with this as its basis, the Islamic 
Movement expanded the scale of its preaching as well as its educational, media, political and social work 
to be consistent with the preaching. It is clear that the Islamic Movement understands and interacts with 
the people on the street. The statements of the Islamic Movement following the Iraq War may be are 
clear-cut evidence on the Movement's concern for the public and its interaction with them52. This is also 
evident from the systematic communication with the wider masses and the Movement's endeavor to put 
the self-reliant society project into action, the special attention given to the Al-Aqsa Mosque by the 
Islamic Movement and its care for endowments and holy places and its focus on their spiritual, religious, 
and national dimensions. This is in addition to the Movement's keenness to create a new Arab character 
in the country that combines timeless social and religious values and social solidarity. Moreover, the 
political stances of the Islamic Movement were clear on issues concerning the Arab public and it took a 
firm stance refusing to relinquish the right of return, striking or dividing the Al-Aqsa Mosque or breaking 
the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 into small pieces and transforming it into cantons. It also 
refused to be involved in the Israeli Knesset and turned down parliamentary participation as it is clear 
that the Movement understands the people's concerns and is certain that parliament is not the mechanism 
to solve their problems53. The Islamic Movement also made progress on social, political and housing 
issues. The movement’s leadership considers this success the reason for the systematic incitation against 
the Movement since 1995, the arrest of Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, president of the Islamic Movement, and his 
imprisonment together with other members between 2003 and 2005. This incitement against the 
Movement is explained by the sheikh himself in a series of articles that he wrote in Sawt al-Haq wal 
Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom) aimed at forcing the Movement to change its position. 
 
51 A poll conducted by the Center for Contemporary Studies on 31/8/2003 revealed that 85.9% consider what happened 
religious persecution whereas 49.3% indicated that arrest will significantly affect the momentum for struggle of the Arab 
masses. 
52 See graph no. (1) under the title "This is Notification to the People" 27/9/2002 and see graph no. (2) 21/1/2003. 
53 Interview of IslamOnline with Sheikh Ra'ed Salah about the Knesset and its role on 19/1/2003. 
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However, the leaders of the Movement who were arrested stressed that it is a movement of associations 
and committees and its organization abides by the laws of the state. It is not a movement spearheaded by 
an individual that ceases to exist if he is persecuted or imprisoned.  
3.2.2 Southern (parliamentary) Branch of the Islamic Movement54 
Since 1996, the Movement of Sheikh Darwish participated in parliamentary elections in 1999, 2003, and 
2006 in a coalition called the United Arab List (UAL) together with the Arab Democratic Party and three 
other smaller Arab parties. Of the total 120 parliamentary seats, the UAL gained 5 seats, 2 seats, and 4 
seats in those election years respectively.55 The leaders of the Movement of Sheikh  Darwish who 
support participation in the Knesset and who emphasize the necessity of integration into the Israeli state 
and society, also stress the paradox of their situation as an indigenous minority. They demonstrate 
concern that, despite holding citizenship, they do not “belong” to the nation of the state in which they 
hold citizenship and in whose parliament they serve as elected representatives. Both Sheikh  Kamel 
Rayan (interview), who today holds the position of Deputy Manager of the Union of Local Authorities in 
Israel, and Member of Knesset Sheikh  Ibrahim Sarsour (interview), admitted that they were disappointed 
with their inability to make any changes to the political system after having joined the Knesset. Both 
stated that now, with hindsight, they did not think that their presence in parliament had made much of a 
difference for their constituency. However, they both consider it important to keep their parliamentary 
positions and to continue to voice their opinions and protests. 
The pragmatic perspective of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish is evident in the reply of Sheikh  Ibrahim 
Sarsour (interview). When asked about the main goals of the Islamic Movement in Israel, he said: 
Let me answer this question in an ironic way. Once, a journalist asked me: “What do you, as an 
Islamist and a leader of the Islamic Movement, think about creating an Islamic state within the state 
of Israel?” Maybe he expected me to say “No,” directly. I said to him, “Yes, but on one condition. 
If I wake in the morning and switch on the radio and hear that 75% of the Jews embraced Islam. 
Only in those circumstances might I think of having an Islamic state inside of Israel.” So, it is a 
naïve idea to think about creating an Islamic state or looking forward to having an Islamic state 
 
54 During the writing of this chapter, numerous attempts were made to retrieve information about the evolution of the Southern 
Islamic Movement from leaders and members in it. However, our attempts were met with failure when everyone we contacted 
in the Southern Movement showed no interest in providing such information. Therefore, the information in this part (2.2.2) is 
based on a paper written by Dr. Tilda Rozmer: Forthcoming in Political Islam: Context versus Ideology, Edited by Khaled 
Hroub, Saqi Books. 
55 Knesset website: http://www.knesset.gov.il 
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inside Israel. Because we are aware of the limitations – we are aware of the realities on the ground. 
We are aware of the fact that we are a part of the Israeli Jewish state. The vast majority of the 
inhabitants of this state are Jews. The Israeli State was established to be the aspiration of the Jewish 
people in the entire world, especially those who immigrated to this part of the world – they created 
the state and they want to live in a Jewish state. We are aware of this fact, but regardless of this 
fact, we want to be a part of this state, but not a part of the identity of this state. 
Sheikh  Darwish, who heads the other branch of the Movement, is reported as speaking of 
coexistence in Israeli media, such as in response to riots in Acre in October 2008, which was sparked 
when a Palestinian citizen drove through a Jewish neighborhood on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. 
Following the riots, Sheikh Darwish himself participated in the Peace Sukkah56 which was set up in Acre 
as a venue for its Jewish and Arab residents to meet and seek understanding. Sheikh Darwish made the 
following address in Hebrew to the people present and to the press:57 
Bless all those who have come here to help and strengthen the coexistence in Acre, but those who have come 
from outside Acre – whether they be big or small, bearded or not – those who have only come to incite and 
come between the residents are an unwelcome presence in this city. We have learned from you, Acre, how to 
live together. 
 
However, from interviews with other leaders of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish, coexistence is 
expressed to be an aspiration, but they do not describe the present relations between Jews and Palestinian 
in Israel as constituting coexistence. 
When considering the different attitudes towards the Israeli state and its institutions, as expressed by 
leaders of the two branches of the Movement, the repressive treatment of the Movement of Sheikh Salah 
must be taken into consideration. Sheikh  Salah and his Movement has been closely monitored by the 
Israeli authorities and the Sheikh  was imprisoned in May 2003 charged with supporting “terrorism” due 
to fundraising for charities in the West Bank linked with Hamas.58 Sheikh  Salah was released in July 
 
56 A sukkha is a hut built as part of the Jewish holiday Sukkot to commemorate the wandering of Moses in the Sinai desert.  
57 Ynet, 15.10.2008, “Hundreds gather at Akko 'Peace Sukkah'”, by Hagai Einav. 
58 Dakwar, J., 2007, “The Islamic Movement Inside Israel, an Interview with Shaykh Ra’id Salah”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Winter), pp. 66-76, p. 67. 
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2005. Recently, in autumn 2008, the offices of the Movement in Um al-Fahm were closed and documents 
and computers confiscated by Israeli police due to suspicion of cooperation with Hamas.59 
In sum, whereas the religious goals of the two branches of the Islamic Movement are presented as 
being the same, (i.e. to protect the holy sites and to revive observance of Islam among Palestinian 
Muslims), their political responses to Israeli policies and to the predicament of Palestinian citizens as a 
minority group sometimes differ. In broad terms, the Movement of Sheikh Salah advocates autonomy, or 
a self-reliant society as described by Sheikh Khatib above, whereas the Movement of Sheikh  Darwish 
advocates participation in the state and the advancement of a multicultural society. These differences are 
evident in the strategies and approaches chosen by the two branches.  
Sheikh Sarsour (interview) of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish identified three main challenges 
facing Palestinians in Israel that all are directly connected with relations with the state and/or its Jewish 
citizens: 
1. Israelization/Zionization (i.e. the pacification of Palestinian citizens and their assimilation into 
Israeli society and culture through education and language, and by denying them their own 
religious and cultural institutions); 
2. The threat of population transfer; 
3. Violence against Palestinians by state agencies and by Jewish citizens. 
 
All interviewees raised these issues, but with different emphasis and attitudes concerning how to act 
towards the Israeli state and its Jewish citizens. Addressing the first challenge of Israelization and 
Zionization, Sheikh Sarsour (interview) relates the strategies employed by the Movement for developing 
a Palestinian Muslim identity, including strengthening the attachment of the Muslim population inside 
Israel to their cultural roots and national history. He emphasized that, as Palestinian citizens of Israel, 
they do not wish to be the target of the Israelization and Zionization policies that their population has 
been exposed to since 1948. Rather, they want to be active citizens whose citizenship is acknowledged 
for its civic value. They have no interest in becoming part of the Israeli Jewish Zionist identity. 
 




Apart from that, the achievements of the Southern Islamic Movement that is currently lead by Sheikh 
Hammad Abu Daabes, will be discussed in chapter 4.1  
 
3.3 The Nationalist Movement 
 
The Arab nationalist movement in Israel today is mainly represented by the Nationalist Democratic 
Assembly (NDA). Before the NDA, the banner of Arab nationalism was raised by the Abnaa' al-Balad 
("children of the homeland") movement, but due to internal divisions and the emergence of new political 
powers, Abnaa' al-Balad slowly shrank and many of its members joined other parties, particularly the 
new NDA. Given the internal split that divided the movement into two branches, one led by Raja 
Igbariah and the other led by Muhammad Kana'nah, the fact that many of its senior members joined other 
parties, and that it is an extra-parliamentary movement that boycotts the Knesset elections for ideological 
reasons, Abnaa al-Balad is currently a small movement that has little influence in the political sphere. 
Thus, our analysis of the nationalist movement will focus on the new, energetic Nationalist Democratic 
Assembly whose power has been steadily growing since its establishment in 1996. 
3.3.1 The Nationalist Democratic Assembly - NDA 
The Nationalist Democratic Assembly (NDA) was formed in 1996 bringing together many political and 
intellectual movements that had been active in the past in Palestinian cities and towns such as the Abnaa 
al-Balad (People of the Homeland) movement. The NDA was founded by Azmi Bishara along with 
former members of the Progressive Movement and a number of local organizations such as the 
Progressive Socialist Party, which was established in Al-Maghar village in Galilee, the al-Ansar 
movement in Umm al-Fahm, the Al-Nahda movement in Al-Tiba and the Abnaa Al-Tira movement, as 
well as activists in the Palestinian community.  
The development of the NDA cannot be separated in any way from the political experiences of Arab 
parties inside the 48 territories, beginning with Land Day, then Abnaa al-Balad, the Communist Front, 
the Progressive Movement, followed by the emergence of the NDA. Although there were forerunners in 
the movement, the NDA emerged in a different political context, that of the 1990s, which marked the 
beginning of the political settlement process and attempts at the Israelization of the Palestinian 
community, accompanied by or as a result of the settlement process itself. This context explains many of 
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the components of the NDA at the organizational and ideological levels. As an organization, the coming 
together was clear when the Abnaa el-Balad movement joined forces with Balad (either as part of the 
organizational structure of NDA or as an ally), and when figures from Abnaa el-Balad and the Arab 
Students Front joined the NDA in leadership positions. On the ideological axis, the coming together is 
seen through the attempt to merge or reconcile (successfully or otherwise) citizenship and national 
identity; collective rights and the state with all its citizens; and the internal organization of the 
community and participation in the Knesset. 
The bylaws of the party, which were approved at the fourth conference in 2004 stated that, "The 
Nationalist Democratic Assembly was established with the aim of reshaping the nationalist movement 
inside Israel into one party that seeks to preserve the national identity of Arab citizens in Israel ..."60 
The NDA emphasizes the struggle to transform the state of Israel into a democracy for all its citizens and 
advocates that Palestinians must have cultural autonomy (the right of the minority to manage its own 
affairs, such as education). It also seeks to combine nationality and democracy by combining national 
identity and equal citizenship. These features are significant in the National Democratic Declaration 
presented at the third party conference in 1999 where it states, "... The Nationalist Democratic Assembly 
proposed the scheme of a state for all its citizens with cultural autonomy, rebutting the claims that Arabs 
in Israel have only two options: integration or separation. The Assembly has shown that Arab citizens 
have more than these two options.”61 
The NDA tried to combine citizenship and national identity, one of the major concepts upon which it 
established its organization and ideology. The NDA was the organizational expression of this concept, 
born as a result of prior political and organizational experiences. Before the NDA, the Progressive 
Movement tried to find means of expressing this but failed to.  
The NDA and Bishara tried to find a harmony between day-to-day and civil issues that fall under 
citizenship and stressed upon by the Communist Front and CPI, and the nationalist and national sense of 
belonging as stressed by Abnaa el-Balad and the Land Movement. Azmi Bishara recognized the problem 
that the nationalist movement faces in the 48 territories (Israel). He says, "The matter we are discussing 
deals in fact with the possibility of building a Palestinian national movement while holding Israeli 
citizenship. It is not easy to answer this question at all as the Arab community is not separate from the 
 
60 Ghanim and Mustafa,  Ibid, p. 176. 
61 Ghanim and Mustafa, Ibid,  p. 180.   
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structure of Israeli society and there is no autonomous Arab economy inside the 1948 borders. 
Additionally, there is no political action outside the framework of citizenship."62 
The NDA presented a structural model for a political organization that has played an important role in 
developing a political rhetoric and creating an ideological influence within society, without this reflecting 
on its political dominance. This is unlike the Communist Front (DFPE) which is still dominant politically 
through its participation and representation in the elections for the local authorities, the Knesset, 
Histadrut (General Federation of Laborers) and some trade unions and Arab students committees, 
although its ideological influence has declined over the past decade.  
The NDA ran for elections for the first time jointly with the DFPE in 1996 and won fourth place. In the 
1999 elections, the NDA ran on a joint platform with the Arab Movement for Change headed by Ahmad 
Tibi. They won two seats. In 2003, the party ran for the parliamentary elections by itself and won three 
seats (Azmi Bishara, Jamal Zahalka and Wasil Taha). In the last elections held in 2006, Balad won three 
seats in Parliament. 
Balad started as an elite party that drew in many Arab intellectuals and academics. It formed an alliance 
with the Communist DFPE in 1996 under one list, which was an unavoidable electoral choice for the two 
parties in light of the high voting rates expected in the 1992 elections (about 50% of Arabs voted for 
Zionist parties). At the time, the Arab parties did not realize the political implications moving to direct 
elections in the elections of the prime minister.  
The NDA turned into an ideological political movement after these elections but Ghanim and Mustafa 
argue that it started to lose its elite academic and intellectual figures’ support and at the same time 
expanded its popular base. An alliance with the Arab Movement for Change headed by Ahmad Tibi was 
a decisive point in the party's history, leading many of its elite and activists to leave the party in protest, 
on principle on the one hand and the way this decision was made on the other. The breakdown in the 
alliance between the two parties immediately after the elections did not remedy the damage done to the 
party. Not only did the party fail to see the principled and political error it made in the alliance, but also 
failed to assess the electoral importance of this alliance. Key figures in the NDA claimed it would have 
been able to win two seats even without an alliance with the Arab Movement for Change. Ghanim and 
 
62 Ibid, p. 177.  
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Mustafa claim that the NDA suffered the consequences of that step, which nevertheless led to greater 
democratization within the party63. 
In 2007, the Assembly bid farewell to its president Azmi Bishara, as he left the country to settle in Doha, 
where he established the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Before he left, Bishara faced 
charges of money laundering and contact with a foreign agent. Bishara's subsequent absence and his 
presence abroad may have created, a dual leadership, internal and external; however, it is not yet clear the 
extent to which Bishara's absence from the internal political scene has impacted the party's work.. The 
truth is that the organizational structure of the party and its constitution allowed the party to escape the 
dilemma of having to elect a president because there is no such post in the NDA as "Party President", 
which is usually given to Bishara symbolically and not constitutionally. The party’s General Assembly 
elects the central committee, which in turn elects members of the political department. There is the party 
secretary and the head of the parliamentary list. This keeps Bishara as party President because of the 
important role he played in its formation and in establishing its ideology. 
Since Bishara’s departure, the NDA’s conferences have been held without him. The conferences have 
approved a number of decisions and plans to move to a new stage in his absence. This is a challenge for 
the party, to prove that the NDA is not limited to Bishara and that Bishara is not limited it. Although the 
party maintains and affirms this approach, it cannot be denied that the political and ideological 
communication between the NDA and the Arab World takes place through Bishara himself. Bishara is a 
political leader and an intellectual known for his books and writings in the Arab World. The Israeli 
experience gave new dimensions to Bishara’s nationalist ideology that helped him stand out among the 
Arab nationalists. Being a member of the Knesset has helped to break many of the barriers facing Arab 
intellectuals due to the political reality in which they live. Ghanim and Mustafa believe that the election 
of the NDA’s central committee at its 2008 conference led to the exclusion of personalities affiliated with 
civil society institutions, which means, according to them, that the Assembly wishes to exclude activists 
from its central committee and instead give an opportunity to young or new blood to work within the 
party’s organization.  
Ghanim and Mustafa also believe that a more liberal and less nationalist current emerged within the 
Assembly that adopts western liberal principles without paying heed to Arab cultural idiosyncrasies. 
They argue that this internal movement is contributing to increasingly and unwittingly isolating the 
 
63 Ibid, p. 178.  
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Assembly from the community. Perhaps the departure of Abnaa el-Balad and some of the nationalist 
movement figures has weakened those adopting the Arab cultural nationalist approach in the party 
against those adopting the liberal approach. Indeed, the NDA tends to adopt a more liberal approach, 
reflected in the activism of the NDA’s youth groups that aim to promote principles that may not be 
welcomed enthusiastically by the largely conservative Palestinian society. Yet we cannot assume that this 
has weakened the party.  
Ghanim and Mustafa argue that the challenge the Assembly faces is not restricted to its organization, 
which was approved by its last conference, such as reserving one in every three seats in the Assembly’s 
list for Knesset elections for women. There is also the intellectual challenge, namely giving up on its 
ideology to come closer to the day-to-day issues the people face and maintain their collective identity 
through the idiosyncrasies of Arab culture64.  
The Assembly believes it is capable of addressing these challenges and continuing its political and 
ideological activity on the Palestinian scene inside the 48 territories despite the absence of Azmi Bishara. 
The party's leaders believe that the Assembly could once again embody Arab political rhetoric and 
become a major influential factor on the content of that rhetoric. Jamal Zahalka, an NDA Knesset 
member, says that the Assembly, "put three challenges to the Hebrew State that it could not accept, and 
thus decided to get rid of it. These challenges were democracy, Palestinian nationality and 
communication with the Arab world and its concerns. Perhaps the party's major intellectual contribution 
was linking the nationalistic and democratic challenge even though it has made significant contributions 
to each issue separately. When the party drafted its ideas in the form of an integrated political project and 
penetrated the political action scene, this led to a real change in the political rhetoric of Palestinians 
inside the 1948 territories and its impact was wider than the framework of the National Democratic 
Assembly so much that even political rivals started imitating it and reiterating its ideas.”65 
In the last elections in 2013, the NDA won 3 seats (out of 11 seats that the Arab parties won altogether), 
which is the same number of seats the NDA won in previous elections. Yet an examination of the NDA's 
achievements in parliamentary elections since 1999 shows an increase in the vote for the NDA, and the 
percentage it received of the total Arab vote. The following table by Rohana (2010) shows the increase in 
the NDA's influence since 1999.  
 
64 Ibid, p. 179.  
65 Ibid, p. 180.  
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Figure 1: The rise of NDE’s influence between 1999 and 2013 
Year 
National Democratic Assembly United Arab List 
 
 DFPE 
 ~ ~       % of total Arab vote Votes % of total Arab vote Votes % of total Arab vote Votes 
1999 16.8 66,103 30.6 114,810 21.3 87,022 
2003 20.0 71,299 18.0 65,551 26.0 93,819 
2006 20.2 72,066 27.4 94,786 24.3 86,092 
2009 22.2 83,739 30.3 113,954 29.6 112,130 
2013 22.0 97,030 31.0 138,450 24.0 113,439 
 
3.4 Summary of the differences between Arab political movements in 
Israel 
 




It adopts "Islam is the Solution" as a slogan to solve all the 
problems of society. The Islamic Movement believes that Islam 
as a religion and way of life and all resulting schemes are 
sufficient to solve all problems arising in society or problems it 
faces on an ongoing basis. Therefore, the Islamic Movement was 
born as a civic mobilization to solve problems of the society 
under the oppression and prosecution exercised by the Israeli 
institution.    
Islamic Islamic Movement 
The Assembly has a secular identity, using the nationalist project 
as a tool to solve Palestine's problems. It believes in nationalism 
and democracy. It sees nationalism as a movement formed 
through cultural heritage, but that it is not only a phenomenon 
associated with language, as the era of Arab nationalism is not 
like the era of the Arabic language; nationalism in its current 




form is a political and cultural movement that seeks to create an 
Arab sovereign nation. From the Assembly's perspective, 
nationalism is not an ideological chauvinistic doctrine but a 
modern Arab political and cultural project. The Assembly 
believes that through nationalism, a position should be taken 
based on a historical identity and call for a state for all citizens 
with full equality. The Assembly does not believe in linking 
rights and duties and consider them two separate parts of 
democratic citizenship. 
The Front was established in early 1977 following a resolution 
by the Communist Party. The Front's platform had eight points: 
1. Israeli/Palestinian and Israeli/Arab peace; 2. Protecting 
workers' rights; 3. Equality for the Arab population; 4. 
Eradicating ethnic discrimination in all areas; 5. Protecting 
democratic freedoms, eradicating discrimination, struggling 
against fascism and eradicating all forms of religious coercion; 
6. Protecting women's rights; 7. Demilitarization of weapons of 
mass destruction; 8. Protecting the environment.  
The Communist Party is the backbone of Hadash. Hadash 
considers peace to be a central cause. By achieving peace, better 
chances for equality will emerge for the Arab community. 
Hadash calls for the recognition of the Arab population as a 
minority by virtue of a law that was drafted especially on this 
matter and revokes all laws of a discriminatory nature, protection 
of the rights of the Arab population and an end to land grabbing 
endorsed by the law. At the twenty second convention of the 
Communist Party, it was said, "... we have struggled and shall 
continue struggling for the full national rights of the Arab 
population in Israel until Israel is a state for all its citizens".66  
Secular The Democratic Front 
for Peace and Equality 
(Hadash) 
 
66 Convention 22 of the Communist Party, page 58, 1993. 
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4 The Rhetoric of Arab Political Parties in Israel 
 
As I demonstrated in the previous section, Arab political parties in Israel have adopted different, and 
sometimes contrasting ideologies. I will therefore argue that even though they belong to the same ethnic 
minority, share the same experiences of the past and the present, and are treated by the Israeli state in the 
same way, which they collectively agree is racist and discriminatory, these parties often hold dissimilar 
views regarding key issues affecting the Arab population in Israel as well as regional issues. I further 
argue that multiple motivations drive consensus within these parties on specific issues. Each party also 
uses a specific rhetoric, which is mostly shaped by its ideology but is also influenced by certain 
developments specially as is the case with the more pragmatic parties like Hadash. 
Aristotle’s three rhetorical appeals and three divisions will be used to analyze the attitude of each party 
on the five issues proposed for discussion earlier in chapter 1.2 on methodology. Each argument will be 
presented using quotations by party leaders from press media release, speeches and statements made at 
public gatherings and demonstrations, from television interviews, newspaper articles, and other 
publications. The methodology, that is, how I intend to use these resources and rhetorical tools in my 
analysis, has been explained in the introductory chapter to this thesis. The next few pages will focus on 
the first issue: Arab representation in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset.  
 
4.1 Rhetoric for/against Arab representation in the Israeli Parliament 
 
Before discussing the rhetoric of ‘participation or boycott’, it is essential to summarize the history of 
Arab political activism within the Israeli political system.  
Until 1965, Arab representation in the Knesset took two forms: through the Communist Party of Israel 
(CPI) and, through what Ghanim calls ‘satellite lists.’ He defines this as ‘lists that Jewish Zionist parties 
set up to capture Arab votes [a phenomenon that lasted from 1949 until 1981 when the last of the satellite 
lists disappeared]’67. These lists were far from influential and were dependent on the ‘mother’ Zionist 
parties. They were only active at election time in order to mobilize Arabs to vote for Zionist parties. 
 
67 As’ad Ghanim. The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel 1948 - 2000 ; a Political Study, 2001, SUNY Press, p. 39.  
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Although the CPI and its successor, the New Communist List (NCL), won parliamentary seats prior to 
1977, it had no significant influence on the political scene. Kenig points to the reasons for this: ‘the 
governing party was in a dominant and pivotal position and could easily build several center-based 
coalitions. Thus, the NCL was irrelevant to the coalition game. Second, the NCL’s ideological stance 
placed it in a double extreme position - its Marxist rhetoric and its anti-Zionist messages prevented it 
from effectively participating in the political process.’68 
As explained earlier in chapter 3.1 about the evolution of the Communist party, in 1977 the Party merged 
with the Black Panthers; a movement that was exclusively Jewish [compared to the CPI which had both 
Arab and Jewish members], and Hadash [also known as the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality] 
was born. Hadash won fifty per cent of the total Arab votes in 1977, but still could not make any 
significant changes as it was excluded from the coalition led by the dominant Jewish, Zionist parties who 
perceived its positions as ‘radical’.  
In 1984, a new non-Communist Jewish-Arab party emerged - the Progressive List for Peace (PLP). 
According to Abd El Rahman, the PLP demanded equal rights for Arab citizens and stressed the national 
aspirations and Palestinian identity of the Arab minority in Israel.69 In the 1984 elections, which the PLP 
participated in for the first time, it received eighteen per cent of the total Arab votes. This translated into 
two seats in the Knesset. The following elections of 1988 saw a drop in the PLP’s popularity, possibly 
because its list included a Jewish army general70, which clearly did not appeal to many Arab voters. 
Additionally, the 1988 elections saw the emergence of a new party - the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), 
which for the first time was a party that was completely Arab. This had a profound effect on the Arab 
political sphere. Kenig believes that the ADP attracted those who wanted to express their Arab identity 
yet refrained from voting for the NCL because of ‘its radical socio-economic stance’. Since all Arab 
parties formed after NCL managed to attract significant support, it seems many Arab voters prefer a party 
 
68 Ofir Kenig, "The Political Representation of Israel’s Arab Minorities: The Challenge of Marginality and the Dilemma of 
Influence versus Protest", Inter-Disciplinary Net 3rd Global Conference,2007, Department of Political Science, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem and the Israel Democracy Institute. <http://inter-
disciplinary.net/ati/diversity/pluralism/pl3/Kenig%20paper.pdf>    .  
69 Sherihan Abd El Rahman, The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and 
Activities, 2010, College of Arts and Sciences CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal University of 
Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania, p. 29. 
<http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=curej>. Accessed on 9.7.2013 
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like the ADP that stresses Arab identity, rather than one, exemplified by the NCL, that cannot because it 
is composed of both Arab and Jewish members. The rhetoric of the NCL, as noted earlier, does not seem 
to describe the conflict as one between Arabs and Jews, but as one between a capitalist regime and an 
oppressed labor force. In the 1988 elections, the ADP won one seat in the Knesset, which for the first 
time, was an entirely Arab seat. 
In 1992, the ADP won two seats, which was considered a success. Mostafa and Ghanim explain this 
success by pointing to the ADP’s emphasis on tackling the day-to-day concerns of the Arab community 
in Israel, while still showing concern for the Palestinian issue. They believe that the party also avoided 
touching on the Jewish identity of the Zionist state. Apparently, this helped it uphold a good relationship 
with the state and maintain the possibility of entering a coalition with Jewish parties71. The ADP 
therefore emphasized the need for Arab parties to be part of the ruling coalition in order to have the 
chance of influencing in favor of the Arab minority. It is for this reason that the party maintained its 
promotion of a united Arab list, both in the 1996 and 1999 elections, when the united list that included 
the ADP, the Southern Islamic Movement, and other independent candidates, won four and five seats in 
the Knesset respectively.  
The ADP became weaker however, with the 1996 emergence of the parliamentary [Southern] branch of 
the Islamic Movement and the new National Democratic Assembly (NDA).  Since then, it has only won a 
single seat under the United Arab List, which comprises the ADP and the Southern Islamic Movement. 
It must be noted that in the 1992 elections, the Arab parties won five seats [Hadash 3, ADP 2] and there 
were hopes that they would be included in a coalition with the Israeli Labor Party (ILP) which is 
considered center-left, but is still Zionist. Yitzhak Rabin nevertheless declared that he would not consider 
them an integral part of the forthcoming coalition72. As such, despite the ADP’s declared interest in 
joining an ILP-led coalition [since the founder of the ADP, Abdul Wahab Darawsha, is himself a former 
ILP member], the ILP did not regard non-Zionist Arab parties to be suitable partners in a political 
coalition. 
Kenig describes the next stage, from 1996 to the present, as that of ‘radicalization, fragmentation, and 
increased representation’. Kenig believes that this radicalization was influenced by the abortion of the 
 
71 Mostafa and Ghanim 2009, p. 175.  
72 Kenig, Ofir 2007 Ibid. 
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peace process with the Palestinian Authority, and the events of October 2000. This refers to the killing of 
thirteen Israeli Arab citizens by the Israeli police force. They had been protesting ‘Ariel Sharon’s 
desecration of the Al-Aqsa mosque’ when he entered the mosque accompanied by more than a thousand 
security personnel. This was a massive show of power that provoked large-scale violent clashes in Israel 
and the Palestinian territories73. The second Intifada that followed the Al-Aqsa events, coupled with the 
murder of hundreds of Palestinian citizens by Israeli security forces and rising discrimination against the 
Arab citizens of Israel, undoubtedly intensified Arab resentment towards the Israeli authorities.  
In light of these developments, all Arab parties called for a boycott of the next parliamentary elections in 
2001; the result was a very low Arab voting rate of nineteen per cent74. This election brought Ariel 
Sharon of the right-wing Likud Party, to power. The result indicated that the more powerful and 
aggressive politician was most likely more appealing to the Jewish public, with images of Sharon 
surrounded by hundreds of bodyguards and Border Guards still fresh. This further bolstered the sense of 
distrust and indignation felt by Arabs towards the Israeli public, the authorities and the policies. 
Since the 2001 elections, the rate of Arabs voting in parliamentary elections has been in decline [see 
Figure 3]. Hadash, the IDP, the NDA, as well as the Southern [parliamentary] branch of the Islamic 
Movement all displayed critical attitudes towards Israel’s discriminatory policies. The extra-
parliamentary Islamic Movement also started to use terms such as ‘the Israeli establishment’ instead of 
‘the Israeli State’ so as not to lend any legitimacy to the Zionist state. The different parties started to 
speak out publicly against attempts at the ‘Judaization’ of Arab areas in Israel. They also spoke against 
the state’s alleged plans to distort Arab Palestinian identity and its cultural components through 
Israelization in order to cut relations between Palestinian citizens in Israel and their fellow Arabs in the 
Arab world. Azmi Bishara, for instance, warned that ‘Israelization’ might be a model to end discussion 
on the ‘Palestinian issue’ in all countries that have a Palestinian [refugee] minority. He therefore stresses 
the importance of preserving the different components of the Palestinian identity. 
 
 
73 Kenig, Ofir, Ibid. 
74 Abd El Rahman, Ibid, p. 32.  
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Figure 3: rate of Arab votes in Israeli parliamentary elections75 
Election year Rate of Arab vote (%)  Total vote rate (%) Boycott rate (%) 
1949 79 86.9 21 
1951 86 75.1 14 
1955 90 82.8 10 
1959 85 81.6 15 
1961 83 81.6 17 
1965 82 83 18 
1969 80 81.7 20 
1973 73 78.6 28 
1977 74 79.2 26 
1981 68 78.5 32 
1984 72 79.8 28 
1988 74 79.7 26 
1992 70 77.4 30 
1996* 78 79.3 22 
1999* 75 78.7 25 
2001** 19 62.3 81 
2003 62 67.8 38 
2006 56 63.2 44 
2009 53 85 48 
 
75 Based on data provided in Taha, pp. 2013: 29, and Mostafa and Ghanim, pp. 2009: 226.  
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* In 1996, for the first time the Prime Minister was elected in a separate ballot from the other members of Knesset. This was 
repeated in 1999, as all Prime Ministerial elections were held simultaneously alongside Knesset elections. 
** In 2001 only Prime Ministerial elections were held, without parliamentary elections, following the resignation of the then 
Prime Minister, Ehud Barak.  
Indeed, there has been an increase in the representation of Arabs in the Israeli parliament [see figure 
two], however this has not been reflected in improvements in the conditions of Arabs in Israel. This is yet 
another reason that the attitudes of Arab parties have tended to be more radical. Kenig points out that for 
the first time, two Arab politicians were appointed as ministers: Salih Tarif (2001) and Ghalib Majadle 
(2007). Tarif and Majadle are both members of the ILP Zionist party however, and are therefore likely to 
share its Zionist views, which the Arab parties consider ‘racist’. As such, considering them ‘Arab’ in the 
context of the collective Arab-Palestinian struggle against the Zionist state is a matter of debate. 
 
Figure 4 - Arab members of the Israeli parliament (Knesset)76 
 
 
76 Kenig, Ofir, 2007,Ibid, 
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Despite Arab representation in the Knesset, all parties and politicians agree that there is racial 
discrimination in Israel’s relationship with Arabs. MP Ahmad Tibi, one of the most active Knesset 
members, states that ‘Israel is indeed a democratic Jewish state – democratic towards Jews and Jewish 
towards Arabs’77. Researcher Yusuf Jabareen claims that although there are laws that forbid 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity or religion, there are also many laws that create clear inequality 
between Arabs and Jews. Jabareen presents a series of laws that are discriminatory against Arabs and are 
intended to solely serve the interests of the Jewish majority78. 
Figure 3 shows that almost half of the Arab population in Israel oppose participation in parliamentary 
elections or does not believe it has contributed to improving their conditions. Despite the failure of Arab 
parliamentary members to change this reality and stop the passage of discriminatory laws, Arab parties 
are still involved in the political game. Since the outset in fact, some parties have chosen to be a part of 
the Knesset. Not all Arab political movements in Israel participate in the Knesset elections however, and  
some have decided that the Knesset does not serve the interests of Palestinians in Israel. As such, Arab 
representation in the Knesset could even have negative implications for the Arab minority in Israel. 
In the following pages, I will review the rhetoric that is used by each of the parties to back its position for 
or against participation in the Israeli parliament. I will base my analysis of their arguments on Aristotle’s 
rhetorical principles, which I elaborated on in chapter 1.2. As in chapter 4.1.3, conclusions will be drawn 
about the collective rhetoric of Arab parties concerning participation in the Knesset: is it consistent or 
divergent? 
In the next section (3.1.1), I will first provide an overview of the way in which each party deals with the 
Israeli state: through recognition or denial. Then (in 3.1.2) I will analyze the stances of the parties on 
representation in the Knesset, which is largely based on their views presented in 3.1.1.  
 
 
77 Ben Porat, S. (2009,  December 22). Conservations with Ahmad Tiebe. Harretz. Tel aviv. P. 71    
78 Jabereen, Y. (2010). The constitutional status of the Arab minority in Israel: a new proposal to order. State and society. 
Issue 7. Pp (107-112). (In Hebrew). 
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4.1.1 The Arab parties’ Position on Israel’s legitimacy and right to exist 
A discussion of the parties’ positions with regard to participation in the Israeli parliamentary elections 
should start with an overview of the relationship between each party and the Israeli state. Investigating 
the way that each party perceives Israel and its legitimacy is vital because it largely determines many of 
their political stances, including whether or not to participate in the Knesset. Thus, the first question is 
whether Arab parties approve of or reject the founding of the Israeli state following the Palestinian Nakba 
in 1948, on Palestinian land that was under the British mandate? Do Jewish people [as a national 
collective] have the right to self-determination in Palestine? 
In Israel, the nationalist and communist Arab movements usually address these questions. It seems that 
the Islamist groups, represented by the Islamic Movement, seldom consider these questions, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. This does not imply that the Islamist movement deems the events of the 
1948 Nakba unimportant; instead, it understands these events from a broader perspective. The Islamic 
Movement places the occupation of Palestine into the larger context of the collapse of the Islamic 
Ottoman Empire that ruled the area of Palestine. This led to the division of its territories and the fall of 
Palestine under the British mandate. Thus, unlike the Communists and Nationalists, the Islamists do not 
perceive of the conflict as a recent one between Arabs and Jews, but as part of the history of the Middle 
East, and the earlier Islamic rule of the region. 
Hence, while the Communists perceive the conflict as a clash between a colonizing capitalist power and 
the middle class, and nationalists view it as a conflict between the Zionist national movement and Arab 
nationalism, Islamists primarily view it as a religious conflict. This view is strengthened in light of the 
current vigorous process of Judaization targeting Jerusalem and its holy sites, which is one of the reasons 
the Islamic Movement stresses the importance of the Islamic component of Palestinian identity. These 
aspects will be dealt with in the following pages.  
4.1.1.1 The view of the Communist party 
In 1947, the Communists resolved the question of whether Jews should have the right to self-
determination in Palestine, when the Soviet Union declared its support for the United Nations Partition 
Plan for Palestine (Resolution 181). The Communist movement, represented by two parties before 1948; 
one Arab and one Jewish, committed to this Soviet position, and thus supported the Jewish right to self-
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determination on Palestinian land79. Retrospectively, Communists still back their support of the partition 
plan. According to Issam Makhoul, the prominent Communist leader and former MP representing DFPE, 
the mistake was the way the plan was implemented by Israel. He claims that according to the plan, the 
new Israeli state was supposed to have an Arab minority constituting forty-five per cent of the total 
Israeli population, who would have lived inside the borders of the new state. But according to him, Israel 
interpreted the name ‘Jewish State’ as ‘Jewish-only state’. This was fulfilled by the ethnic cleansing 
operations carried out by Jewish forces during and after the 1948 war, which aimed to rid the new state of 
its Arab population that lived in territories allocated to this new state. Makhoul believes that the Israeli 
state considered Arab citizens a threat to the state’s Jewish character, which led it to ethnically cleanse 
them, and then subject the few that remained to military law80.  
It can be noted however, that the leaders of the Communist Party speak about Communist support for the 
partition plan in a remorseful tone. Muhammad Barakih, for instance, states that ‘the partition plan wasn’t 
fair to Palestinians  - the native inhabitants of the land and its majority- but it was important to secure the 
living necessities for them, especially in light of the plots of the Zionist movement and the British 
support it enjoyed.’81 Makhoul further claims that some of the Arab leaders of the Communist Party’s at 
the time were initially against accepting the partition plan but had to accept it because the majority of the 
leadership did, and they had to abide by the official position of the Soviet Union82. Ayman Odeh, current 
secretary of the Communist Party, states that the partition plan they supported stated that all citizens in 
the new state; Arabs and Jews, would be treated equally and enjoy full citizenship, based on the fact that 
they both live on the same land. As Odeh states, it transpired that full citizenship was granted only to 
those who belong to the Jewish nation, which is a complete contrast to that which was stated in the 
partition plan they agreed to83. 
 
 79 Mjali, N. (2009). Position of Arab representation to Partition: Crime and Punishment, in Rot Gabizon (Ed.). Sixty Years to 
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80 Makhol, E. (2009). Two states: the solution and those who deny. In Tamar Gojanski and Anjelka taym (eds.). For Against! 
Israeli Communist Party 2009-1919: essays and posters. Tel aviv. Pp. 38-39  
81 Barakih, M. (2007, December). Upholding the principle of partition and two-state slogan means adhering to the 
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To sum up, Communists do not oppose Jews having the right to self-determination in Palestine. They 
express reservation on how this right was fulfilled, and believe that despite their support of this right, its 
fulfilment must not undermine the rights of Arab citizens in the country. 
This view determines the position of the Communist movement with regard to the ultimate solution to the 
conflict. It supports two states for two peoples instead of one state for two peoples [advocated by 
nationalists].The Communists’ advocacy of two states, one for Palestinians and one for Jews [in which 
Israeli Arabs would still live], is based on their recognition of the Jewish right to self-determination and 
to a state in the area of historic Palestine. This topic will be discussed in detail in section 3.3.  
4.1.1.2 The view of the Nationalist movement 
Palestinian nationalists in Israel seem to adopt two different views regarding the Jewish right to self-
determination in Palestine [which means their right to have a state of their own, on Palestinian land]..One 
group accepts it, but with certain conditions. This position is represented in the Haifa Declaration 
published by Mada al-Carmel, a Haifa-based think tank unofficially affiliated with the National 
Democratic Assembly. This think tank ‘generates and provides information, critical analysis, and diverse 
perspectives on the social and political life and history of Palestinians, with particular attention to 
Palestinians within Israel's 1948 boundaries.’84 The most important points in the Haifa Declaration 
include the recognition of the right of the ‘Israeli Jewish people to self-determination, and to live 
alongside the Palestinians and other peoples of the region, in peace, dignity, and safety’. At the same 
time, it called on Israel to admit its responsibility for the Nakba of 1948 and for all the consequential 
suffering that befell the Palestinian people85. This recognition of the Israeli right to self-determination 
drives the concept of a bi-national state as a means to transform Israel into a more tolerant, less racist 
state in which Arabs and Jews can live together without discrimination. Such recognition is not granted 
merely for pragmatic reasons, namely, that Israel is an existing reality, and there is no choice but to 
recognize it. There is another fundamental reason for it. Some nationalists principally recognize the right 
of Jews to Palestine, even though it differs from the Palestinians’ right to Palestine in that the Jewish 
 
84  "About" page in Mada's official website. Accessed on: 01.08.2013. <http://mada-research.org/en/about/>. 
85 Haifa Declaration, Mada Al-Carmel (2007), 12. Accessed on 02.08.2013 <http://mada-
research.org/files/2007/09/haifaarabic.pdf>.   
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right is ‘an acquired right’, not an ‘indigenous right’, as in the case of Palestinians86.  Bishara states that 
recognising an Israeli state does not mean acknowledging the Zionist narrative that led to the 
establishment of this state87. This statement is important in that it argues against the core idea of Zionism, 
which aims to create a national home for Jews in Palestine. Those that adopt this view accordingly 
recognize the right of Palestine’s Jews to live in Palestine, but not the entire Jewish nation from around 
the world.  
Not all nationalists adopted the Haifa Declaration, however. Many opposed it, and even harshly criticized 
it as an attempt to ‘Israelize’ the Arab public. Many of those who oppose it claim that Jews migrated to 
Palestine within the framework of the Zionist colonial movement, which brought misery to the Arabs, the 
native inhabitants of this land. Nakhlih, for instance, states that the concept of ‘self-determination’ must 
be based on a natural relationship between the residents of a country and their land. Therefore, the right 
of Arabs to self-determination stems from them being the indigenous people of Palestine. This right 
serves to strengthen their connection to their land. On the other hand, Nakhlih concludes that the 
connection between the Jewish majority [which was not a majority until the Israeli state was established] 
and the land is artificial and meaningless, which makes the framework of ‘a Jewish state’ invalid and 
unacceptable.88  
Nakhlih’s view summarizes the position of some nationalists, especially the Abnaa al-Balad Movement, 
who do not recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state in Palestine, and call for the ‘liberation of 
Palestine’. This is unlike the NDA, which calls for one non-Zionist state for the two peoples. 
Nonetheless, the extra-parliamentary Abnaa al-Balad is a small movement, with a very small support 
base compared to the much larger NDA. For this reason, any discussion in this study about the Arab 
nationalist current in Israel and its approaches and attitudes will refer to the NDA, unless otherwise 
stated, as it is the dominant nationalist movement in Israel. 
 
86 Rouhana, Nadim. Reconciliation in the Enduring National Conflicts. Journal of Palestine Studies, Institute for Palestinian 
Studies, 2004, volume 15. Pp. 72-73 
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4.1.1.3 The view of the Islamic Movement 
Under Islamic law, Jews [followers of the Jewish religion] are considered a religious group, not a 
national group. In a state that follows Islamic law, they would be treated as ‘people of the book’, which is 
a special status reserved for Christians and Jews. Followers of these two religions who live in a 
dominantly Muslim country are allowed, under Islamic law, to practice their religions. They must not be 
compelled to change their religion or embrace Islam89. The fact that Jews are considered a religious 
group means that the Islamic current does not recognize their right to have their own state in Palestine. 
Furthermore, Palestine is part of the former Islamic empire and is at the heart of the Middle East, which 
is mainly inhabited by Muslims. Historically, Jews had the right to live in Palestine and in all parts of the 
Islamic State. They did not have the right to create their own state or have sovereignty over a Muslim 
land, particularly following a violent occupation of land, such as the Zionist occupation in 1948. Islamists 
nevertheless acknowledge the Israeli state as the status quo and admit the possibility of a new reality in 
which a Jewish national group can accomplish its right to self-determination in Palestine.   
Some researchers argue that the relation between the southern parliamentary branch of the Islamic 
Movement and the Israeli state greatly differs from the relation between the northern extra-parliamentary 
branch and the state. Elie Rekhess, for example, claims that the views of the southern branch represented 
by its founder, Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish, can be understood as accepting the right of Israel to 
exist90. Frisch goes even further to claim that to some extent, Darwish recognized the Jewish identity of 
the state91. It should be mentioned that Darwish’s views were considered by some, including some of his 
followers, to be too pacifist.92 This was especially true after he was released from an Israeli prison. It is 
possible that this is the reason that following his replacement by MP Ibrahim Sarsour, who headed the 
movement from 1999 until 2011, he no longer occupied an important position in the southern Movement.  
Chapter two reviewed the history of the Islamic Movement in Israel and its division in 1996, when the 
Southern branch decided to participate in the Knesset elections, while the Northern branch declared that 
 
89 Islam Today website. <http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-262-3441.htm>. Accessed on 21.8.2013. 
90 Elie Rekhess, The Islamic Movement in Israel and its Relation to the Political Islam in the West Bank, in Rot Gbizon and 
Dafna Hakar, The Arab-Israeli Gap, 2000, Jerusalem, The Israeli Institute for Democracy, p. 295. 
91 Frisch, Hillel (2011). ‘Israel’s Security and Its Arab Citizens’, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 95. 




the Islamic Movement must not participate. One aspect of the discussion that preceded and followed the 
division was whether a Jewish sovereignty on Palestine [that had been part of the Muslim Empire until 
WWI] should be tolerated. Each of the branches of the Islamic Movement has a different answer to this 
question, as is expected. This reflects its ideology and therefore its practice, as will be illustrated. 
Israel’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Southern [parliamentary] Islamic Movement 
One of the main reasons for the split of the Islamic Movement was internal divergence over the critical 
issues that had started to emerge. While the northern Islamic Movement demonstrated opposition to the 
Islamic Movement’s representation in the Knesset, the southern branch considered such representation to 
be permissible under Islamic law. It provided arguments to support its position that this would help 
address the interests of Muslims and Arabs in the state. Both positions within the Movement stem from 
the way each side views the Israeli state, and the Jewish right to self-determination in Palestine.  
Statements by Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish, the founder of the Islamic Movement, represent the 
approach of the southern branch, with which he sided after the split. In 1992, Darwish stated ‘loudly, and 
publicly, we declare that we recognize the state of Israel; its symbols, including the flag and the Star of 
David; we shall carry it in our pockets wherever we go’.93 This recognition also motivated participation 
in the Knesset. Sheikh Sarsour, former leader of the Southern Islamic Movement and head of its 
parliamentary bloc, stated that the participation of his movement in the Knesset elections aims to prove 
that the movement is not separatist, but actually aspires to merge into the state94. One of the Southern 
Islamic Movement’s Knesset members; Masoud Ghanayim, tried to reconcile the Islamic character of the 
Movement and its political involvement in a non-Muslim country. In an interview with him, Ghanayim 
said: ‘we live in a reality, which is the state of Israel, and we are its citizens. Yes, we have our distinct 
identity as Arabs, Palestinians, and Muslims, of which we are proud. We preserve our identity within the 
boundaries of Israeli citizenship. I am convinced that Islam as a religion allows us to be realistic, and for 
that reason, we are entitled to enter the Knesset in order to preserve our identity, our lands, and roots, 
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without being assimilated into the other.’95 The other branch of the Islamic Movement totally rejects this 
view of acceptance, and even recognition of the Israeli state and its existence. 
It can accordingly be seen that the Southern Islamic Movement recognizes the Israeli state and to an 
extent considers it a legitimate entity that must not necessarily be treated with hostility.  
Israel’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Northern [extra-parliamentary] Islamic 
Movement 
The Northern Islamic Movement’s stance concerning the legitimacy of the Israeli state seems to derive 
from the stance of Muslim scholars who dominate Sharia [Islamic law] studies in the Muslim world. 
Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a very distinguished scholar, has contributed significantly to the development 
of the relatively new field of Islamic studies dealing with minorities [Fiqh al-Aqalliyat]. According to his 
doctrine, Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries can take part in the political process if it serves 
their interests and in a way that does not threaten their Muslim identity. The southern parliamentary 
branch of the Islamic Movement relied on this doctrine to justify its participation in the Knesset, and in 
contrast, the northern branch did not. Instead, it relied on the fatwa of Sheikh Qaradawi himself, stating 
that unlike other countries; Israel is a ‘foreign element’ [kayan dakheel] in the Middle East. Muslim 
participation in the Knesset therefore can be seen as a recognition of this state and its right to exist in the 
region. 
Mordechai Kedar claims that the publications of the Northern Islamic Movement infer that the state of 
Israel has the status of ‘a foreign occupation’. It is illegitimate for three reasons: firstly, from a religious 
perspective, Islam is the ‘religion of righteousness’ and Judaism is the ‘religion of falsehood’. Secondly, 
in the eyes of the leaders of the Northern Movement, there is no ‘Jewish nation’ that can be defined as 
such; there are Jewish communities that have lived in different countries. Therefore, there is no logical 
reason to create a new state and call it ‘the state of the Jewish people’, and the Zionist movement is 
simply a coalition between the Zionist elites and the colonial powers. Thirdly, before falling under the 
British mandate, the land of Palestine was part of the Muslim [Ottoman] empire, and therefore it is a 
Waqf [Muslim property] land that cannot be taken by non-Muslims. The Israeli state is thus an 
 




illegitimate state. Kedar claims that these are the three reasons the Northern Islamic Movement does not 
recognize Israel. He concludes that Israel is an illegitimate country in its eyes and must be combated96. 
It appears as though only Kedar’s third justification is relevant. The question of the ‘right vs. false’ 
religion is not actually present in the Islamic Movement’s view concerning the Israeli State. Rather, as 
the vast majority of Palestinians are Muslim, the Islamic Movement would accept Islamic rule over 
Palestine [such as Ottoman rule, which some nationalists considered an ‘occupation’] and not non-
Islamic rule, such as under a Christian or Jewish state.  
In addition, the question of the Jewish people as a ‘nation’ or not, is irrelevant for the Islamic Movement  
[and arguably for all Muslims], and the most important issue is the fact that Jewish Zionist groups, who 
later established a Jewish state on their land, occupied Palestine. This is critical, and less or no regard is 
given to whether the Jewish community can or cannot be called a ‘nation’. Thus, Kedar’s third 
explanation echoes the Northern movement's rejection of having a Muslim land ruled by non-Muslims. 
Leaders of the NIM seem to recognize Israel but only in the sense that it is an existing reality. They do 
not believe that the Islamic Movement can merge with Israeli society. Sheikh Kamal Khatib, vice 
chairman of the NIM stated: ‘I admit that we live in Israel, but we will not agree to be assimilated into 
the Israeli reality; not mentally, politically or culturally. The Israeli entity does not represent us at all.’ 
97From other public speeches, it can be inferred that the leaders of the NIM do not recognize the right of 
Israel to exist, and its actual existence is regarded as a temporary situation that is unlawful and 
unacceptable. In an interview with Khatib in 2012, he demonstrated a firm stance, stating: ‘we as 
Palestinians believe that we are the rightful owners of the land, and that Israel and Israelis are only 
temporary occupiers.98 Sheikh Salah expressed a similar stance in February 2011, during a mass 
gathering that was held under the title ‘The Palestinian Principles’ in the city of Baqa al-Gharbiya, in 
which representative leaders of all parties took part. Sheikh Salah stated: ‘we tell all oppressors, learn 
from the ones who preceded you: many have tried to expel us from our land. The oppressors are all gone, 
and we have remained steadfast in our land.’99 
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In conclusion, most of the main Arab political parties in Israel acknowledge the existence of the Israeli 
state and its right to exist, with some reservations by the Nationalist movement. The NIM, which is 
considered by many to be the largest Arab political entity in Israel, is an exception, as it seems to reject 
the Israeli state and its existence and considers it a ‘temporary occupation’. The attitude of each of the 
parties determines their position concerning participation or boycott of parliamentary elections. While the 
communists and nationalists participate in the elections, the Islamic Movement is divided: its southern 
branch takes part in the elections, while the northern branch abstains. The specific reasons for these 
attitudes will be dealt with in the following pages.  
4.1.2 The Arab parties’ Position and Rhetoric for / against Participation in the 
Knesset 
The Arab parties are divided on whether the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel must be represented in the 
Israeli parliament, the Knesset. Each party, with its supporters' base, tries to persuade the general Arab 
public to adopt its view for or against such representation. The discourse used by the parties usually 
involves discussion of advantages versus disadvantages. It also concerns a discussion of the moral aspect 
of participating in the Knesset, given that the Knesset is an extension of the Zionist state that was 
established on the ruins of the Palestinian towns and villages, and is the legislative authority that passes 
laws that are defined by Arabs themselves as ‘racist and discriminatory’.  
Statistics (as in Figure 3) show that there is a decline in the voting rate among Arabs, and a decrease in 
the interest in political parties and parliamentary participation. Researchers like Abd al-Rahman observe 
that this disinterest is a ‘direct result of the inability and inefficiency of parliamentary processes to make 
practical changes in the daily lives of the Arab minority, who are underprivileged socio-economically, 
politically, and legally’35. The view that the Arab representatives in the Knesset are unable to 
significantly improve the lives of Arab citizens is a motivating factor in the boycott of the Knesset and its 
elections by some of the Arab political parties in Israel, most notable among them being the Northern 
Islamic Movement (NIM). The following pages will review the rhetoric used by the NIM and its 
arguments against participation, and will also examine the arguments of the Arab parties who participate 
in the Knesset elections, including the Southern Islamic Movement, the Communist Party of Israel, and 
the Nationalist Democratic Assembly.   
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4.1.2.1 The Position of the Northern Islamic Movement (NIM) on representation in the 
Knesset  
In terms of representation in the Knesset, the position of the NIM is remarkably different from the SIM. 
Analysis of the literature produced by the NIM reveals both practical and ideological motivations for this 
position.  
On a practical level, leaders of the NIM hold that Arab citizens do not benefit from participation in 
Knesset elections. The Knesset therefore cannot be considered a body that actually represents their 
interests. Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, the head of the NIM and a prominent figure in the Arab and Muslim 
world, affirms this view. In November 2002, when other Arab parties were attempting to convince Arab 
citizens to vote in the sixteenth Knesset elections, Sheikh Salah stated:  
Concerning the position Arab members fill in the Knesset, it can be concluded that from day one 
the Knesset has been functioning solely as a platform to complain. Arab members of the Knesset 
have tried their best to fulfil their roles successfully, but the grounds upon which the Knesset was 
established prevents this…The Knesset is still failing them and preventing them from 
accomplishing anything. The Knesset is the highest institution of a state that defines itself as the 
state of the Jewish people, which implies that it does not care about our concerns. It is therefore 
failing us. Ultimately, it is part of the Zionist movement that doesn’t recognize us, neither as a 
national minority nor as citizens who deserve equal rights. Therefore, the Knesset is not an 
institution for us Arab Palestinians in Israel. 100  
On another occasion, Sheikh Salah claimed that ‘Israel as a state cannot improve its relationship with 
Arab citizens as long as it continues to entrench itself in its Jewish character. First and foremost, this is 
the state of Jews, especially as the security factor determines the state of its relations with the Arab 
minority’.101 
From the ideological perspective, the leaders of the NIM believe that Islamic representation in the 
Knesset is unacceptable as the Knesset is an institution based on the sovereignty of the Jewish people, for 
their right to self-determination or sovereignty. This contradicts Islamic law, which states that the Jewish 
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people are a religious group and not a national group. Since the 1990s, Sheikh Salah has declared a clear 
ideological position that forbids participation in the Knesset from a theological point of view. He stated 
that ‘the Knesset represents a legislative system that clashes with God’s orders’ 102. Some researchers, 
including Tal and Abu-Raya, explain that the leaders of the NIM oppose participation in the Knesset 
because it would entail having to swear allegiance to a secular, non-Islamic state, and to its symbols and 
objectives. Furthermore, this is a state regarded as an enemy to Muslims. Furthermore, such a swear of 
allegiance, according to Tal and Abu-Raya, would mean the recognition of Israel as a Jewish national 
state, and a recognition of the Jewish right to self-determination on the land of Palestine. The Islamic 
Movement considers Palestine a Waqf land.103. 
It is important to note that the NIM’s boycott of parliamentary elections is not a form of political protest. 
NIM’s decision to abstain from nominating its members as parliamentary members and from voting is a 
matter of principle and is not due to temporary conditions or urgent developments. These ‘principles’ are 
best demonstrated in the NIM's latest press release, circulated before the last Knesset elections held in 
January 2013. The Movement summarized its position as follows:  
1. The Knesset is one of the pillars of the Zionist movement, and it was shaped in such a way that it 
only serves Arabs by providing a ‘platform to complain’ at best.  
2. Thus, Arab representation in the Knesset has not aided the improvement of the conditions of 
Palestinian Arabs in Israel since the state was established; we still suffer from racial 
discrimination and religious prejudice as policies that determine how the state deals with us. 
3. Our past experiences with the Israeli Establishment [Israel] show that it treats us as if we are 
staying here temporarily and it may expel us from our land at any given moment if provided the 
opportunity. Therefore, staying here is a strategy that depends on the extent of our steadfastness 
in holding onto our land, houses, and sacred sites. Additionally, it is about building our own 
institutions and supporting our local Arab municipalities, directly electing the High Follow-Up 
Committee for Arab Citizens, and not being lured by the Knesset illusion. 
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4. Evidence shows that Arab presence in the Knesset has been used by the Israeli Establishment to 
whitewash its crimes against us and against Palestinian people, and against Arab and Muslim 
countries.  
5. Thus, the Islamic Movement calls on all its members and supporters, as well as the whole public 
in the Palestinian interior [Israel] to consider all these factors when taking a decision with regard 
to Knesset elections. Firstly to please Allah, to show the true face of the Israeli Establishment, 
and to support our Palestinian people in general and the people of Gaza in particular, and finally 
to satisfy our conscience in accordance with our religious understanding and our nationalist 
sense104. 
The NIM justifies its position against participation in the Knesset with these explanations, taken from 
one of its press releases. In fact, these are the main guiding lines that leaders and members of the 
Movement follow when discussing this matter. Sheikh Kamal Khatib, vice chair of NIM, upholds 
these ‘guidelines’ in stating:  
The Knesset is one aspect of the Zionist plan and it serves Arab Palestinians in nothing more than 
allowing them to cry out their complaints. Assessing the record of Arab Knesset members and 
their parties from day one shows that the Knesset has done us no justice nor granted us our rights, 
and since the Nakba, we have been suffering. Furthermore, it has been evident that the Israeli 
establishment has used Arab Knesset members as a mask to hide its crimes against our people and 
other Arab and Muslim nations.105 
Abdulhakim Mufeed, a journalist and member of the NIM's political bureau reaffirms this by stating: 
‘…but with regard to real influence on [Israel's] policies and laws, we can see that things are 
deteriorating, due to the fact that the scene is dominated by the [Jewish] majority and by the Israeli 
establishment – the Knesset - which in essence was founded to serve the interests of this Jewish majority 
more than anyone else’106. 
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Based on these clearly consistent statements, the motivation that drives the NIM’s opposition to an Arab 
participation in the Knesset can be summarized as follows: 
1. The way the Knesset works does not enable Arab members to achieve any significant 
improvement in the status of Arab citizens.  
2. Arabs must pursue their interests through independent institutions that cater for their national, 
social, educational, and financial needs, without relying on the state or its apparatus, such as the 
Knesset. 
3. Israel takes advantage of Arab representation in the Knesset to affirm its claims that it is a 
democratic country, while racial discrimination against Arabs on a daily basis proves the 
contrary. 
4. The NIM’s alternatives to the Knesset are its institutions and NGOs founded and run by Arab 
Palestinians in Israel. These institutions serve them and meet their needs. 
It is striking that most of these justifications provide practical reasons to reject participation in the 
Knesset. One would expect an ‘Islamic Movement’ to also give religious explanations based on certain 
Holy Scriptures or religious principles. The NIM however, presents a pragmatic position and focuses on 
the fact that Arab parliamentary parties could not achieve anything within the Knesset and that their 
presence there merely serves the ‘Establishment’ itself, as Israel uses them to celebrate its purported 
democracy to the international media. The Islamic Movement seems to focus on interests rather than 
principles. As such, if these interests can be addressed successfully, there should be no objection to 
participation. If the NIM simply rejects Arab representation in the Knesset because it has not been 
beneficial to Arabs, then it is logical to assume that if the Knesset becomes beneficial and Arabs could 
make certain achievements through it, then the NIM's position would switch from rejecting participation 
to endorsing it.  
In reality however, the NIM abstains from participating in the Knesset not only because it does not help 
improve the lives of Arabs, but also because it contradicts its core belief that Non-Muslims, let alone an 
‘occupying’ state, as it defines Israel, must not rule Muslims. Chapter 3.2.3 discussed the reasons for 
NIM's refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. This is based on the fact that Israel is regarded as an 
anti-Islamic system, as it was founded on the ruins of the Islamic Ottoman Empire that ruled the region 
before Israel was established. It has also fought with all the neighboring Muslim countries in the Middle 
East. The chapter also demonstrated that the Islamic Movement refrains from expressing this view 
publicly in order to avoid what Powell and Neiva call the ‘Pharisee effect’, which refers to party’s that 
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come across as too radical or like religious fanatics. Therefore, the NIM adopts a more balanced attitude 
and focuses on the practical reasons for rejecting participation in the Knesset, and avoids talking about 
the religious reasons, such as stating that Israel is an anti-Islamic or anti-Muslim country. 
Another reason the Islamic Movement might be intentionally avoiding religious rhetoric concerning this 
topic is that it wants its position to also be acceptable to non-Muslims. Among the Arab citizens who 
constitute twenty per cent of the total Israeli population, nine per cent or 158 thousand, are Christian107. 
The Islamic Movement would logically attempt to make its positions and the connected motivations 
appealing to all sectors of the Arab community in Israel. Providing religious reasons for positions on 
non-religious topics such as participation in the Knesset might not be persuasive for non-Muslims who 
do not believe in the religious principles of Islam. Therefore, wherever possible, the Islamic Movement 
resorts to extra-religious justifications to appeal to the entire Arab community irrespective of their 
religious or sectarian affiliations. Additionally, participation in the Knesset is a matter of debate among 
Muslims themselves. There are groups of Muslims, like the SIM, who consider participation in the 
Knesset permissible under Islamic law, as shown in in the previous section 3.1.1. This affirms the 
assumption proposed earlier in this section that the NIM is often pragmatic in presenting its views and 
motivations to the public.  
It must be noted that the Islamic Movement usually relates to the fact that the Knesset is ‘part of the 
Zionist plan’ as illustrated in the first item of the press release quoted above. This serves to remind the 
Arab Palestinian people that the Knesset was established only after the Zionist occupation of Palestine in 
1948. It is therefore an establishment founded on the ruins of Palestinian towns and villages, and their 
seized lands. Leaders of the Islamic Movement, including Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, repeat the slogan ‘The 
Knesset is in an extension to the Zionist plan’108. These leaders indicate that participation in the Knesset 
elections means recognising it and acknowledging the historical circumstances that led to its foundation, 
namely the Zionist occupation and the violence that accompanied it. Yet in its public press releases, the 
Islamic movement does not give special weight to this argument, which is arguably because undermining 
the legitimacy of the Knesset –the Israeli parliament- is similar to undermining the legitimacy of the 
 
107 Calam Christian website. 2.9.2013. <http://www.calam1.org/a/8302>. Accessed on 04.3.2012. 




Israeli state itself. This can be considered a violation of certain Israeli laws that criminalise attempts to 
delegitimise Israel, its institutions or symbols109.  
Rhetorical analysis 
In light of Aristotle's three branches of rhetoric, analysis of the arguments presented above against 
participation in the Knesset reveals strong use of deliberative rhetoric.  
In Aristotle's Rhetoric, according to Ruth CA Higgins, ‘the deliberative rhetoric must exhort or persuade 
his audience his speech is addressed to a judge of the future, and its end is to promote the good and avoid 
the harmful. Deliberative rhetoric concerns contingencies within human control. The deliberative orator 
addresses topics such as war and peace, national defense, trade and legislation, in order to assess what is 
harmful and beneficial. Accordingly, he must grasp the relationships between various means and the ends 
of expedience and happiness’.110 This describes NIM’s arguments precisely, as presented above, to 
persuade people not to vote. It is remarkable that the NIM does not explicitly call people to boycott the 
elections [as a general practice, not only in the press release quoted above], but it repeatedly reminds 
people of the reasons they should not participate in the parliamentary elections [by claiming that 
participation didn't contribute to improving conditions of Arabs, and worse, is used to mask Israel's 
crimes]. In deliberative terms, it is therefore a call to take an inactive action, by not taking the action of 
voting. At the same time, it is a call to take an active action, by building independent institutions and 
NGOs that would satisfy their needs without having to rely on the Knesset that in any case, won't be fair 
in its dealing with Arabs. In Higgins terms, the NIM is trying to avoid the harmful [the shortcomings of 
participation in the Knesset], and is attempting to promote the positive [building a self-reliant society 
with its independent institutions]. It is about ‘expedience and happiness’ that the NIM believes is 
achievable not by fighting for representation in the Knesset, but rather by acquiring a type of autonomy 
and independence from the authorities of the Israeli state. NIM believes that these authorities not only 
fail to improve the lives of Arabs, but even oppress and discriminate against them.  
Most of the arguments that the NIM uses to back its position concerning participation in the Knesset are 
from the deliberative register, and accordingly touch on advantages versus disadvantages. This is not 
 
109  New law bills that criminalise attempts to undermine Israel's character as a Jewish and a democratic state were either 
proposed or passed. See report on these laws and similar laws that were considered ‘racist’ by human rights groups such as 
Adalah, on Adalah's website. Accessed on 9.3.2013. <http://www.adalah.org/upfiles/Inequality%20Report%20Arabic.pdf>  




surprising, given that the main argument around participation in the Knesset is linked to this notion. The 
parties that participate in the Knesset claim they do so to improve the conditions of the Arab minority, 
while those abstaining claim that they do so because participation isn't in the interest of Arabs.  
The NIM also uses a forensic argument to justify its position when it repeatedly reminds the audience or 
readers that ‘the Knesset is an extension of the Zionist plan’. This claim touches on the past; it evaluates 
it and draws a link between past experiences and the present. It is a reminder of the crime that was 
committed in 1948, and of the tragic experiences that befell Palestinian people at the hand of the Zionist 
occupation of Palestine, the result of which was the establishment of the Israeli state and its parliament, 
the Knesset. The NIM hopes that this reminder of the ‘perpetrator of the crime’ as claimed by the NIM, 
and linking the crime to the Knesset, deters people from voting in the Knesset elections.  
With regards to the other essential elements in Aristotle's rhetoric, namely the three appeals of 
persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos, it can be said that the NIM promotes its views concerning the 
Knesset using arguments that are mostly logos-based. An examination of the claims made by the NIM's 
leaders including those expressed in its press releases, show that the NIM does not rely on pathos as 
much as the other parties do. In practice, the NIM can make a pathos-based claim, such as reminding 
Palestinians that the Knesset is actually the parliament of the occupation force that occupied their land in 
1948. Some anti-Knesset activists say this and make the connection that it is therefore morally 
unacceptable for Palestinians to be members in it. The NIM refrains from using such claims; possibly 
since logos is the most powerful of all appeals. Pathos, or the NIM's attempts to evoke emotions, may not 
work for all because of the diversity within the Palestinian community in Israel. It is therefore possible 
that logos is a more guaranteed method and is a stronger persuasion tool for a non-homogeneous 
community like the Palestinian minority in Israel. 
Ethos might nevertheless be present in the fourth argument. This claims that Palestinians in Israel should, 
wherever possible, be self-reliant. By doing so through Arab-run institutions and NGOs, they can care for 
the needs and interests that the state cannot or does not want to care for, including their national and 
cultural needs. The Islamic Movement in general, and the NIM in particular, is known for its network of 
organizations that work locally and regionally in Israel. These cover many of the needs of the citizens: 
health service facilities, educational centers and libraries, schools and kindergartens, institutions for 
preparation for higher academic studies, family welfare and social work services, religious colleges, 
economic development and funds for supporting new businesses, human rights organizations, research 
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centers, and media (websites, newspapers, magazines in different fields), among others. The unmatched 
experience of the Islamic Movement in this field, which actually filled countless gaps left by the 
government and helped Palestinians in Israel in many ways, would be appealing to the audience that 
believes that the NIM knows how to serve the interests of the people best. Since the central matter is 
advantage vs. disadvantage, the NIM's advocacy of a self-reliant society as opposed to a state-reliant one 
[participation in the Knesset as one of its manifestations] could be appealing to the audience given the 
proven experience the NIM has in this area. It is accordingly an ‘extrinsic pathos’ where the rhetor [the 
NIM] has an established credibility, and the audience [the Arab community in Israel] finds its arguments 
and views trustworthy based on the NIM's experience and knowledge.  
To summarize, the NIM opposes participation in the Knesset primarily because it believes that the Israeli 
authorities exploit Arab representation in the Knesset to promote its alleged democracy and justice 
towards the Arab citizens [by claiming that the mere presence of Arab members in the Knesset indicates 
Israel's democracy]. The NIM also believes that such participation did not improve the lives of 
Palestinians, and statistics support this claim.  
Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors explain that deliberative rhetoric is concerned with ‘what we 
should choose or what we should avoid’111. This is very true in the case of the NIM, as primarily it has 
deliberative arguments about this. The NIM believes that the Arab community should avoid being part of 
the Knesset and should rather choose to build its own institutions instead of relying on the institutions of 
the government with its biased and discriminatory attitude towards Arabs.  
4.1.2.2 The Position of the SIM on representation in the Knesset  
In chapter 2.2 we summarized the development of the Islamic Movement and its split in 1996 that 
resulted in two branches of the Movement: the Southern Islamic Movement (SIM), that participates in the 
elections of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, and has members in it; and the Northern (NIM), which 
chooses to boycott the elections and has no representation in the Knesset. The previous section reviewed 
the position of the NIM and the rhetoric it uses to justify its position. Similarly, this section intends to 
summarize the arguments that the SIM uses to support its position and will analyze these arguments 
based on the components of rhetoric set by Aristotle.  
 




The aim is to begin by examining the literature produced by the SIM leaders; most remarkable among 
them being Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour, who is very active within the SIM-led parliamentary bloc [The 
United Arab List] and is a prominent leader in the SIM. He was its chairman until 2010. 
In an article published online112, Sarsour addressed the general public and listed three reasons that he 
thinks Arabs must cast their vote in the Knesset elections:  
1- By voting, you express your eagerness to take part in shaping the present and the future of the 
Arab public in this land, and of bolstering its power against the Israeli parties and government. 
2- You decrease the chances of the Israeli radical right winning a majority in the next Knesset. Not 
doing so would simply mean allowing this radical right to rule the country and lead it in a path 
that contradicts our interest as an Arab community and as a Palestinian people under occupation. 
3- You confuse those radical parties, and hinder their plans to entrench racism and enmity towards 
us in the interior [Israel] and towards our people in the Palestinian territories.  
In another statement by the SIM leader Masoud Ghanayim and a current Knesset member, he said:  
In my capacity as a Knesset member, I have served the people as much as I could, and I have used 
all the parliamentary resources that I could to resolve the problems our Arab community faces, 
and to stop the discrimination against it. I also served the people in my city Sakhnin, on different 
issues such as expanding the town's territorial area. I used my position as a Knesset member to 
emphasize the discrimination and marginalization that we are suffering as Arab Palestinians in 
this state. In order to continue providing this service, we urge everybody to go and vote on the 
elections day, and not to leave the stage for the Zionist parties.  
Another motif that the SIM, and in fact all Arab parliamentary parties seem to repeat each time the 
Knesset topic is raised, is the claim that ‘every uncast Arab vote goes to the radical far-right Israeli 
parties who show flagrant enmity towards Arabs, and we must not allow them to take control and 
determine our fate in this land’. Sarsour from the SIM made this claim 113, as did Jamal Zahalka from 
 
112 Sarsour, Sheikh .AlMakan website. <http://www.almakan.co.il/?mod=articles&ID=34908>. Accessed on 4.4.2013. 
113 In a press conference, Accessed on 17.5.2013: <http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18896>.  
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BALAD114, and Muhammad Barakih from the CPI115.  Sarsour goes as far as accusing the boycotters of 
‘supporting the radical right-wing Zionist parties’116. Nevertheless, these parties collectively fail to 
explain the way in which the far-right parties will benefit from the uncast votes of Arab citizens. Not 
only do those parties fail to provide facts to support their claim, but they repeat and express it in a way 
that makes Arab citizens who choose to boycott the elections seem responsible for any potential 
shortcomings should the far-right control the government, whether or not the boycotters are actually 
responsible. Moreover, extra-parliamentary Arab parties like the NIM and the nationalist Abnaa al-Balad, 
criticise this claim on the basis that it makes it look as if there is a difference between the ‘left’ and the 
‘right’ in Israeli politics. They claim that when it comes to Arabs, Palestinians, and their rights, there is 
no difference between Zionist left-wing parties and Zionist right-wing parties, and that wars or offensive 
operations against the Arab countries or against the Palestinians were in most cases initiated under a 
government led by ‘left-wing’ parties. Examples include the two Israeli offensive operations on the 
Palestinian region of Gaza [in 2008 and 2012] that left hundreds dead, which took place when Ehud 
Barak; the leader of the left-wing Avodah (labor) party was the minister of defense. Another is the 
second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) that broke out when Barak was prime minister, during which 
thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli security forces killed dozens of Arab 
Palestinians in Israel. The Israeli-Arab 1967 war between Israel and the Arab countries Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, and Jordan broke out under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol who was a prominent leader in the Mapai 
party (left-wing labor party)117. In any case, threatening the Arab community with the ‘rise of the right’ is 
another argument that Arab parties use, including the SIM, to urge people to vote. Indeed, there's no 
difference in the way Arabs are treated by the right or left Zionist parties.  
In a public gathering that aimed to promote the SIM-led United Arab List and mobilise votes in the Arab 
city of Sakhnin, Sheikh Ali Abu-Raya, one of the SIM's leaders stated: ‘politics is an integral part of 
Islam, and is one aspect of our multifaceted activism as an Islamic Movement. Through politics, we aid 
 
114 In a public meeting, Accessed on 17.5.2013: <http://www.alarab.net/Article/509319>.  
115  In one of CPI's party gatherings, Accessed on 17.5.2013: <http://www.panet.co.il/online/articles/88/89/S-
637202,88,89.html>.  
116 In the official website of SIM. Accessed on 14.7.2013. <http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18881>  
117 "Levy Eshkol", Wikipedia.< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levi_Eshkol > 
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and support our people, to help them be steadfast on our land. There is no dirty politics or good politics. 
There are good politicians or bad politicians’118. 
This short yet powerful statement serves two purposes: firstly, it reassures Islamist members of the SIM 
that politics, including Israeli politics, does not contradict Islam or Islamic teachings. The speaker, Abu-
Raya, felt it important to stress that, given the skepticism of the party’s members about political activism 
within the Knesset. Many consider it to be contradictory to Islam [which is the idea that drives the NIM’s 
boycott of the Knesset elections]. Abu-Raya therefore, reassured them that politics is an ‘integral part of 
Islam’. Secondly, Abu-Raya emphasized that the SIM takes advantage of the Israeli political system 
[represented by the Knesset] to improve the lives of Palestinian people in Israel, and to support their 
steadfastness and resistance. He justifies participation in the Knesset; an act that some SIM members may 
regard unfavorably, with the claim that it is in the benefit of Arab citizens. Lastly, Abu-Raya reasserts 
that politics in itself is not inherently problematic, but the way it is used by the ‘dirty’ politicians can be. 
On the other hand, he states that it can be used for good.  
Leader in the SIM, Advocate Abdulmalik Dahamshi, was an active Knesset member between 1996 and 
2006. On the eve of the 2013 elections he released a statement that listed some of what he called 
‘achievements’ of the United Arab List [the parliamentary bloc that includes several parties led by SIM]:  
We took every opportunity to influence Israeli policy, and many significant achievements were 
made for our people in the interior [Israel] through our parliamentary work. We also managed to 
impose our Arab and Islamic presence everywhere. Chief among these achievements is the 
cancellation of the “property tax” that has caused suffering in particular to Arab citizens, forcing 
them to sell their properties under the pretext of this tax, after they were annexed by the state… Our 
Arab community is standing at a critical and historical crossroads that will determine whether we 
are going to be influential and impose our will, or be the victims of oppressive Israeli policies that 
target our subsistence and our fair struggle for rights and a decent life. The Zionist parties, despite 
their differences, are united in fighting us and trying to put an end to our presence in this land, and 
we have to sweepingly move them out of our towns and cities. I call on the Arab citizens of Israel 
to go and cast their ballots, specifically to the United Arab List.119 
 
 118 Southern Islamic Movement's official website. <http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18915>.  
119 Dahamshi, (2013) 19 January 2013. Accessed 22.8.2013. <http://eltira.org/Neweltirasite/art.php?id=33051>.  
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The arguments presented by the SIM leaders can be summarized in the following: 
- Voting for the Arab parties who represent the Arab minority makes them stronger, which in turn 
strengthens the Arab minority.  
- Based on the SIM's claim, a stronger Arab representation means a weaker Zionist right-wing 
representation in the Knesset, and consequently lowers chances of right-wing extremist Jewish parties 
targeting the Arab minority. 
- Representation in the Knesset is important to voice the needs and demands of the Arab minority. 
- Such representation is important to service the Arab public in Israel and fulfil their needs.  
Rhetorical analysis 
From these and other statements by leaders of the SIM, it is apparent that the party focuses on utility: 
participation in the Knesset is regarded as important to protect the rights of Arab citizens, to bolster their 
steadfastness, and to support their hold to their lands.  
Clearly, the position of the SIM that Arabs must be represented in the Israeli Knesset is driven by utility 
and interest. The leaders of the SIM believe that the Knesset is important in the Arab struggle for rights, 
and promotes its activism through the Knesset as greatly benefiting, and having the potential to greatly 
benefit the Arab community in Israel. Utility and benefit are essential in every Arab parliamentary party 
in Israel, since the Arab struggle is not only about values and recognition of national, cultural, religious 
or linguistic heritage. It is also about tangible, basic needs, which is a domain in which Arab citizens in 
Israel feel they are discriminated against.  
The second argument presented above [the fear that stronger Arab representation would cause a weaker 
right-wing representation – regardless of the validity of this argument].is also deliberative as it relates to 
interest and benefits. It may initially appear that the fear only concerns values, namely that a stronger 
right-wing Jewish current in the Knesset would cause the radicalization of the Knesset and its attitudes 
towards the far right. But in fact, it also regards the fear that a stronger right-wing movement in the 
Knesset would mean a stronger threat to the Arab presence and future in the country. This would be  a 
threat to Arab citizens' rights and even their lives given that, as previously demonstrated in the 
introduction, prominent right-wing leaders in the Knesset have loudly voiced their belief that Arabs are a 
cancer that must be cleansed.  
60 
 
In discussion of the rhetoric of the SIM, it is important to note that it focuses on the utility or advantage 
of participating in the Knesset, in the same way that the NIM uses it to justify boycotting the Knesset. 
The difference between the two is that the SIM claim that Arab representation in the Knesset can help 
protect the rights of Arabs, fulfil their needs, and improve their lives; and the NIM claim that any 
accomplishments obtained through the Knesset are minor and insignificant compared to the experiences 
and demands of the Arab minority. For this reason, leaders of the NIM state that based on the minimal 
achievements that Arab Knesset members can achieve through the Knesset, it only functions for Arabs as 
a complaining platform, not as an effective tool for improving their lives. According to its leaders whom 
were quoted above, the NIM also believes that the mere presence of Arabs in the Knesset and the 
insignificant ‘achievements’ they make, are used by Israel to mask its crimes against Palestinians in 
Israel, in the West Bank, and in Gaza. It highlights them in the media to support the Israeli claims that 
Israel is the ‘oasis of democracy in the Middle East’.  
Sheikh Hamad Abu Daabes, the current leader of the SIM who replaced Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour in 2010, 
echoed the claim that the ‘achievements’ of Arab Knesset members are minor or insignificant. Since 
coming to position, Abu Daabes made serious efforts to reunite the two branches of the Islamic 
Movement, which was split in 1996 following internal disparities on several issues, particularly 
participation in the Knesset. In an article that discussed Arab representation in the Knesset and re-
unification of the Movement, Abu Daabes stated:  
Arab citizens are a minority composing approximately twenty per cent of the population, and 
their votes are scattered. In fact, Arab representation does not exceed ten per cent of the total 
Knesset mandates. Surely, this means that Arabs will never be able to change the character of this 
racist state, which favors Jewish citizens in all aspects of life. Furthermore, the small percentage 
of Arab members in the Knesset will never manage to end the Israeli occupation or liberate the 
Al-Aqsa mosque or the West bank, or any other parts of our homeland. Thus, evaluation of the 
parliamentary situation demonstrates that that the [Muslim and Arab] nation cannot use this 
channel in a significant way to rescue the Palestinian people, liberate their lands and return their 
refugees.120  
 
120  Methak, official SIM website. Accessed on 27.2.2013. <http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18736>.  
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This statement was made in the context of Sheikh Abu Daabes's attempts to converge the views within 
the Islamic Movement as a first step towards re-unification, however it shows that the current leader of 
the SIM is convinced that despite what other Knesset-enthusiasts say, Arabs can only achieve limited 
gains through the Knesset. This is in accordance with the claims of the leaders of the NIM.  
On the scale of Aristotle's three appeals of rhetoric; ethos, pathos, and logos, it can be concluded that the 
SIM leaders make significant use of logos-based arguments to support their decision to participate in the 
Knesset. On urging people to vote for them in the Knesset elections with the main focus on the benefits 
for Arab citizens, the leaders of the SIM must convince the voters of the importance of being represented 
in the Knesset. Again, in the deliberative rhetoric, it is important to prove that such representation is 
going to be useful and would improve the lives of the Arab voters. The rhetoric to the Arab public is 
simple: if their interest can be fulfilled through the Knesset the legislative authority in the Israeli state, 
then they must be part of it and voice their demands through it. 
Based on this logic, doing the opposite and boycotting the Knesset would mean that no one would care 
for the needs of Arabs. They would therefore end up disadvantaged by being deprived of their rights. For 
instance, Knesset member Sarsour stated:  
With the help of all Arab parties, we have set a target of at least sixty to sixty-five per cent voter 
turnout. This is possible and will mean strengthening the Arab powers in the Knesset, which will 
be reflected positively on the conditions of the Arab community. It is thus important to reinforce 
the Arab voice in the Knesset, the guardian of the Arabs interest in Israel.121 
The rhetoric of the SIM also uses ethos, which refers to the ability of the rhetor to establish credibility by 
emphasizing the party’s experience, skills, and qualifications, and their eligibility to fill the position. The 
words of the former Knesset member of the SIM; Abdumalik Dahamshi, demonstrates a significant 
amount of ethos. He says:  
We took every chance we could to influence Israeli policy, and through our parliamentary work 
we made many significant achievements for our people in the interior [Israel]. We also managed 
to impose our Arab and Islamic presence everywhere. 
 
121 Interview with Al-Arab magazine. Accessed on 27.2.2013. <http://www.alarab.net/Article/508817>.  
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This is a strong speech charged with ethos that Dahamshi followed by mentioning some of the 
achievements of his party, the UAL. Dahamshi calls on people to vote for the Arab parties, and to vote 
particularly for the UAL. He gives reasons as to why Arabs must vote [to counter the growing anti-Arab 
current in the Knesset], and why they must vote specifically for the UAL [due to its ability to make 
significant improvements to the lives of the Arab citizens in Israel]. 
Clearly, it is not sufficient to only use logos in calling people to vote in the Knesset elections. Examples 
of these are claims that ‘the Knesset is the tool through which your lives can be improved, and therefore 
our presence in the Knesset is beneficial for you’. If a party like the SIM has been in the Knesset for 
decades, it is also essential to make use of ethos and highlight the credibility of the party or its 
candidates. The competence and expertise would ultimately be necessary to realize its promises to 
improve the lives of Arab citizens and defend their rights. People would expect a party with a long 
history in the Knesset to have achieved some substantial accomplishments that would highlight their 
eligibility to be elected. Therefore, it is not enough to simply claim that voting is crucial, or that voting 
for a certain party is important. It is also important to prove such claims by presenting evidence that 
voting will be beneficial for the Arab public and that it is in the best interest of Arabs to choose that 
specific party, owing to its proven experience and noteworthy accomplishments attained through the 
Knesset. The SIM does that.  
4.1.2.3 The Position of the Nationalist Democratic Assembly (NDA) on representation in the 
Knesset  
As demonstrated in chapter 2, the National Democratic Assembly is an Arab political movement that 
stresses Arab nationalism as the core component of the identity of Arab citizens in Israel. While Islamists 
priorities the Muslim identity, and Communists put the Communist affiliation first, the NDA prioritizes 
the Arab identity, with its cultural, social, and linguistic values. Despite embracing Arab nationalism, 
which is considered by many to be genuinely contradictory with the Knesset and the values it is 
established upon, the NDA is one of the Arab parties that endorse participation in the Knesset. In doing 
so, it has managed to maintain stable power in the past decade.  
In light of the opposition to Arab participation in the Knesset by certain political powers, the NDA feels 
obligated to defend its position and prove the importance of Arab representation in the Knesset. In order 
to do so, it uses different arguments and rhetorical devices.  
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In an opening article published in the first bulletin The Voice of the NDA, circulated by the NDA in 
preparation for the 2013 elections, Jamal Zahalka, a Knesset member representing the NDA, wrote:  
The NDA has engaged the parliamentary work in order to service the people and handle the daily 
issues they face. Through this work, the NDA also seeks to introduce its ideological principals on 
all topics. The NDA has stood out with its dedication to the cause of the public and the 
responsibilities that the people have laid on its shoulders. It has bravely presented its anti-Zionist 
political program and its standpoints have angered many racist people in the Knesset. The NDA 
follows up people's issues on different aspects including education, labor, agriculture, industry, 
transportation, land allocation, housing, and health services, among others. That is all insufficient 
however, as the most important role of an opposition member in a parliamentary system is 
opposition to, and abortion of, racist policies, laws, and procedures by the government or its 
parties122.  
This statement by Zahalka highlights two important aspects of the NDA's view of the parliamentary work 
within the Knesset. Firstly, the NDA, like the other parties, considers Arab representation in the Knesset 
an important gateway to obtaining the rights of Arabs and to fulfilling their interests. Secondly, the NDA 
deems it important to be in the Knesset to present and promote its political views, and simultaneously 
oppose the political views of the Zionist parties. 
Like the SIM whose position concerning the Knesset was analyzed earlier in this paper, the NDA 
endorses Arab representation in the Knesset on the basis that it is vital for the Arab minority. Both, as 
well as the Communist Party, believe that albeit being the legislative body that creates laws that 
discriminate against Arabs, the Knesset can be instrumental in improving the lives of Arabs. The Arab 
citizens in Israel complain about the injustice and inequality that they experience. The discrimination 
against them by the government, specifically regarding allocation of budgets and lands, in addition to 
what they call the government's attempts to obliterate their cultural and national identity, are included in 
these experiences123.  The NDA declares that it is important to enter the Knesset to counter these 
 
122  The Voice of the NDA (2012), 4. <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf>.  
123 This report discusses curricula for Arab schools in Israel in which essential events in the Arab and Palestinian history 
were intentionally omitted, and ‘Zionist values’ were adopted instead by Israel. Accessed on 03.08.2013. 
<http://felesteen.ps/details/news/81397>.   
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discriminatory practices by the government. In doing so, it can promote the interests of the Arab 
community and address its concerns through utilizing the power of the Knesset as a legislative body.  
Remarkable in the rhetoric of the NDA is that its leaders do not differentiate between the political and the 
daily material needs of the people as it considers these to be intertwined. This was clear in the statements 
by Knesset member Zahalka, and is clear in the following, written by Knesset member Haneen Zoabi, the 
second candidate in the NDA's list for the 2013 elections:  
Under a racist regime, people's daily issues are political issues. The details of our daily lives are a 
result of the racism and discrimination by the authority that defines itself as a Jewish state. 
Detaching the daily life concerns from the political action is intended to blind us to seeing that 
our daily material issues are part of a political reality that cannot be changed without political 
struggle. It is a detachment that serves to make us realize the difficulty of our condition, but 
without knowing how to change it124.  
The other aspect of the NDA's parliamentary work is its view that the Knesset functions as the place in 
which Arab politicians can express their political and ideological opinions in front of the Zionist parties 
that get ‘angry’ in response, as Zahalka said. From that quotation it seemed as if the NDA gives more 
weight to vocalizing its ideological views before the Zionist parties than to the Arab public. This is 
reinforced by the fact that the NDA, in Zahalka's words, estimate that opposing ‘racist laws’ is the most 
important action that a parliamentary member in the Knesset can do. ‘The most important role of an 
opposition member in a parliamentary system is to practice opposition, and attempt to abort all racist 
policies, laws and procedure by the government or its parties’. The importance of ‘opposing’ is 
highlighted even more strongly in other parts of NDA's bulletins. These exalt NDA's ‘achievements’ in 
stopping, or even attempting to stop ‘racist laws’. This is regarded as much more important than actively 
engaging in the legislative process and working towards passing laws, not just opposing them. 
In The Voice of the NDA, the party highlighted the number of ‘racist laws’ that it had voted against. It 
also emphasized a number of counter laws that it had proposed, namely laws aimed at cancelling racist 
bills proposed by right wing parties. Among the many actions that the NDA mentioned in this regard, 
were the following: 
 
124  The Voice of the NDA (2012), 2. <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/nashra-women-16-B.pdf.  
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- The NDA proposes thirteen laws to cancel racist legislations. 
- A conference in the Knesset to counter the flood of racist laws was initiated by the NDA.  
- Zahalka: The NDA has spearheaded the struggle against the racist laws, and it has initiated 
actions within and outside the Knesset to stop the series of racist and anti-Arab laws. We couldn't 
stop them all, but we have definitely contributed to preventing the approval of many of them. We 
must be aware of this remarkable achievement and its importance in defending people's rights.125 
All of these examples confirm the suggestion that the NDA gives significant weight to the act of 
opposing laws that they deem to be against the interest of the Arab minority. In Zahalka's words, this may 
even be the most important work that a [Arab] parliamentary member can do.  
The position expressed by the leadership of the NDA that opposition is the most important aspect of a 
Knesset member's activism cannot be taken out of context. The Israeli Knesset is an arena in which Arabs 
constitute a tiny minority. They cannot pass any laws that directly influence Arab citizens and their status 
in the Zionist state. In fact, Arab Knesset members can voice their support and even recruit the support of 
the majority for the animal rights bill, but not for a law that aims to enhance the lives of Arabs or reverse 
the discrimination that they experience.  The leaders of the NDA, the CPI, and the SIM are all aware of 
the very slim chances they have in the Knesset game, and yet they play by its rules, hoping that the little 
that they achieve will help reduce their people's hardships. Accordingly, opposition might not be the 
game-changing practice, but leaders of the NDA believe that in the case of Arabs in Israel who are a 
minority that depend on the state, it can be helpful.   
Ms. Haneen Zoabi wrote in the fourth NDA promotional bulletin:  
We do not beg for leftovers, we demand rights, our rights. 
We are here before the [Israeli] state, whoever came to us must recognize us, 
recognize our existence on our land, and our standing in our homeland. 
We Participate in the Knesset elections to say our words, 
to transform complaints into an undertaking of change 
He who considers himself the land owner does not make complaints, but creates change and 
supports a political party that works towards claiming his rights 
The NDA is a struggle party, 
 
125 The Voice of the NDA, 1 January 2013, 4-5. http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf  
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The NDA represents all groups within the Palestinian people, without compulsion or exclusion... 
Together we will make the NDA victorious126 
This remarkable statement reveals three important points. Firstly, Zoabi echoes her colleague Zahalka's 
assertion that participation in the Knesset is essential in the pursuit for rights. Zoabi stresses however, 
that Arab citizens are worthy of these rights not out of the generosity of the state but because Arabs are 
the ‘landowners who were there before the state’. Secondly, Zoabi confirms Zahalka's idea that the 
Knesset is an important platform for Arab citizens to voice themselves, especially in opposition to issues 
that they disagree with and feel affect them. Thirdly, Zoabi talks about ‘transforming complaints into 
change’ through the Knesset, and states that ‘a landowner does not complain, he creates change’. This 
could be a hint at the Arab parties who boycott the Knesset, whom Zoabi accuses of ‘complaining’ but 
not ‘creating change’ by actively engaging in the Knesset's work. Lastly, Zoabi concludes with the 
importance of supporting her party; the NDA, in order to put these ideas into effect.  
The sixth candidate in the NDA's list for the 2013 elections was Heba Yazbak, the second female 
candidate in the NDA's list, after Zoabi. She wrote:  
The NDA enters the next elections with a list that includes the highest number of women ever, 
with plans to handle various issues that it is passionately working on in order to improve the 
status of women. The NDA continues to challenge the racist political system. This means 
standing against the racist regime and raising our voice, and in this case, the confrontation and 
raising our voice means casting the vote. We do not enter the Knesset because we trust it, but we 
enter it to confront the system and to represent the voices of our people. In this case, political 
participation is not only a right but also a duty, and it is our duty as women to also participate and 
influence.127  
This quotation reaffirms the NDA's view presented by the other NDA leaders discussed earlier. Yazbak 
fuses political and daily concerns, specifically social issues such as the status of women. She proposes 
that ‘challenging the racist political system’ is a gateway to improving their status. This echoes Knesset 
member Zoabi's statement that political struggle against the Israeli government goes hand in hand with 
other non-political struggles, like the fight for daily material necessities or social change. Like Zahalka 
 
126 The Voice of the NDA, 4 January 2013: 2.  <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/120-nashra-16pages.pdf>  
127 The Voice of the NDA, 3 January 2013: 2. <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/second-nashra-16pages-B.pdf> 
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and Zoabi, Yazbak stresses that the NDA is capable of leading the struggle in all its forms, whether 
political, material, social, educational, and so forth.  
In discussing the NDA's rhetoric, it is necessary to talk about a rhetorical ‘phenomenon’ that was the matter 
of debate in the months that preceded the last Knesset elections of January 2013. The NDA used what some 
called ‘the rhetoric of intimidation’ in order to win the votes of the Arab citizens. The NDA's rhetoric 
focused on the right-wing Zionist parties, and on key figures in these parties known for their blatant anti-
Arab positions and statements. These include Avigdor Lieberman, Baruch Marzel, and Michael Ben-Ari. 
The NDA utilized those figures and their radical attitudes, and vehemently warned against allowing them a 
position in the government. In doing so, the NDA pleaded with people to vote for it to prevent this outcome.  
An example of this is a poster that appeared in print and as web banners, displaying close-up photos of 
Lieberman, Marzel, and Ben-Ari masked in a dark color. Underneath, it read: ‘Our people want to scrap the 
racists’128. 
Another poster featured a quotation by Michael Ben-Ari that said: ‘we must encourage Arab migration from 
Israel. This has to be the plan, the objective’. Under the quotation it was written in large font: ‘to whom are 
you leaving this situation? It needs the NDA’129, hinting at the needs of Arabs to vote, and to vote for the 
NDA to rid them of these ‘racists’.  
Figure 5: NDE’s slogan: Scrapping the racists! 
 
 
128 The Voice of the NDA 1 January 2013,1.  <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf> 
129  The Voice of the NDA 1 January 2013, 3.  <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf> 
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In a promotional video130 that the NDA released on the eve of the 2013 Knesset elections, animated 
figures of famous radical right-wing people appeared, singing sarcastic songs that depicted what the 
NDA considered ‘racist, Anti-Arab statements’. The title of the video was We Will Not Leave the Arena 
for Them; another affirmation that the NDA had set a goal to fight the ‘racists’, and that Arab voters 
should vote and support that goal by voting for the NDA.  
In Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses torture and the compulsion that's attached to it, which sometimes leads to 
the victim giving false evidence in order to avoid more torture. He says:  
Those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true evidence, some being ready to 
endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others being equally ready to make false 
charges against others, in the hope of sooner being released from torture 131. 
There is a clear difference between torture and intimidation; while torture is physical, intimidation is 
psychological. There could, however, be a similarity between voting due to intimidation, and admitting to 
the crime under compulsion. Similarly to the way a person who didn't commit a crime admits to having 
done it out of fear of torture, some voters who did not actually want to vote did so out of fear of being 
responsible for the ‘rise of the right’. As such, this intimidation by the NDA and the other parliamentary 
parties manifest in a depiction of the boycott movement as a supporter of the extremist right-wing parties. 
Therefore, many will vote to avoid being in the position of unintentionally supporting the right and being 
classified as ‘Jewish right supporters’. This is especially likely given that some pro-Knesset Arab writers 
explicitly accused the boycotters of increasing the power of the right-wing Jewish parties.132. Those 
voters may have been intimidated into believing that if they do not vote, they will contribute to the rise of 
the ‘racists’ who want to expel and kill Arabs. 
Whether or not this ‘rhetoric of intimidation’ actually works in mobilizing votes for the NDA is 
irrelevant to this paper. However, what is of interest is that it is a card that the NDA repeatedly plays 
during and after election periods.  
 
130 On Youtube. < http://youtu.be/wOHsrzmDwZI>. 
131 Aristotle, Rhetoric. Online version translated by J.H. Freese. 
<http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1:1.15.26>   




The arguments that the NDA uses to justify its pro-Knesset position can be summarized in the following: 
1. Arab representation in the Knesset is important in order to represent the Arab minority, pursue its 
interests and its material, social, educational, cultural, and other needs. 
2. Participating in the Knesset is essential in having the Arab voice heard. It is one of the pillars of 
political struggle against racist laws and in countering racist legislative procedures. 
3. Only complaining without trying to make a change through the Knesset is futile.  
4. The political views of the Arab parties must be introduced to the public, and the Knesset is the 
right place for that. 
5. If Arabs are not represented in the Knesset, the right-wing parties will take over and the results 
will be catastrophic for Arabs.  
Rhetorical analysis 
With Aristotle's rhetorical classifications in mind, arguments in the deliberative axis, relating to the 
future, are identified. This is expected, given that the rhetoric under discussion is the rhetoric used for the 
elections, and the elections will have implications on the future. It will therefore influence people's lives, 
and most of the arguments are accordingly deliberative.  
Arguments one and two assume that if the Arab minority wants to achieve its goals, fulfil its interests, 
and improve its social, educational, cultural, and economical status and conditions, it must be part of the 
Knesset. They further propose that since laws are legislated in the Knesset, including laws that Arabs 
define as racist and discriminatory, it is important to be in the Knesset in order to counter attempts to pass 
such laws and accordingly defend the Arab public.  
The argument of point three is that if Arabs aim to be in control of their situation and conditions, they 
must not only complain, but must play a more active role by engaging in the work of the Knesset. They 
must utilize the Knesset's platform to tackle the issues that the Arabic minority is facing.  
Argument four states that it is in the interest of the Arab community to have its voice heard in the 
Knesset. In doing so, its demands would be exposed to the Knesset and the legislators, as well as the 
collective Arab public in Israel. The first step towards the fulfilment of the demands is the presentation of 
the demands to the legislators. Presenting them to the public [through the Knesset's Channel 33] serves to 




Argument five takes the concept of ‘interest’ to another level, as it uses the ‘rhetoric of intimidation’ to 
warn against the right-wing Zionist parties. The argument states that Arabs face genuine threats in the 
scenario that sees the ring-wing parties taking control of the government. It is thus critical that Arab 
citizens vote for the Arab parties in order to increase Arab representation in the Knesset and prevent the 
right from forming a right-dominated government. The interest in this case is not to promote legislation 
that benefits the Arabs, but rather to oppose legislations that would harm them and have negative 
consequences on their future in their homeland.  
These arguments relate to the question of the interest of Arabs in Israel. The pro-Knesset parties, like the 
NDA, claim that participating in the Knesset is important in pursuing Arab interests and in claiming their 
rights. Using Higgin's words cited in 3.1.2.1, these arguments are an accurate demonstration of Aristotle's 
deliberative rhetoric, in that they promote the good [arguments 1, 3 and 4] and avoid the harmful 
[arguments 2 and 5]. 
These arguments are exclusively logos-based in light of the three rhetorical proofs set by Aristotle. The 
logic behind the NDA’s arguments presented above, to justify participation in the Knesset, is simple. It 
follows that it is important for Arabs to have representatives in the Knesset for two reasons: to promote 
legislation that benefit Arabs, and to hinder legislation that harms them. It is logos-based as much as 
deliberative, in that it is about logical reasoning concerning that which is beneficial and that which is 
harmful for the Arab minority. The deliberative arguments suggest that logically, Arabs must be 
represented in the Knesset to fulfil their interests, whether political, economic, social, religious, 
educational, and so forth. This is no different from the rhetoric used by the other parties to explain their 
attitudes towards Knesset representation. Even the majority of NIM's arguments against representation in 
the Knesset used deliberative, logos-based arguments.  
4.1.2.4 The Position of the Communist Party of Israel (CPI) represented by the Democratic 
Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) 
DFPE’s support of Arab representation in the Knesset is very well documented in a study specifically 
focused on this topic, written by Ayman Odeh, the current secretary of the DFPE. The main arguments 
presented by Odeh, as well as some counterarguments to refute the arguments of parties opposing Arab 
participation in the Knesset, follow.  
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1. Parliamentary activism is not the only arena in which Arabs can struggle for rights; indeed, 
popular struggle is even more important, but this doesn't mean we can't utilize the parliament for 
the sake of resolving our main issues. 
2. Boycotting parliament does not aid in delegitimizing the Knesset. As long as the Arab citizens 
continue to hold Israeli passports and IDs, and run for the local municipalities' elections, we can't 
claim that Israel is an illegitimate country.  
3. For a nation that struggles for national and civil rights, it is pointless to abandon the most 
influential political platform in the country. Even if it only serves as a ‘platform for complaints’ 
as the boycott supporters' claim, should we refrain from voicing our call for truth and justice 
before an oppressive ruler?  
4. The elections provide the best opportunity for the politicization of the Arab people in Israel, as 
activists in large numbers are mobilized during the elections to raise awareness on political issues. 
The public is also much more willing to take part in political events and forums at the time of 
elections. This political mobilization in preparation for the elections has significantly contributed 
to the politicization of the Arab minority, especially during the martial law. 
5. It is not true that the Arab representatives in the Knesset have not been able to accomplish any 
tangible achievements. In the period between 2006 and 2009 alone, twenty laws were passed that 
were proposed by Arab members. 
Other leaders of the DFPE and CPI echo these ideas. For instance, Issam Makhoul, a CPI leader and a 
former Knesset member, stated in an open meeting: 
We do not believe that the parliamentary work is an alternative to the popular struggle and 
activism, but an extension to it. Thus our electoral battle and our appeal to the people does not 
aim to only convince the people to vote for us, but is also an invitation to them to take part in our 
battle to achieve change and confront oppression, discrimination, racism, occupation, settlements, 
and war.133   
Ibrahim Assadi, a communist writer, wrote in an article that was published in the DFPE's website: 
One month from now, the nineteenth Knesset elections will be held at a time when we are hearing 
radical voices provoking Arab citizens. They are calling on them to deprive their right of 
 
133 DFPE's website. Accessed on 18.8.2013: <http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=73559>. 
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citizenship and exclude themselves from any process that entails making a crucial decision about 
the issues that concern every citizen. Do we allow ourselves to support racist attitudes by 
boycotting [the elections]? Do we boycott the parliamentary elections, which is regarded as one 
of the simplest forms of active citizenship? Which rights can we demand after relinquishing our 
principal rights in [participating in] the parliamentary elections?134 
In another quotation that reaffirms the position shared by the DFPE and other parliamentary parties, 
Assadi speaks about participation in the Knesset as vital for the struggle for rights:  
We are the ones who have a cause; we are the victims of the policies of racial discrimination and 
national oppression, causing our poverty, educational regression, and relegation of our people to 
industrial zones. These are all reason enough for us to unite in our struggle to take what is ours 
from the ruling regime.135  
Lastly, Assadi warns against the way in which he foresees the negative implications of boycotting the 
Knesset: 
If we boycott the Knesset, you shouldn't be surprised at the reaction of the extremists against us, 
the intensification of the regulations of oppression, and the increase in calls to deprive us of the 
citizenship, which we have elected to abandon. I do not want to predict, as everybody knows what 
the non-citizens suffer in Israel or in other countries in the world. And whoever doesn't know can 
look at the residents of East Jerusalem or the Sudanese refugees [in Israel] who were either 
deprived of citizenship or are seeking to obtain it.136  
Dov Khenin is one of the DFPE's Jewish leaders and a current Knesset member representing the DFPE. 
In a speech he gave during a promotional meeting in one of the Arab villages in the Galilee, Khenin 
emphasized the material aspect of the DFPE's parliamentary work. He said: 
I am standing before you today after we managed to enter the Knesset in the last term with 
significant public support from north to south, and with fifty parliamentary accomplishments 
[successful moves in the Knesset, like proposing new bills or blocking bills that are considered 
 
134  Assadi, Ibrahem. Accessed on 10.8.2013.‘Boycotting the Knesset Elections is Cutting our link with Citizenship’.   
135 DFPE's official website. <http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=73564>.  
136 Ibid.  
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discriminatory towards Arabs], which we are going to double in our next parliamentary term. The 
DFPE is the warm house for our people; you vote for the DFPE because you are confident that 
this party seeks nothing but to support its people and promote its cause. When we say DFPE, we 
declare that we stand against the fascist right; we declare that we are in the arena; taking part in 
the protests and in the strikes to obtain social justice and equality, and we confront the right-wing 
government that seeks to ignite war and destroy every chance for peace. We are the ones who 
attained peaceful coexistence, and we are working; Arabs and Jews, men and women, to achieve 
peace and live in dignity.137 
In the context of discussing these parties' position concerning participation in the Knesset, it would be 
unfair to compare this pathos-charged quote with the previous quotes by leaders of the other parties. This 
speech by Khenin does not particularly aim to convince people to just participate in the Knesset 
elections, which is the case with the quotes presented by leaders of the other parties. Instead, Khenin's 
speech aims to convince people to specifically vote for his party, the DFPE. This statement is 
nevertheless useful in that it shows the way in which leaders of the DFPE convince people to vote 
through promoting the party. Namely, if the DFPE could achieve the accomplishments in the Knesset, 
could confront the fascist right, and largely enhance the lives of the Arab citizens, as Khenin claims, then 
of course participation in the Knesset is better than boycotting. Khenin's speech therefore serves two 
purposes: convincing boycotters to vote, and persuading people who usually vote, to vote specifically for 
the DFPE.  
In the same promotional meeting, one DFPE youth leader, Alaa Sa'ada, used what was earlier termed the 
‘rhetoric of intimidation’, namely, cautioning the audience against what could happen if the Arab voters 
boycott the elections and allow the ‘right-wing extremists’ to control the government. He stated: 
The existence of this racist government makes it mandatory that we, the general public; including 
Arab and Jewish youth, declare a firm stance against the right, in support of a just peace, equality, 
and social justice. Hence, we disapprove of the defeatist attitudes and voices that are calling for 
boycott, as this serves no one but the [Jewish] right. We all want to vote to practice a right and a 
 
137 A speech by Dov Hanin. 6 January 2013. Accessed on. 10.8.2013. < http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=73660> 
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duty, and we will vote for the DFPE, to wipe the right out and resist its racism against the 
minority.138  
Finally, it seems that this ‘rhetoric of intimidation’ used by the DFPE and the CPI comes from the person 
who occupies the highest positions in their hierarchy. The following is a very unambiguous and strong 
statement by the top leader of the DFPE and CPI, Knesset member Muhammad Barakih: 
If Netanyahu [the leader of the right-wing Likud party] is back in government, such a government 
would be a threat to life, health, economy, and all other [life] aspects. The DFPE is not going to 
allow that, as today we are in a more difficult situation, as they [the right-wing parties controlling 
the government] are threatening to attack Iran, which would come at our expense. It doesn't 
amaze me to hear voices that are discouraging our people from voting. This is a government that 
will bring harm upon your life, your house, your family, and you say that you don't care about 
politics. What logic is that? Whoever doesn't vote, votes for the right, therefore we must fight the 
government that want the Arabs not to cast their vote... Voting must bring down this horrendous 
monster and its crimes139. 
The way in which Barakih uses specific words in order to intimidate is clear. Phrases like ‘threat to life, 
health, economy’ or ‘this horrendous monster’, that Barakih used to describe the right-led government, 
are examples of the way that he attempts to arouse fear of the right in the hearts of his audience. Barakih 
played on this fear in an attempt to convince people to vote for the Arab parties. Repeatedly reminding 
people about the ‘threat’ of the ‘horrendous monster’ that is the Jewish right-wing parties, is one of the 
main arguments in the DFPE and CPI's rhetoric endorsing participation in the Knesset.  
Barakih does not only employ intimidation, however. It was remarkable that during the last elections held 
on January 22, 2013, the Arab parties resorted to a completely different tone in their attempts to convince 
Arab citizens to vote. Leaders of the Arab parties suddenly switched from threatening Arabs with the 
right-wing parties, to appealing to those who didn't vote to head to the polling stations and vote for any 
Arab party. Muhammad Barakih was among those who thought that if threatening didn't work, begging 
could.  Hours before the polling stations closed, Barakih released the following short statement: 
 
138 Ibid.  
139  Ibid.  
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Polls based on actual vote statistics indicate that there is a real possibility of overthrowing 
Netanyahu and Lieberman. I therefore appeal to all Arab citizens who have not yet voted, to head 
instantly to the ballots to cast their votes and strengthen our weight in the new equation, to 
prevent a situation whereby the right stays in power. If we don’t make a move at this critical 
moment, we will never forgive ourselves should this happen.140 
After using strong words such as ‘threat’ and ‘horrendous monster’, Barakih uses ‘I appeal’ and ‘forgive 
ourselves’. The DFPE was not the only party to change its tone on the day of the elections. All Arab 
parliamentary parties went on an appealing frenzy, and utilized every possible opportunity to transmit 
their appeals to the people, via internet websites, mobile SMS messages, paid radio broadcasts, and even 
the mosque minarets that are used to call people to prayer. Party members were also sent to the houses of 
citizens to beg them to come and vote141.  
This change of tone on the day of elections was motivated by the fear that the Arab parties had of a low 
voting rate among Arab citizens. This would mean that some Arab parties might not have received 
enough votes to be in the Knesset. Since every vote counts in this case, the parties had no choice but to 
struggle for each additional vote they could secure.  
Such change did not make the argument any different. In both cases [when using the rhetoric of 
intimidation, or the rhetoric of appealing], the Arab parties tried to alert the Arab citizens to the extremist 
right-wing Zionist parties that would control the country if the Arab parties did not get enough votes. 
These parties therefore didn't transparently say that if the Arab voter turnout were low, they would be 
excluded from the next parliament. Rather, they said that if it was low, the ‘horrendous monster’ 
represented by the right is going to take control of the country. Therefore, both intimidation and appeal 
served one purpose, which was to inflict fear in people's hearts, to pressure them to cast a vote that would 
prevent right-wing control of the next government.  
The arguments provided by the DFPE in support of Arab representation in the Knesset can be 
summarized in the following:  
 
140 Barakih, Muhammad. DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 18.8.2013. 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191960277613509>.  




1. Political action through the Knesset, alongside the popular struggle, is necessary to improve the 
lives of Arab citizens in Israel. 
2. Arab representation in the Knesset is crucial to prevent the right-wing ‘racist’ Zionist parties from 
constituting a majority and controlling the government and state, which would allow them to 
oppress Arab citizens even more. 
3. The Knesset elections are a great opportunity for the politicization of the Arab community in 
Israel, and for mobilizing it in the struggle for rights, justice, and equality.  
4. Voicing Arab demands through the Knesset is very important, even if it was only considered a 
‘platform for complaints’; after all, complaining is one part of the struggle for rights.  
Counterarguments to participation in the Knesset used by the DFPE and CPI leaders include: 
1. Voting in the Knesset elections is a core element of active citizenship. Abandoning it is like 
abandoning citizenship, and if Arabs abandon it, they can't demand citizen rights afterwards. 
2. Boycotting the Knesset election doesn’t really aid in delegitimizing the Israeli state, as simply 
carrying Israeli IDs and passports is an acknowledgement of Israel's legitimacy.  
3. Contrary to what the pro-boycott parties say, Arab Knesset members could actually accomplish a 
lot through the Knesset that alleviates some of the suffering of the Arab people and increases their 
quality of life.  
Rhetorical analysis 
Similar to the other parties, all of the arguments presented by the DFPE in favor of participation in the 
Knesset are deliberative arguments. This also applies to the counter arguments that the party uses to 
refute the claims of the Arab parties who oppose participation in the Knesset. Deliberative rhetoric 
[which is also called ‘political rhetoric’ since it is greatly used by politicians] concerns what is to come, 
and is used to convince the audience to either do or not do a certain action. This is based on what the 
rhetor believes is in the interest of that audience. Deliberative rhetoric is therefore about utility, efficiency 
and the benefit of the audience. The arguments of the DFPE above deal with what is beneficial for the 
Arab minority in Israel. These arguments and counterarguments, presented by leaders of the DFPE and 
CPI, serve to convince the Arab citizens of Israel that voting in the Knesset elections, and being 
represented there, is vital for their future, for their lives, their families, education, financial status, and 
social welfare. They claim that Arab members in the Knesset are able to pass laws that help to enhance 
the lives of Arabs, and at the same time block laws that would harm Arab citizens and threaten their and 
their families' future. To prove that, political leaders of DFPE /CPI remind the people about ‘the fifty 
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achievements that the Arab Knesset members have already achieved’. This is aimed at confirming their 
theory that Arab representation in the Knesset is not to be compromised.  
Deliberative rhetoric is also about what's not beneficial for the people. It is clear in one of the counter 
arguments presented above, that leaders of the DFPE, assured Arab citizens that giving up the right to 
vote, which is a principal component of citizenship, is akin to giving up citizenship itself. This is not 
positive, as it would entail nullifying the demands of the Arab citizens for rights and equality.  
In terms of the three rhetorical appeals set by Aristotle, it seems that the DFPE/CPI use a variety of 
arguments that are based on ethos, pathos, and logos.  
Ethos is strongly evident in arguments that the DFPE/CPI leaders and activists use to persuade people to 
vote for them, not just in the Knesset elections. Ethos is also present in rhetoric that the Arab political 
parties employ to convince Arab citizens to vote in general. An argument that utilizes ethos is 
exemplified by Dov Khenin’s statement, which started by reminding the audience that contrary to claims 
by anti-Knesset parties, Arab Knesset members accomplished fifty achievements in the last Knesset term 
alone (2006-2009). As a Knesset member and having supposedly contributed to these achievements, 
Khenin established his credibility before the audience as a person whose word is to be trusted. 
Accordingly, he claims that he took part in improving the lives of Arabs, and therefore assures them that 
Arab participation in the Knesset can undoubtedly improve their lives.  
Pathos, or the arousal of emotions, is clearly used in what was earlier called the ‘rhetoric of intimidation’. 
Many DFPE/CPI leaders spoke about the threat of the right-wing Jewish parties, and in doing so, 
intimidated the Arab citizens into casting their votes, warning them against the possibility that these 
parties would control the government and steer it towards more oppression and discrimination against the 
Arab minority. The DFPE/CPI, and other parties resorted to the solution that they believed could 
persuade people to vote; the attempt to instill fear in people. As the Arab parties wanted, Arab citizens 
that become afraid enough of the potential of the right-wing parties to dominate the government will not 
only vote, but will vote for the Arab parties.  
Ethos in rhetoric is the orator's ability to evoke the emotions of the audience, but not only through fear. 
Using words like Barakih's ‘I appeal to you’, imploring people to vote via radio broadcasts and mosque 
speakers, and pleading with them to rush to the polling stations before they close, was the last solution to 
the very low vote rate problem. After the threat of the right extremists failed, the Arab parties thought 
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that they could overcome the problem by begging people to vote. In the last hours before the polling 
stations closed, almost every leader of the DFPE, including Barakih142, Sweid 143, Odeh144, and the 
spokesman145 of the party, released a statement asking people to immediately leave what they were 
doing, and go to the stations to vote. 
Assadi, the DFPE youth leader who was quoted above, also made significant use of pathos to convince 
people to vote. Assadi specifically tried to evoke the sense of revenge in the hearts of his audience 
against the ‘racist’ regime that is discriminating against them in all aspects of life. In doing so, he urges 
them to unite; under the DFPE of course, and to struggle to reclaim what is theirs from the government. 
Encouraging a sense of victimhood is very likely to entice action by the audience against the victimizer, 
who in this case, is the government. Based on the DFPE's recommendation, the correct form of retaliation 
by taking back what is lawfully theirs, would be voting for the Arab parties in the Knesset. 
 
Another blatant pathos-charged attempt at persuasion was witnessed in the city of Umm Al-Fahm in 
which DFPE activists appealed to local residents to vote for its candidate and Umm Al-Fahm resident, 
Afu Agbariah. In a politically unconventional move, DFPE activists held large, printed banners with 
Agbariah's pictures on them. The posters read: ‘To those who possess morals and principals and whose 
conscience is alert, the respected residents of our town are worthy of your vote more than your fellow 
resident of Um Al-Fahm’146. In the Arab world, it is well known that family and tribal bonds are very 
strong. Similarly, in a village or town, people prefer to support fellow citizens rather than someone from 
another town. The DFPE tried to take advantage of this sense of ‘town patriotism’, and attempted to 
convince residents of Um Al-Fahim to vote for Agbariah, their fellow resident. His supposed eligibility 
was therefore not based on experience or qualification. In the event that every other persuasion method 
failed, the parties hoped that this would work.  
 
142 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191745680968302>.  
143 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013.< https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191760414300162>.  
144  DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013.<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191795350963335>.  
145 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013.  <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191872170955653>. 
146 DFPE fan page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. < https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=390127664413960>.  
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Logos is also present in the arguments of the DFPE as a persuasion strategy of cause and consequence, as 
a warning against right-wing parties. They repeatedly warned Arabs of the consequences of not voting. 
They were especially fearful of a stronger right considering the rising popularity of these radical Jewish 
parties in the past decade. Furthermore, this increase in the power of the right-wing parties would 
consequently create a weaker Arab front. This would significantly decrease the opportunity to hinder or 
block racist bills that would likely be passed by the radical parties controlling the government. The DFPE 
therefore claims that Arab citizens refraining from voting for the Arab parties would likely cause a 
significant power imbalance that would be damaging for them.  




Chapter 4.1 reviewed the position of the three largest Arab parties in Israel on Israel’s right to exist and 
on participation in the Knesset. The Knesset is the parliament of the Israeli state, established after the 
Zionist occupation of Palestine in 1948, marked in Palestinian historical narratives as the ‘Nakba day’, 
meaning ‘catastrophe’. This analysis unveils a critical aspect of the relationship between the Israeli state 
and its Arab citizens, the majority of whom define themselves as Palestinian, not Israeli. Discussing this 
matter is important in the study of the rhetoric of Arab political parties in the state of Israel, a place 




The analysis included a review of the way in which the different Arab parties perceive and articulate 
Israel's legitimacy. It revealed that the attitudes of the Arab parties towards the Knesset, and their 
decisions on whether to partake or boycott the Knesset elections, is largely determined by their belief of 
how legitimate Israel is. Analysis revealed that the parties that partake in the Knesset elections accept 
Israel's legitimacy fully or partly, whereas the one party that seems to not recognize Israel's legitimacy 
and its right to exist on Palestinian land, is the one that boycotts the Knesset elections.  
Analysis revealed different arguments used by the parties to defend their position, whether for or against. 
The parties that support Arab participation in the Knesset, particularly the NDA and the DFPE, share 
many arguments. Both claim that Arabs must be represented in the Knesset to pass laws that would 
improve their lives, and hinder laws that would make their lives worse. Both declare that being in the 
Knesset is important in order to prevent the extremist right-wing Jewish parties from taking over the 
government. Arabs were never part of the government though; even when the parties considered to be 
‘left’ in Israel formed it. Both parties also claim that simply resorting to complaints will not improve 
anything, and Arabs must rather take an active part. They maintain that this can take the form of 
engagement in the Knesset and its work, in blocking the passing of racist and discriminatory laws. The 
arguments of the NIM, which is the main political party that opposes Arab participation in the Knesset, 
and some argue is the largest Arab party in Israel, usually counter the pro-Knesset parties. The NIM 
claims that despite any accomplishments that the Arab parties in the Knesset claim they managed to 
attain, they could not make any tangible change regarding the serious issues facing the Arab minority in 
Israel. These include discrimination in land and budget allocation, in education, social services, ethnic 
rights, and ending the racist attitude that Arabs experience in many of the governmental intuitions and 
services.  
While NIM uses forensic rhetoric in opposing participation, stating that the Knesset is the parliament of 
what once was a group of Zionist military groups that occupied the Palestinian lands and later solidified 
into a state, most of the arguments used by both sides - for or against Arab participation in the Knesset 
elections - are rhetorically deliberative. They are concerned with the future, and deal with advantages 
versus disadvantages. More specifically, they present participation in the Knesset as an advantageous 
move that would improve the lives of the Arab citizens in Israel, secure their rights and fulfil their needs; 
or as a disadvantageous move in that it would harm the interests of Arab citizens, or at least not improve 




In their argumentation, each party employs various rhetorical appeals set by Aristotle. Ethos used by both 
writers and speakers hinted at their eligibility, and their opinions trusted regarding Knesset 
representation. I also found logos in many arguments that draw conclusions, via logical strategies like 
cause and consequence, about Knesset representation. I noted the extensive use of pathos whereby the 
rhetors (whether orators or writers) attempted to evoke the emotions of the audience or the readers in the 
hope that they would be emotionally aroused, and thus more willing to accept arguments. Arab party 
leaders did a good job in this regard, by attempting, in different circumstances, to arouse fear, 
enthusiasm, rage, or pity in Arab citizens.  This would have served in their attempts to persuade them to 
vote in the elections. 
Understandably, the rhetoric and arguments used by each party is determined by its ideology, which 
determines its position.  It was obvious though, that despite the significant ideological gap between the 
NDA and the CPI, they shared many of the arguments in support of Arab representation in the Knesset. 
This is explained by the fact that these two are, after all, Arab parties. Their members and leaders are 
Arab, and therefore they support the interests of the Arab minority. They speak the same language, 




4.2 Rhetoric Against The Recognition of Israel as a “Jewish State” 
 
The political and academic spheres in Israel have been occupied in recent years with discussion about the 
concept of a “Jewish Nation State”. Since he was elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu has 
continuously called for Palestinians to accept Israel as a Jewish state as a condition for negotiations to 
resume. Netanyahu is not alone; many analysts claim that the most important sentence in Obama’s 
speech during his “historic” visit to Palestine, last April, was “Palestinians must recognize that Israel will 
be a Jewish state”147. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority publicly expressed 
objection to recognize Israel as a Jewish state148. Such recognition does not mean that Israel is currently 
not a Jewish state, as Israel has been functioning as a Jewish state, for the Jewish people, since it was 
established, and Arabs who tolerated this first, started to feel that it is translated into discrimination 
against them, and started challenging the nature of this state. For this reason, Yuval Disken, the chairman 
of the Shabak (Israel’s General Security Service) declared that attempts to remove the Jewish nature of 
the state are “a strategic threat” and that the Shabak will abort all attempts to change it, even 
democratically149. What is new in this respect is that Israel now demands that the Palestinian Authority 
officially recognize it as a Jewish State. So, while Israel is in practice Jewish, and its Jewish citizens have 
first priority at all levels, it now wants official acknowledgement from the Palestinians and Arab 
countries, that it has the right to be a “Jewish State”.  
The reasons why Palestinians or Arabs reject the concept of a “Jewish State” have been illustrated no 
better than in an article by Professor Sari Nusseibeh150, where they can be summarized as: 
1. A state cannot be a “modern and democratic” state if defined by one ethnicity or one religion. 
2. If “Jewish” in a “Jewish state” refers to Judaism, it would be a theocracy; if it refers to the 
ethnicity, it would be an apartheid state. In both cases, it is far from being a democratic state. 
3. More than 20 percent of Israel’s citizens are Arabs, and the state being “Jewish” automatically 
means the alienation of Arabs in their own native land and reducing them to second-class citizens 
or even later stripping them of their citizenship and displacing them.  
 
147 <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/22/obama-s-demand-of-jewish-state-recognition.html>. Accessed: 
12.8.2013. 
148 <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4114446,00.html> 
149 Muhannad Mostafa, "Transfer Projects and the Jewish State", Tenth Intellectual Conference, in Haaretz 16.3.2007.  
150 <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201192614417586774.html> Accessed: 12.8.2013. 
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4. Recognizing a “Jewish State” means that any Jewish person, anywhere in the world, is entitled to 
full citizenship rights, while Palestinians who were actually born in that land would in practice be 
non-citizens with no rights.  
5. It would mean giving up the rights of 7 million Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, victims of the 
Israeli occupation in 1948, to repatriation or compensation.  
6. Recognizing a “Jewish State” that purports to complete the annexation of the whole of Jerusalem 
means “completely ignoring the fact that Jerusalem is as holy to 2.2 billion Christians and 1.6 
billion Muslims, as it is to 15-20 million Jews worldwide”. 
Professor Nusseibeh concludes:  
In short, recognition of Israel as a "Jewish State" in Israel is not the same as, say, recognition of Greece 
today as a "Christian State". It entails, in the Old Testament itself, a Covenant between God and a 
Chosen People regarding a Promised Land that should be taken by force at the expense of the other 
inhabitants of the land and of non-Jews151. 
However, what do the Arab parties in Israel say about the country they live in being officially recognized 
as a “Jewish State”? In the following pages, I shall discuss the position of the Arab political parties and 
the Arabic public they represent on the notion of a “Jewish Nation State”. What does such a concept 
mean to the Arab public in Israel? If Arabs oppose it, is this for ideological or pragmatic reasons? What 
are the alternative definitions of the state that Arabs may accept? Answering these questions will clarify 
the picture regarding this matter.  
 According to the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, by Professor Sami Smooha, the number of 
Arabs willing to accept a definition of the state as “Jewish and democratic” is in decline. The Index 
shows that the percentage of Arabs who agreed that the “Israel that exists within the Green line has the 
right to exist as a Jewish democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live” decreased from 65.6% in 2003 
to 51.6% in 2009152. Another opinion poll that was carried out in August 2009 shows that the percentage 
of Arabs who agreed to the statement “Israel has to stop being a Jewish state and must become one state 
for the two peoples” was 95.5%153. 
 
151 Ibid 
152 Smooha, Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2003-2009, p. 19. 
 153 Ghanim & Mustafa, 2009, Ibid, p. 118.  
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Understandably, Arab politicians have the same attitude. In September 2010 when the resumption of 
negotiations was declared between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), Knesset member Ahmad 
Tibi stated that Israel’s demand to be recognized by the Palestinians as a Jewish state was illegitimate. He 
said it is unlikely that Abu Mazin (Mahmoud Abbas, the PA’s head) would sign a treaty that includes 
such recognition, for it might endanger the status of Arab Palestinians in Israel, and void the right of 
Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland154.   
The position of the Islamic movement is not different. At its 2009 mass meeting held annually under the 
slogan “the Al-Aqsa is in danger”, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, deputy chair of the extra-parliamentary branch 
of the Movement, warned the PA negotiators that they are not authorized to decide on behalf of the 
Palestinian people regarding the recognition of Israel as a Jewish State155. 
Dr. Jamal Zahalka, a Knesset member and one of the leaders of the National Democratic Assembly 
(NDA), openly attacked Yasser Abd Rabbo, one of the PA negotiators, after news spread that the latter 
showed readiness to recognize Israel as a Jewish State within the framework of the peace negotiations 
between Israel and the PA. Zahalka called for the dismissal of Abd Rabbo and claimed that he has no 
right to waive the rights of Palestinians in Israel or the rights of Palestinian refugees156.  
Muhammad Barakih, chairman of Hadash, the Communist Party’s parliamentary bloc, claimed that the 
definition of “Jewish State” grants legitimacy to Israel functioning as an “immigrant state” welcoming all 
Jewish people around the world to be citizens in it, but on the other hand undermining the legitimacy of 
the native people’s citizenships157. 
In addition to the reasons why such recognition should not happen according to Professor Nusseibeh 
quoted above, what seems to motivate the opposition of Palestinian Arabs in Israel to official recognition 
of Israel as a Jewish State is the fact that they already feel oppressed and discriminated against even 
without such a definition being officially recognized, which raises concerns that things may get even 
worse if Israel wins the recognition it seeks. The Or Commission158 found that the Arab minority in Israel 
 
154 Ahmad Tibi, “Pressing Netanyahu is the key to success in Mideast peace talks.” Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2010 
155 Panorama paper, October1, 2010. 
156 Alarab news website, October 13, 2010. http://www.alarab.net/Article/334903. It should be mentioned that later, Abd 
Rabbo denied having made such a statement, and said, “We cannot recognize Israel as a Jewish State”. See Kul al-Arab paper, 
15 October 2010.  
157 In Arabic: Dawlat al-Muhajireen. Muhammad Barakih, “Haq al-‘Awda: Bayna Yahidiyat al-dawla wa-sahyanat al-
makan”. Haqq al-Awda, no. 17 (May 2006), pp. 7. 
158 About Or Commission from Wikipedia: “The Or Commission was a panel of inquiry appointed by the Israeli government 
to investigate the events of October 2000 at the beginning of the Second Intifada in which 12 Arab citizens of Israel and 
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suffers clear discrimination and inequality, and it presented individuals who testified to the unfair 
treatment Arabs receive from the government and its various bodies in all matters, including land 
distribution, budgets, employment, living conditions, as well as the prejudiced treatment they experience 
in educational, social, cultural, political, and religious spheres159. The High Follow-Up Committee for 
Arab Citizens of Israel is an NGO that represents Arabs in Israel on the national level, whose members 
are chairpersons or deputy chairpersons of the different Arab parties. It plays a rule in liaising between 
the different parties and facilitates collaboration between them and joint action on issues Arabs face in 
Israel160. Its chairman, Muhammad Zaidan, stated that accepting Israel as a Jewish State might mean the 
annexation of what is left of Arab lands and allocating them to Jewish citizens. Worse than that, 
according to Zaidan, the Israeli state may force Arabs to undergo another episode of displacement and 
even transfer, since Israel would, as a Jewish State, feel entitled to do what it wishes in the territories it 
controls within the boundaries of the Green Line161.  
To sum up, Arab citizens of Israel are not content with Israel being recognized as a Jewish State due to 
fears this may empower Israel to further oppress Palestinians inside Israel, and would mean the end of 
Palestinian refugees’ hopes of returning to their homeland.  
4.2.1 Rhetoric of CPI & DFPE - the Communist Party of Israel and the 
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality 
Although Arab Communists in Israel define their (mostly Arab) party as “Israeli”, they too deny the 
definition of the Jewish State and oppose recognition of Israel as such. Ayman Odeh, secretary-general of 
Hadash, stated: 
 A “Jewish state” means degrading our status, and in the worst case is a threat to our existence; 
it means terminating the Palestinian refugees’ right to return, legitimizing “population 
exchange”, adopting the official Zionist narrative, and it makes Israel, not the Palestinian people, 
 
one Palestinian were killed by Israeli police amidst several demonstrations”. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Or_Commission>. 
Accessed on 28.5.2013. 
159 From the official summary of the Or Commission’s findings, on Sikkuy, accessed on 28.5.2013. 
<www.sikkuy.org.il/english/2004/OfficialSummary.pdf>  
160 More on The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel : < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Follow-
Up_Committee_for_Arab_Citizens_of_Israel>.   
161 Interview with Muhammad Zaidan: Repercussions of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, in Jadal no.5 (Haifa: Mada al-
Carmel, December 2009). <http://jadal.mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/Jadal_PDF/jadal5-heb/intreview_with_zidan-
_final[1][1].pdf> accessed on 11.12.2010.  
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the victim who needs to secure its national rights. For these reasons, we reject the Israeli 
approach of “a Jewish State”. 162  
In the same spirit, Muhammad Barakih, the head of Hadash’s parliamentary bloc, in a speech he gave to 
an Arab audience in the Arab city of Nazareth stated:  
The concept of “a Jewish State” is a knife that threatens our mere existence, this is not a legal 
matter, it is an existential matter for all Palestinians whether in Israel or in the diaspora. How 
did Israel become a Jewish State? The answer is that it displaced the Palestinian people from 
their homeland and welcomed Jews from other countries based on Zionist principles. Are we, the 
victims, requested to recognize and acknowledge a concept like that? 163 
What is the rhetoric that leaders of Hadash and the CPI use to present their view on the concept of a 
Jewish State? Using Aristotle’s terms, it can be said that both ethos and pathos are used in the above 
citations. Firstly, we notice the repeated use of the term “victims” in the first two paragraphs above. In 
Ayman Odeh’s statement, he hints that “we are the victims who need to secure their national rights”, not 
the Jewish people. The victim vs. victimizer analogy is often used in an attempt to stir the emotions of 
the audience and persuade them to accept the speaker’s view. In this case, it is used by Mr. Odeh to 
affirm that demanding recognition of Israel as a Jewish State implies that Israel is the “victim” appealing 
for recognition of its national rights and aspirations, while the reality is that the Palestinian people, whose 
lands were occupied by the Zionist forces, are the true victims who were and are still being deprived of 
their rights despite being the native inhabitants. 
Similarly, and more strongly, Barakih uses the same technique, the victim vs. the victimizer analogy, to 
delegitimize Israel’s insistence on being recognized as a Jewish State, when he says: “Are we, the 
victims, requested to recognize and acknowledge a concept like that?” Barakih spoke about how 
Palestinians were expelled from their land and forced to become refugees in other countries, while Jews, 
who never lived in that land, were welcomed by the Zionist movement to the Israeli state simply because 
they are Jews. The description of the image of expulsion, displacement, and refugees aims to win the 
sympathy of the audience, and asserting that Palestinians are victims is another representation of how 
emotions, pathos are used to make the audience more accepting and supportive of the speaker’s position. 
 
162 Ayman Odeh’s blog < http://aymanodeh.blogspot.com/2011/06/blog-post_6792.html> accessed on 30.5.2013. 
163 A speech by Muhammad Barakih. <http://felesteen.ps/details/news/79290/بركة-يهودية-الدولة -خنجر-موجه-نحو-صدورنا.html>. 
accessed on 30.5.2013. 
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Logos as understood by the standard of Aristotelian rhetoric is active in Odeh’s statement when he states: 
“A ‘Jewish state’ means degrading our status […], it means terminating the Palestinian refugees’ right 
of return, legitimizing “population exchange”, adopting the official Zionist narrative…”. He offers 
several logical reasons as to why his listeners should adopt his view on recognizing Israel as a Jewish 
State. Odeh claims that being a non-Jew in a Jewish State automatically means you have a status inferior 
to Jews. He also claims that since it is a state for Jews, Palestinian refugees, who are obviously not Jews, 
will never be allowed to return to the land they were born in and from which they were expelled by the 
Zionists in 1948. Accepting it as a Jewish State, in Odeh’s view, also means adopting the Zionist 
narrative of Palestine being the promised land of the Jews. Warning against these logical outcomes in 
such official recognition of Israel is what Odeh uses to promote his, and his party’s, view that it is 
important to reject recognition of Israel as a Jewish State. 
On another occasion, the seventh mass assembly of Hadash in Nazareth, which was also attended by 
Jewish activists and leaders who are members of Hadash, Barakih stated:  
Hadash’s objection to the condition that the Palestinian side must acknowledges Israel as a 
Jewish state [so that Israel may agree to resume negotiations] does not mean rejecting the Jewish 
people’s right to self-determination, or abandoning the historical slogan “two states for two 
peoples”. 164 
Barakih here expressed the same position, rejection of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, but this time 
in a way that is more appealing to the Jewish members of Hadash and the Communist party who attended 
the event. He assured them that objecting to an official definition of the state as being Jewish does not 
mean opposition of Jews having a state of their own. To make that even clearer, Barakih underlined that 
his party’s position of still supporting two states for two peoples, one for Palestinians and one for Jews. 
This too can be explained using Aristotle’s pathos, where the speaker speaks to the audience who might 
be suspicious about his intentions by reassuring them that what he proposes is not something they should 
be concerned about but should instead support. 
This statement is a good instance of double rhetoric as a form of address to two different groups, in itself 
a case of a heterogeneous audience:  Barakih expresses his political views to supporters who belong to 
the two conflicting groups in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Barakih was certain to state 
 
164 http://hagada.org.il/2007/12/24/מסקנות-מהוועידה-השביעית-של-חדש-עוזי-ב/ accessed on 30.5.2013. 
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what Palestinian supporters wanted to hear, that he is against recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, but at 
the same time, stated what his Jewish supporters wanted to hear, that this is not a call to delegitimize 
Israel as a state and the Jewish people’s right to have a state of their own.  
The arguments presented by the CPI against recognizing Israel as a Jewish State can be summarized as 
follows: 
1- It would mean the acknowledgment of the official ZN narrative (that it was “a land without a 
people for a people without a land” and there was no Palestinian “nation” when Jews arrived). 
2- It would mean admitting that Israel is the victim, not the Palestinians, which in turn entails 
accepting what Israel (or the Zionist gangs that ravaged Palestinian villages and killed or expelled 
its residents before Israel’s official political entities were formed) has done to the Palestinians. 
3-  It would mean degrading the status of Arab citizens of Israel for being non-Jewish. 
4- It would mean ending the Palestinian refugees’ right of return. 
5- It may motivate the Israeli state to implement its population exchange plans and remove Arabs 
who do not belong to the “Jewish” class from their lands. 
The first two arguments are forensic, insofar as they deal with the past and with events that took place 
then but whose effects extend into the present. They relate to a law that was broken, and from the 
viewpoint of Palestinians, a crime that was committed against them, perpetrated unarguably by the 
Zionist movement. Palestinians claim that if they agree to recognize Israel as a Jewish State, they would 
also automatically agree to switch the roles of the victim and victimizer who broke the law. For 
Palestinians, there is a forensic value to the Nakba of 1948, which was the demolition, displacement and 
forced migration caused by Israeli occupation. Palestinians would not agree to have this value changed, 
which would happen if they agreed to Israel’s recognition as a Jewish state. 
On the other hand, it could be said that arguments 3, 4 and 5 also operate at a deliberative level inasmuch 
as they create a scenario for the future: they outline what could happen if Israel’s attempts to be 
recognized as a Jewish State are met with success.  These arguments warn against the likelihood that 
Israel may further degrade the status of Arab citizens who do not fall under the “Jewish” category in the 
“Jewish State”. It is feared that if Arabs are not Jews in the new State of Jews, the argument assumes, it is 
likely that they will be deprived of the citizen’s rights and be treated as a lower-class citizens. Noting that 
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Palestinians in Israel claim that they are already treated as sub-class citizens, which is confirmed by 
statistical data done by independent research centers165.  
Similarly, raising the issue of refugees, who were forced to leave their land and settle in a foreign, 
sometimes hostile, environment in what they thought would be a temporary situation is another 
deliberative argument. The poor conditions of Palestinian refugees, especially in neighboring Arab 
countries which today accommodate millions of them, is a reminder of their need to return to their 
homeland at some stage in the near future. This is supposed to be an essential component of any final 
resolution between Israel and the Palestinians. This argument warns that refugees will not be allowed to 
return to their homeland because if the Jewish State is established as such, as non-Jews, they will not 
have the right to settle in the country. It should be noted that even presently no Arab or a Palestinian who 
was not born in Israel may be an Israeli citizen. Palestinians argue that recognizing Israel as a Jewish 
State would eliminate any possible hope that Palestinian refugees or some of them may be allowed to 
return.  
Finally, existing Arab citizens of Israel face the threat of being displaced again under the pretext of “the 
need for a population exchange”. Some Israeli leading figures explicitly state that “transfer” could be a 
solution to the “Arab threat in Israel”166. This idea has been raised quite a lot in recent years as part of 
negotiations on illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, concerning which some propose that Jewish 
settlers move into dominantly Arab areas in Israel whose Arab residents, in turn, can move to the West 
Bank, which means losing their citizenship and, more importantly, their lands. Perhaps the best context 
for the implementation of such an idea is Israel as a Jewish State, whose priority in terms of resources 
and land allocation would be to Jews. Therefore, a deliberation about the purposefulness of the 
population exchange plan is the essence of this argument. It shows that such a future scenario which is 
likely to take place if Israel is indeed recognized as a Jewish State, is totally opposed to the interests of 
Arab citizens in Israel, and for that reason it must not be accepted.  
To sum up, it can be said that if deliberative is about utility or interest, namely, which condition or 
solution is better for the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel, then the above deliberative arguments 
 
165 Adalah, The Inequality Report. < http://adalh.org/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf>. 
Accessed on 12.3.2013. 
166 Avigdor Liberman repeatedly stated that transfer is a good solution to the problem of "disloyal" Arabs. < 




suggesting scenarios demonstrating that recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is certainly not in the interest 
of this community, therefore, their interest demands there to be no agreement to such recognition. 
Next, I will discuss the rhetoric used by the other two political streams when addressing the same topic of 
a Jewish State.  
4.2.2 Rhetoric of NDA - the National Democratic Assembly 
The National Democratic Assembly (NDA) shares the position as the CPI in opposing recognition of 
Israel as a Jewish State, albeit for slightly different reasons. Knesset member Ms. Hanin Zoabi who 
represents the NDA in the Knesset, believes that the Israeli state, by redefining democracy and restricting 
it to cover only those who fall under the definition of “Jewish”, aims to restrict the Arab political 
nationalist movement and exclude its members from spheres of influence. Zoabi claims that Israel did not 
do this previously as it did not feel threatened by what Zoabi calls “the old struggle for peace and 
equality”, hinting at the rhetoric of the Communist Party, the NDA’s main rival, which nationalists such 
as Zoabi criticize as being too “integrationist”. On that basis, Zoabi claims that “Israel cannot fight those 
who use democratic means, and the solution is therefore to re-define “democracy” to turn means that 
were once considered democratic into being undemocratic or even illegal. Arab activists would then be 
looked at as a threat to the country and its security”167.  
Azmi Bishara168, the renowned Palestinian intellectual who played a major rule in forming the NDA in 
1996, offers another perspective on such recognition that indirectly relates to the debate of who has the 
right to Palestinian land. He says169:  
Recognizing Israel as a Jewish state has another end, which is taking recognition of Israel as a 
fact on the ground to another stage, of recognizing Zionism. Namely, recognizing that the Zionist 
movement was right, and Arabs and Palestinians were wrong when they didn’t accept the conflict 
as being a conflict between two sides who had equal rights in the same land. The “historic Jewish 
right” to the land is more capable of being fulfilled due to the current balance of power. 
Palestinians [if they agree to recognize Israel as such] will end up only recognizing a historic 
 
167 Hanin Zoubi, Recognizing Israel as a Mechanism to Criminalize Palestinian Political Activism”. < 
http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=763352/2> accessed on 6.4.2013 
168 Currently lives in Doha after charges of money laundering and contact with foreign agents were laid against him in Israel 
169 Azmi Bishara, “Last but Not Least- Recognizing Israel as a Jewish State”. Published on Arabs48.net < 
http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=757321/4> accessed on 7.6.2013. 
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Jewish right over it, and an unfulfilled temporary Palestinian right, conditioned by Zionist 
consent.  
Bishara then proposes how Arabs should respond to the Israeli request to recognize Israel as a Jewish 
State, saying:  
The answer is not referring to the past or intimidation by the threat of expulsion of Arabs who 
remain in their land [what is now Israel]. Arabs were in fact already expelled before when the 
Jewish state declared its independence and launched attacks to occupy Palestine and displace 
most of its inhabitants. The response is therefore to hold on to the right of return on the one hand 
and rejecting Zionism and its legitimacy on the other. This is a political stance; it is a political 
and an educational process at the same time.   
Dr. Jamal Zahalka, an NDA member of the Knesset provides examples of how recognizing Israel as a 
Jewish State can further add to the oppression Palestinians are suffering. Commenting on the new 
“citizenship” law that prevents any Israeli Arab man who is married to a Palestinian woman from the 
West Bank bringing his family to live in Israel, Dr. Zahalka said: 
What is most important about the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision is that it approved the legality 
of the racist “citizenship” law based on Israel being a Jewish state. The court clearly ruled that 
preserving the Jewish State means depriving the Palestinian citizen of a very basic right which is 
forming a family. The court blatantly said, “if you want to get married, leave the country”.  
The court’s decision and its circumstances completely undermine the legitimacy of recognizing 
Israel as a Jewish state, and it affirms the reality to the countries of the world, that recognizing it 
as a Jewish State means automatically recognizing its racism. This is the true meaning of the 
Israeli court’s decision.170  
In summarizing the arguments the NDA uses to back its position of opposing the recognition of Israel as 
a Jewish State, the following arguments stand out:  
1- It would mean recognizing the legitimacy of the ZN movement and its occupation of Palestine, 
displacing its people and seizing their lands.  
2- It would also mean recognition of the alleged historic Jewish right in Palestine. 
 
170 Jamal Zahalka. The Last Illusion About Preserving Israeli’s Jewish State”. < http://www.ahlan.co.il/article3626.html> 
accessed on 8.6.2013 
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3- If Israel is recognized as a Jewish state, there will be no room for anti-Zionist political activism. 
4- It would mean the recognition and acceptance of Israel’s racism against its Arab citizens. 
If we consider these arguments with the different rhetorical registers in mind, it could be said that the 
first two arguments are forensic, while the third and fourth are deliberative. The first two arguments 
relate to the past. The first one, the claim that recognizing Israel as a Jewish State would mean accepting 
the ZN movement, its narrative, and its justifications for the occupation of Palestine in 1948 and the 
surrounding circumstance: the displacement of Palestinians, massacres against them and demolishment of 
their houses; this clearly relates to the past, although its effects are still felt to this day. Reminding the 
target audience about the past in the Palestinian context with its atrocities and hardships is forensic in that 
it is an evaluation and assessment of the past. Such an evaluation is concluded with a remark about the 
perpetrator who, in forensic terms, broke the law. Such a reference to the past, recalling the catastrophic 
events that Palestinians experienced at the hands of the ZN movement, aims to emphasize the fact that 
this movement which occupied Palestine and displaced its people under the pretext of fulfilling the 
prophecy of the Jewish “chosen people” who ought to inhabit “the land without people for the people 
without a land”, cannot be given further acknowledgement and recognition.   
The second argument against recognizing Israel is because this entails recognition of the alleged “Jewish 
right in Palestine” is also forensic. It is an assessment of the present in light of the past. The Zionist 
movement claims that the land of Israel was promised to them, and it is their destiny to come back to the 
land they once inhabited but were forced out of. Arab political leaders argue that if Palestinians recognize 
Israel as a Jewish state, that would mean acceptance that Jews actually have the right to control the land, 
and their return to it in 1948 (albeit a violent return) was justified not because they have the right to live 
in Palestine like everyone else, but because it is historically their land, and therefore it is their right to do 
what they will in that land, including expelling its non-Jewish inhabitants, as Palestinians fear might 
happen if such recognition is granted. Hence, this is a forensic argument in the sense that it is an 
assessment of what could happen if that claim from the past is fulfilled in the present.  
The third argument made by the NDA leaders is that if Israel achieves recognition as a Jewish state, there 
would be no room for anti-Zionist activism in the country, and the state would crack down on Arab 
political parties especially those with Arab-nationalist agendas, like the NDA. It is deliberative in that 
Ms. Zoabi discussed something that is non-existent and warns against allowing it to become a reality in 
the future. Deliberation of this point, considering the anticipated negative consequences and laying them 
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out for the reader / listener aims to secure their support in the struggle against such recognition. It is 
therefore deliberative in that it relates to the future in an attempt to prevent something from happening in 
the present.  
While the first two arguments could be said to be forensic, and the third deliberative, I may suggest that 
the fourth argument is a value people experience in the present time, and therefore it is epideictic. 
Discussing the racist attitude that Arabs in Israel claim they face from the state is a discussion of values 
that collectively influence the (Arab) community in the present. The epideictic value of this claim is that 
racism is not a good thing, we must fight it and not support it or back it up by agreeing to recognize Israel 
as a Jewish state, which in reality is acceptance of Israel’s racism towards the Arab community. It is also 
epideictic in that racism is an idea that is common to the politicians and to the audience, especially in the 
present time where news headlines are always occupied with news items about the many new and 
genuinely racist laws that are being discussed in the Knesset, as Mr. Zahalka of NDA, quoted above, 
points out.  
Given the complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it might not be surprising to find that the 
arguments used by Palestinians relate to all three appeals of rhetoric: forensic, deliberative, and 
epideictic. The debate has to relate to the past (what Palestinians consider an occupation of their land and 
the calamities that have befallen them as a result of this occupation), and also to the future (the attempts 
to find a viable solution that would be agreeable to both sides and safeguard the rights of Palestinians). It 
should also touch on the values that prevail in the present day that play a rule in formulating people’s 
attitudes and views and are therefore important for consideration. Hence, such a debate and any 
discussion that relates to this topic would understandably incorporate the three types of rhetoric already 
mentioned.  
The four arguments by the NDA, discussed above all seem to be based on Aristotle’s logos appeal of 
rhetoric. They all draw a line between a cause and a consequence. If recognition is granted, it would 
mean the recognition of the occupation’s legitimacy and the alleged Jewish historic right in Palestine, it 
would mean compromising anti-Zionist political activism, and legitimizing Israel’s racism against the 




4.2.3 Rhetoric of the Islamic Movement 
Chapter 2.2 dealt with the Islamic movement, the circumstances of its formation in the 1970s, and the 
reasons behind its division in the 1990s, primarily due to an internal difference over representation in the 
Knesset. However, both branches of the Islamic Movement (the, Southern, parliamentary branch and the 
Northern, extra-parliamentary) seem to share the same negative position on the recognition of Israel as a 
Jewish state.  
4.2.3.1 SIM - Southern (Parliamentary) branch of the Islamic Movement  
The position of the Southern (parliamentary) branch of the Islamic Movement concerning recognition of 
Israel as a Jewish State is consistent with that of the other Arab parties. Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour, an 
eloquent speaker, is the head of the movement, the head of its parliamentary bloc, and its spokesperson. 
He is active in the media and social media spheres, always commenting on developments and events that 
concern the Arab community in Israel, issuing press releases that he writes himself, on almost every 
occasion. In an article about the recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, Sarsour provided reasons why 
Arabs, and especially Muslims, should reject such recognition; these are similar to those presented by the 
CPI and NDA mentioned in previous pages. Yet being an Islamist, he offers an additional, completely 
different motivation, from a religious point of view, which the other parties disregard as they are liberal 
movements. In this article, Sarsour provides the reasons why such recognition should not be granted and 
also sets the context, explaining why he thinks the Israeli government has been placing more and more 
pressure on Palestinian negotiators to officially recognize it as a Jewish State. 
Netanyahu insists on this condition, concerning the Jewish identity of the state, for two reasons 
that make him the winner in both cases whether one or both of them are realized. The first is to 
disrupt the peace negotiations since he knows that the Palestinians will not agree to it, especially 
while illegal Israeli settlements are being expanded in the West Bank and Jerusalem; and the 
second is that Israel will score a number of goals should the Palestinians agree to such 
recognition, among them the termination of the refugees’ right of return, threatening the future of 
the native Palestinian community and turning it into an endangered minority facing transfer and 
expulsion from its homeland; repudiating the Palestinian narrative and acknowledging the 
Zionist narrative; and legalizing racism against Palestinians in Israel…171 
 
171 "How to address the Jewish character of the state particularly at this stage?" 
<http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=329186> Accessed on 19.6.2013. 
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  Then Sarsour presents his core, religious motivation for rejecting such recognition, based on Quranic 
verses. The Quran is considered by Muslims as the most important source of Islamic teachings, followed 
by the Prophet Muhammad’s deeds and sayings. The Quran contains numerous legal rules related to all 
aspects of a Muslim’s life: religion, politics, economy, social life, marriage, inheritance, contracts, war, 
and other important matters. In fact, some researchers classify all verses of the Quran into two types: 
informative and juristic. Sarsour, who is also a religious scholar and a teacher of religion, makes sure he 
uses a religious argument that is also juristic. The following argument is based on one verse of the Quran 
that Sarsour presents for both types of audiences: Muslims and non-Muslims. To Muslims, he explains 
that this is an essential principle in the Quran, and due to its religious nature and being an order from 
Allah, a word of truth, it must be followed. But to non-Muslims, he also explains the juristic dimension 
of the Quranic verse and explains the logical explanation behind that juristic argument.  
There is no scope to impose an idea or an ideology that represents one party on those who do not 
embrace this idea or doctrine, let alone believe in what is contrary to it, religiously, ethnically, and 
nationally… Allah is clear on this, in the Holy Quran: “There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, 
the right path has become distinct from the wrong path”, and if the principle we believe in is 
“there is no compulsion in religion”, despite the weight and importance religion has, it is obvious 
that there should be no compulsion in less important and less critical matters. Earlier I mentioned 
why we oppose recognizing Israel as a Jewish State for political reasons, but I would like to add 
another, more important reason, which is the religious motivation. The principle of al-Walaa’ and 
al-Baraa’ is essential in the Islamic religion. 
Sarsour refers to the principle of al-walaa' and al-baraa', which should be explained first. According to 
Islamic literature, Al-Walaa' – allegiance and sincere love and help for Allaah, and for His Prophets, and 
for the Believers and everything that pleases him whether an act, a deed, an individual, or a group; whereas 
al-Baraa' is dissociation from what displeases him whether an act, a deed or an individual or a group172– in 
this case, the Jewish people, as Sarsour believes. 
 From this passage, we see Sarsour employing a religious principle to justify his opposition for recognition 
of Israel as a Jewish state, but more importantly, he also attempts to reinforce his opinion by attempting to 
undermine a strong counter-argument against his. Sarsour says: as religious Muslims, we cannot agree to 
 
172 Interpretation of Sheikh Muhammed Saeed al-Qahtani. "Al-Walaa wal Baraa'. P.5. < http://www.islamicemirate.com/E-
Books/alWalaawalBaraa1.pdf>. Accessed: 05.12.2013. 
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recognize Israel as a Jewish state, because –being citizens in it- it is like swearing allegiance to this state. 
Sarsour believes that this (declaring allegiance to a Jewish Israel) is problematic for Muslims since it 
negates an essential Islamic principle, that of “Walaa’ and al-Baraa’”. Recognizing Jewish Israel –in the 
eyes of Sarsour- is an act of allegiance to non-Muslims, which contradicts that Islamic principle of 
“Allegiance and Dissociation” and therefore it cannot be accepted. 
Then Sarsour defends his argument against a likely counter-argument: if the Islamic Movement or 
Muslims cannot show loyalty to non-Muslims, how can they live and co-exist with non-Muslims, such as 
Jews, Christians, Druze, Bahai’ and other denominations whose followers are also citizens of Israel? Or 
how can they be part of a society which they do not consider as deserving of their loyalty?  
Sarsour responds to this as follows. Speaking about Walaa’ and al-Baraa’, he says: 
…but its actual practice bears the question: how then can we co-exist with non-Muslims in one 
society, which is not ruled by Muslims? The answer is also found in the Quran: Human beings, We 
created you all from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may 
know one another. Verily the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God-fearing of 
you“(13) (49:13)”. The relationship between the different nations is thus of a civic nature in 
essence, which allows every group to preserve its religious and cultural identity, while still 
converging around the same civic system that secures order in the society in a way that guarantees 
the necessities of “partners” and fulfils their interests. This is the model that Islam and Muslims 
implemented for the fifteen centuries of the Muslim State’s lifespan. 
Sarsour’s argument here is clear: he says that yes, religious differences exist, and the allegiance vs. 
dissociation formula must be followed, but at the same time, Allah states in the Quran that all people are 
equal in His eyes and that they must communicate with each other, despite their differences. Sarsour 
therefore differentiates between the religious, and the civic: we are religiously different, but we are from 
one mother and one father, and can live and co-exist in one society, while preserving our cultural and 
religious values. Sarsour speaks about the “religious and cultural identity”, to remind us that yes, we can 
co-exist to fulfil our “interests”, but that does not mean we must give up our religious and cultural 
traditions and beliefs.  
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Lastly, Sarsour provides a counter-argument that he derives from a fact well-known to the public, against 
recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Sarsour says: 
It should be also noted that this problem [religious differences that makes recognizing Israel as a 
Jewish State not possible] exists even among Jews themselves. It is inexplicable that Israel is 
demanding the Arab, whether a Muslim or a Christian, to recognize its Jewish identity, while 
Jews themselves have not yet come to an agreement on the definition of “Jewish”. So ultra-
orthodox Jews reject Judaism as practiced by the Israeli leftists or seculars, to the extent that the 
party “Yahdut Ha-Torah” rejects the title “minister” due to the religious belief that Israel is not 
yet a religiously legitimate establishment [they believe the Messiah should have come first before 
the Jewish state is established] and their participation in it is driven by interest only. 
Furthermore, there is an aggressive struggle among religious Jews themselves around the same 
issue: Orthodox, conservative, and reformist Jews each have their own view of the type of 
Judaism that must constitute the religion of the state, and this heated debate is well known in 
Israel and foreign countries. How then, can we accept Israeli attempts to force us to swear 
allegiance to it when we believe in something that is contradictory to it, not only for political but 
also for religious reasons?173  
Sarsour utilizes the internal discrepancies among the Jews of Israel over which version of Judaism 
(conservative, liberal, orthodox, etc.) must be adopted as the official religion of the State, as an argument 
against recognizing Israel as a Jewish State. He reminds us that Jews themselves are divided when it 
comes to the relationship between Judaism and the state, and specifically, the question of which Jewish 
sect must dominate. If certain Jewish sects want the Israeli state to follow their own Jewish doctrine, and 
will not recognize the state if it adopts the doctrine of another sect, how can other groups, like Arabs who 
are not even Jewish, agree to grant such recognition? Sarsour therefore uses an argument that some 
Jewish groups use against recognizing one form or another of the “Jewish State”, to back his position of 
why non-Jewish groups should not recognize Israel as a Jewish State.   
The above citations show that Sarsour and his Parliamentary Islamic Movement reject recognizing Israel 
as a Jewish State for the same reasons the other Arab parties do, but also with a religious motivation 





Muslims to dissociate from it because it is not considered god-pleasing state, as it adopts a religion that 
does not acknowledge the prophethood of Muhammad, and Muslims cannot swear allegiance to such a 
state. The political/national reasons Sarsour provides are the same reasons I discussed earlier in my 
analysis of the arguments of the NDA and CPI (terminating the right of return, legalizing racism, 
threatening the Arab presence in Israel, and undermining the Palestinian narrative). They also fall under 
the same registers (forensic, epideictic, deliberative), and hence there is no need to repeat thee analysis 
again. More focus should be directed at the singular attitude of the Islamic Movement: its religious 
motivation.  
Whether or not such a definition of “Walaa’ and Baraa’” (allegiance vs. dissociation) is correct and 
whether it is indeed applicable in this context might be a matter of debate. However, Sarsour’s argument 
is sufficient to see that as a religious movement, his party looks at the matter not only from a political 
perspective but a religious perspective too. Sarsour putting the religious element even before other 
reasons and calling it “the most important” is unsurprising, given that all supporters of the Islamic 
Movement are religiously inclined people, and his argumentation must take that into consideration. 
Religious people usually seek answers, solutions, and guidance from the religion they follow, and such a 
position by the Islamic movement must also be backed by religious literature174. 
Like most verses that carry a legislative value that influence the daily lives of Muslims, the principle of 
allegiance vs. dissociation is not merely a tool used in sermonizing, but constitutes a rule that Muslims 
must follow, whether or not they are ruled by a Muslim ruler. Therefore, Muslims, according to Sarsour’s 
interpretation, must abide by this rule and refrain from showing allegiance to Israel, by recognizing it as a 
Jewish State.  
In the discussion of registers of rhetoric, one can safely say that this is an epideictic rhetorical 
argumentation. Religion is all about the values believers learn from their holy scriptures and prophetic 
teachings. In our case, such values are common and shared by the orator, Sarsour, and the audience, his 
movement’s supporters. The orator is aware of the importance of such religious values in the lives and 
thinking of his followers, and makes sure he addresses the issue at hand also from a religious point of 
view. It is important for the speaker to meet the expectations of his audience when addressing a matter of 
 
174 In fact, leaders of the parliamentary branch of the Islamic Movement used an interpretation of verses of the Quran to justify 
their decision to participate in the Knesset, which was necessary when the extra-parliamentary branch claimed that such 
participation is against Islam. This was discussed in detail in chapter 3.2 
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debate, and present his idea or view in a way that takes these values into consideration. If it is a religious 
audience, the argument must be religiously appealing enough for the audience to accept it. Sarsour’s 
argument shows that he is aware of that, which is evident in the quotations above, taken from an article 
read by followers and members of his Islamic movement, who are all followers of Islam.  
Argumentation based on religion or religious concepts are usually spiritual, and they are therefore pathos 
based, speaking to people’s emotions. In some circumstances, an orator may focus on words that evoke 
emotions to cause the audience to overlook logos and to judge his words logically. An emotionally 
charged speech will overshadow logos and logical thinking, keeping the audience’s minds occupied and 
unable to reason with the speaker's words. The stronger the emotional appeal is, the more control the 
speaker has over his audience. But in the case of Sarsour and the arguments he presents to back his 
position, pathos-based argumentation is not a strategy he uses to evade logos or to restrict the audience’s 
thinking and keep it under control. Sarsour does not even need that because he has already made sure he 
has provided logical arguments even before presenting his spiritual, emotionally appealing, pathos-based 
ones. Sarsour first gave the factual evidence of why the recognition of Israel by the Palestinians will 
bring harm upon them, and then he presented his additional religious reasons that are important for a 
large part of his audience to whom religion – and not only Palestinian nationality- is a very important 
component of their identity. Therefore, we see that Sarsour took care to make his position convincing not 
only for his (religious) audience but also for those who are not necessarily religious, or even follow a 
different religion, by using logos-based arguments. 
Although Sarsour’s argument is based on a religious principle, it still has a logos basis too. It is based on 
the fact that the mostly Muslim Palestinians, as a unique group with its unique beliefs and way of life, 
cannot agree to swear loyalty to a non-Muslim entity. This combination of pathos and logos-based 
arguments is important to make one’s line of argumentation persuasive enough, and the political/national 
arguments Sarsour presented (quoted in the first citation above) contribute to making his position more 
appealing.  
Finally, it must be noted that providing non-religious arguments alongside the religious one is important 
to avoid what Powell and Neiva call “the Pharisee effect”. They claim that if the orator is viewed by the 
audience as a politician who advocates a religious value, the support he enjoys is likely to increase. 
Whereas, if the politician goes too far and is overt in his religious appeal, a “boomerang effect” can 
occur, which means the audience will react negatively. Thus, they say “political speeches which use 
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religious strategies must do so without going so far that the speaker is labelled a religious fanatic”175. 
Sarsour avoids that, and instead gives a balanced position that he justifies with both religious and non-
religious arguments, to make his message appeal to a broader audience, not just Muslims or practicing 
Muslims.  
 
4.2.3.2 NIM - Northern (Extra-parliamentary) branch of the Islamic Movement  
In section 3.1, I showed how, and for which reasons the extra-parliamentary branch of the Islamic 
Movement abstains from participating in the Knesset elections. I showed that for the leaders of this 
branch, the legitimacy of the Israeli state itself is in question, and so one of the reasons why it boycotts 
parliament is that running for its elections grants it legitimacy and acknowledgement.  
Discussion on whether Arab Palestinians in Israel should or should not agree to recognize Israel as a 
Jewish state involves the same argument on legitimacy. If this Movement does not recognize Israel itself 
as a legitimate political establishment in the first place, the question of recognizing it as a Jewish State is 
irrelevant, and that’s exactly what one learns from this Movement’s reaction –or more precisely, the lack 
of it- to this issue.  
Despite the growing tension around this issue over the past few years, there has not been a single press 
release by the Northern Islamic Movement on Israel’s demand to be officially recognized as a Jewish 
State. The Movement monitors the debates, the Israeli political sphere and activity within the legislative 
system, and comments on almost every matter that is of interest to the Arab community, but it seems to 
avoid addressing the idea of a Jewish State and dismisses it entirely. I found very few references to this 
issue by leaders of the Northern Movement that present its stance. One item is a statement by Sheikh 
Ra’ed Salah, the head of the Movement and a prominent figure in the Arab and Islamic world, quoted in 
a news report. In a Friday sermon, Sheikh Salah stated: 
The occupation authorities’ attempt to force Palestinians to recognize a Jewish State through 
pressure and houses demolitions will not succeed. I say to the Israeli establishment, you have 
 
175 Larry Powell and Eduardo Neiva,The Pharisee Effect: When Religious Appeals in Politics Go Too Far, Journal of 
Communication and Religion, 2006, Religious Speech Communication Association, pp. 70-102. 
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been trying to impose such recognition through legal claims, but we are clear: we will not 
recognize the state as a Jewish State. 
Do whatever you want, and destroy what you want; we will not compromise our Arab and Muslim 
cultural identity.176  
Sheikh Salah does not provide arguments or try to justify his position. For him and his movement, the 
question of recognizing Israel’s Jewish status is irrelevant because the status of the state itself is in 
question. That is why, in this statement and in fact in all public statements by Salah, he never mentions 
the “Israeli State” or “country”; he always uses a periphrastic term, “The Israeli establishment” (al-
mo’assasa al-isra’iliya  المؤسسة اإلسرائيلية) to refer to the Israeli government and its parliament. The 
periphrase is a coded term: it allows the subject to be mentioned without being named. It appears in 
written publications or articles and demonstrates a clear refusal to recognize Israel as a state. This was 
discussed in detail in section 3.1. However, what is of importance here is the rhetorical construction used 
by Sheikh Ra’ed Salah and his movement: the lack of an argument seems to be an argument in itself, and 
the lack of rhetoric is itself rhetoric. We consider Sheikh Salah’s approach of refraining from 
commenting on the topic of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is as discussing Israel’s identity conveys 
implicit recognition of it as a state, which the Northern Movement seems to oppose. Sheikh Salah 
dismisses the topic altogether and does not give much attention to the question of whether or not the 
Israeli state has the right to exist as a Jewish State, because for him and his movement, the question is 
rather whether or not the Israeli state itself -Jewish or not- has the right to exist.  
Another area where this rhetorical maneuver can be witnessed is Sheikh Salah’s use of the term “The 
Israeli injustice” when referring to the Israeli government and legal system, particularly in his talks about 
the court cases brought against him for his alleged “role in inciting violence in the Al-Aqsa mosque”. In 
an interview with Al-Mayadeen TV channel, Salah says: “The Israeli injustice that’s persecuting me and 
my people is under my feet, whether it was political, social, or legal persecution”177. In such a wording, 
Salah not avoided mentioning or recognizing Israel as a state, but also used “injustice” instead of “state” 
to reaffirm his beliefs that the whole Israeli system was built on injustice and aggression towards 
Palestinians.   
 
 
176 In Masress news website < http://www.masress.com/alshaab/18158> accessed on 26.6.2013 
177 In Al-Mayadeen TV channel’s website < https://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/1379414>. Accessed 10.2.2013. 
102 
 
In another article by Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, entitled “The Jewish State and Us178”, Sheikh Salah speaks 
about everything except his Movement’s position on it. He resorts to a specific argumentative strategy: 
putting arguments in the mouth of his enemy, using their logos for his own purposes. He states facts and 
quotes Israeli researchers who claim that Israel is collapsing from within, and that many of its Jewish 
citizens are leaving the country and moving to live in the west. He also cites Israeli academics like 
Professor Shlomo Sand of Tel Aviv University, who according to Salah, does not even recognize such a 
thing as a “Jewish nation” and states that “The Jewish nation is an imaginative concept and a myth that 
was invented to create the State of Israel179”. Salah concludes180 that article by stating that:  
1- The concept of a Jewish State is an act of colonization. 
2- It targets us, Palestinians, and threatens to displace us from our land. 
3- There are many indications that this project will fail sooner or later. 
Sheikh Salah only says why he thinks the “project” of a Jewish State will fail, primarily because Israel is 
on the brink of collapse, as he claims, quoting scholars who mention reverse migration from Israel, 
corruption among politicians, and the lack of security. But again, he never provides any substantial 
argument as to why this “project” must be rejected. This reaffirms my suggestion that the Northern 
Movement considers this question irrelevant when the state itself is in question, which is confirmed by 
our analysis in the section about the Islamic movement in previous discussion on representation in the 
Knesset.  
Another reason why we believe the Islamic Movement tends to ignore discussion of the topic of 
recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is to avoid the “Pharisee Effect”, addressed in the previous section. 
Powell and Neiva state that if the orator goes too far in using religion in politics, the “Pharisee effect” 
will occur, where the effect would be unexpectedly negative on the targeted audience. Explaining this 
requires us to first remember that recognizing Israel does not go hand in hand with believing in the idea 
of the Islamic State. Like all Islamic Movements in the Arab world, the Northern, extra-parliamentary 
Movement believes that Islamic rule in the form of an Islamic Caliphate will return to dominate the 
whole region, including the Palestine. This obviously means no Israeli State will exist in that area, 
because a Jewish State cannot exist inside the Islamic Caliphate. In order for the Islamic Caliphate to 
 
178 The Palestinian Interior and the Concept of Jewish State, Tenth Intellectual Conference, Centre for Contemporary Studies, 
2010, p.7. 
 
179 Ibid, p. 8.  
180 Ibid , p. 13. 
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exist, Israel must first cease to exist, and some believe that due to Israel’s colonial imposition as an 
occupation force, this may only be achieved through violent conflict. Belief in the Islamic State means 
the de-legitimization of Israel, or simply not recognizing it as an independent state. 
This idea that Islamic movements around the world believe in has been a reason to attack these 
movements, including the Islamic Movement in Israel. This predictable conflict, the clash between 
Muslims and Arabs on the one side and the Israeli State on the other, is too radical to be addressed 
publicly by an Israeli citizen like Sheikh Ra’ed Salah and his Movement’s members. Not only the Israeli 
State, but many Arab citizens of Israel who are not affiliated with Salah’s movement might see this talk 
about conflict leading to the return of the Caliphate as radical. For this reason, Sheikh Salah as a public 
figure, seems to avoid discussing this topic to evade the risk of sounding like a “religious fanatic” which 
Powell and Neiva (quoted in section 3.2.2) believe is the result of going too far into religion in political 
discourse.  
To summarize, perhaps one reason why the Islamic Movement may avoid talking about recognizing 
Israel as a Jewish State is that doing so signifies implicit recognition of Israel itself, which the Movement 
avoids and for that reason uses the term “Israeli Establishment” rather than “state”. Additionally, talking 
about the Caliphate entails talking about Israel’s [possibly violent] departure, which might be viewed as 
radical by some, and lead to labelling the Islamic Movement ant its members as “religious fanatics”. In 
other words, discussing recognition of Israel as a Jewish state means implicit acceptance of Israel as a 
state. Accepting Israel’s statehood contradicts the belief in the return of the Caliphate. The Caliphate’s 
return would only be possible in an Israel-free region. Therefore, discussing the Caliphate would 
unavoidably involve discussing Israel’s disappearance, most probably after a violent conflict, which 
makes it a sensitive and radical discussion that may lead to the labelling of those who take part in it as 
“religious fanatics”. This is why the Islamic Movement often avoids talking about recognizing Israel as a 
Jewish state and does not relate to it, since it can cause the “Pharisee effect” and damage its reputation.  
Yet if we want to go a bit deeper, we would be able to find out the undeclared position of the extra-
parliamentary Northern Islamic Movement regarding recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. 
Mr. Abdulhakim Mofid, who is not one of the main leaders of the Islamic Movement, but a member of 
the political bureau of the Islamic Movement (the highest political entity), addressed the topic in a 
conference that was held at the University of London. He claimed that the idea of a “Jewish State” is not 
new, but it is being intensely discussed by Israeli leaders these days within the framework of a new 
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political context that they aspire to create. Mofid believes that this topic is receiving more and more focus 
in light of [Israel’s] denial of its Palestinian citizens, as a group that has its own identity and uniqueness 
which cannot go hand in hand with the concepts of “Jewish” or “Israeli”, as well as contradicting them in 
many ways.  
Mofid added:  
Agreeing to recognize Israel as a Jewish State means the disintegration of Palestinians in Israel 
as a group that has its own culture, identity, and heritage; Israel, by demanding its recognition as 
a Jewish State in reality also demands them to abandon their identity when they are requested to 
embrace values the state has failed to impose on Jews themselves, like the flag, the national 
anthem, civil and military service. 
Through this plan of a Jewish State, the Israeli government demands Israelis, namely Jews, to act 
like Jews, due to the failure to formulate a distinct Israeli identity. At the same time, it demands 
Arabs act like Israelis, by embracing these Israeli national values and practicing them.181 
Mofid also discussed the foreseeable risks of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State by Palestinian officials 
and Arab leaders. He believes that such recognition would entail the cancellation of the right of return, 
since Israel has stressed through its officials that this recognition is recognition of Israel as a country for 
Jews and Jews alone. Mofid draws attention to a statement by Tzipi Livni the former foreign minister and 
leader of Kadima Party, who, according to Mofid, stated that “recognizing Israel as a Jewish State means 
that Israel is a state for Jews and Palestine is a country for Palestinians”, which Mofid interprets as a 
reference to the idea of the transfer of Arab citizens in Israel to territories controlled by the Palestinian 
Authority182, an idea that is apparently still on the agenda of some Israeli leaders.  
Earlier in this section I suggested that the Northern Islamic Movement seems to ignore this issue 
(recognizing Israel as a Jewish State) altogether, due to its belief that recognition of Israel itself is a 
matter of debate, let alone recognition of its identity. That is why leaders of the movement show no 
interest in the topic and rarely, if ever, address it, and that is why the Northern Movement boycotts 
Parliamentary elections, partly because participating implies recognizing the state and its right to exist.  
Therefore, as a journalist, Mofid addresses the topic as a researcher, and not as a leader of the Northern 
Islamic Movement. It cannot be said that his involvement in a discussion about it contradicts the position 
 




of the Northern Movement that I proposed earlier. However, his comments on it are useful in stating his 
and his movement’s denial of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, although the movement’s leaders do 
not address it.  
 
4.2.4 Conclusions 
To conclude this section about the position of Arab parties in Israel on recognition of Israel as a Jewish 
state, it is possible to state that Arab parties entirely reject and under no circumstances agree to official 
recognition of Israel as a Jewish State. This argument seems to be driven by motivations that can be 
classified in three groups: pragmatic (epideictic), ideological or moral (forensic), and theoretical 
(deliberative).   
Among the pragmatic or practical reasons for this rejection are the claims that such recognition would 
genuinely contradict the concept of “democracy” which Israel prides itself on being: “the only democracy 
in the Middle East”. Jewish people would be favored in budgets, resources, welfare and public services, 
land allocation, development, and employment. It would threaten the status of Arabs as citizens and, 
since they are not Jewish, make them even lower than second-class citizens. Racism and inequality 
against them will intensify, and discrimination will reach even higher levels.  Democracy, justice, 
equality, racism, discrimination, citizenship are all values, hence the category of epideictic rhetoric 
applies to this set of arguments against recognizing Israel as a Jewish state.  
Secondly, there are ideological or moral motivations that stem from the historical context in which the 
Israeli state was established, that resulted in the displacement of Palestinians and the destruction of their 
villages, properties, culture, and their collective identity as a Palestinian people. Agreeing to recognize 
Israel as a Jewish State means undermining the Palestinian narrative and adopting the Zionist narrative, 
that there was no “people” in Palestine, and that Arabs are the ones who started the violence, and that 
they willingly left their lands because they did not want to live with Jews (and not as a result of 
massacres committed against them, as Arab politicians suggest). Admitting the suffering and the 
horrendous events Palestinians had to undergo following the Zionist occupation is considered by Arabs to 
be a moral obligation. Denying that it happened means denial of the whole Palestinian narrative of the 
struggle and the occupation of their land.  
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This judicial or forensic register of arguments, namely accusing one party and defending the other, and 
stressing moral obligations or violations, is therefore used to back the stance of Arab political parties in 
disapproving such recognition of Israel as a Jewish State. 
Lastly, deliberative arguments are used as well by Arab parties and politicians to outline the future and 
theorize what could happen if such recognition is granted. Deliberative rhetoric is about persuading the 
audience to take or to not take some action. In this case, these parties are encouraging the audience, the 
public, and officials, to agree not to recognize Israel as a Jewish State by advising them about “things to 
come” as Aristotle states. Should Israel be recognized as a Jewish State, it would mean the cancellation 
of the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to their homeland in the future; the future degradation of Arab 
citizenship and consequently depriving them of their rights; curbing Arab political activism; and the 
threat of forced displacement of Arab citizens in Israel (transfer) under the slogan of “population 
exchange”.  
All these likely scenarios are theories that Arabs fear may become a reality in the future if Israel wins the 





4.3 Rhetoric Against The Integration of Arabs into the National 
Service 
 
The topic of National Service has been widely discussed in Israel in the past decade. In particular, the 
political atmosphere among the Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel has been occupied with discussions on 
this topic and how to fight the imposition of the National Service on the Arab citizens of Israel. 
Originally, the National Service was created to allow religious Jewish citizens, especially women who 
did not want to join the Israeli army for religious reasons, to serve their country by doing voluntary work 
in one of several fields including the education system, medical centers, police system, and so forth. In 
the past decade, however, the Israeli authorities have been trying to impose the National Service on the 
Arab citizens. Their argument is that Arabs receive equal rights like Jewish citizens, and therefore they 
must offer duties like them; and since they do not serve in the army, they must at least perform the 
National Service to be eligible for equal rights. Arabs oppose the idea of being required to do the 
National Service for different reasons that will be dealt with in the following pages. But unlike the two 
issues we discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2, there seems to be a consensus among the Arab movements in 
Israel on the need to resist the attempts to make National Service obligatory for Arabs. The next chapter 
will cover the position of each of the major parties in this regard and survey their arguments against it 
and the rhetoric used to support these arguments.  
4.3.1 What is National Service  
The National Service (Sherut Leumi in Hebrew) is an alternative voluntary service for those who are 
exempt from military service in the Israeli forces and who still wish to serve the community183. The 
majority of those who receive exemption from the obligatory military service are religious Jewish men 
and women who abstain from entering the army due to their inability to fulfil their religious 
commandments there, such as the dress code in the case of women and studying Torah in the case of 
men. According to the Volunteer Association, the body recognized by the Israeli authorities to recruit 
volunteers and enroll them in voluntary projects within the frame of National Service, the service is 
 
183 Website of the official National Service association: Volunteer Association. < http://www.sherut-leumi.co.il/about.aspx> 
Accessed on: 15.11.2013. 
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suitable for "People who have ptur (exemption) from the army, irrespective of the reason for 
exemption".184  
In the very beginning, the obligatory National Service law was promulgated in 1953 to solve the issue of 
Jewish women refusing to join the army. Then the law stated that such women can do a National Service 
of twenty-four months instead. However, Jewish spiritual leaders mobilized against making the service 
compulsory, and as a result the bill was revised and the service was made optional in 1979, and what 
remained was a decision by the government to start the endorsement of the law, which never actually 
happened until now. In the same period, the national insurance law was revised to grant women who 
complete National Service the same privileges given to female soldiers in the army185.  
As for Arab citizens, in July 1954 the Israeli Defense Minister declared that Arab men are obliged to 
serve in the Israeli military. However, the law was later revised to include only Druze Arabs due to 
doubts about Arabs' loyalty to the Israeli state. The Arab community was then considered a security risk 
and a hostile element in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict; and hence the idea of the Arabs' service 
in the Israeli defense forces was not present in the political debate in Israel, primarily due to security 
considerations.186 
When the right-wing Zionist current first rose to power in 1977, National Service began to be discussed 
as an alternative for military service for Arabs, albeit without being compulsory. Moshe Sharon, then the 
prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs, demanded that Arabs between 18-35 years old serve in the 
National Service as a condition for being accepted into higher education institutes and governmental 
jobs.  
After Sharon came Binyamin Gur-Aryeh who occupied the same position as an advisor on Arab affairs. 
He revived the debate and called for exempting the Arabs from obligatory military service and rather 
allowing them to voluntarily serve in the army if they wish and creating a framework for their National 
Service. 187 Aryeh summarized the arguments of both camps, those for and against making the National 
Service compulsory for Arabs. According to Aryeh, the basis for the arguments against it are: Arabs’ 
 
184 What is Sherut Leumi. The Volunteer Association official website. < http://www.sherut-leumi.co.il/article.aspx?id=61>. 
Accessed on 12.11.2013 
185 Muhannad Mustafa. National Service and Palestinians in Israel. Um al-Fahim. Center for Contemporary Studies. 2006. P. 
11.  
186 Kimmerling, B. & Migdal, J. Palestinians: The Making of a People. New York, The Free Press. 1993. 
187 Atallah Mansour and Uzi Benziman. Dayareh Mishneh [Sub-Tenants]: Israeli Arabs and the Israeli Policy Towards Them. 
Jerusalem. Keter Publishing House, 1992. Pp. 115-125.  
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opposition to the plan; financing issues; enacting a law for Arabs only is discriminatory against Arabs; 
allowing Arabs to serve would make them equal to the Druze in terms of rights, despite being unequal in 
terms of duties; and creating high expectations among Arabs that the state won't be able to fulfil. Aryeh 
summarized the arguments of those who support the plan as: decreasing the Arabs' feeling of alienation 
in the Israeli primarily Jewish society and enabling the Arabs to show their loyalty to the Israeli state.188 
However, no serious attempts were made to integrate the Arab youth into the National Service until Ariel 
Sharon came to power in 2001, when he formed a special committee composed of national security 
specialists whose task was to set a practical plan for including the Palestinians in Israel into the National 
Service. In one of his key speeches that he gave at the Hertzelia Conference of 2003, Sharon said: "it is 
the duty of us all to design the Jewish and democratic state of Israel; a state where burden and rights are 
shared by means of performing the National Service". In December of the same year, Sharon met with 
the chairmen of the Arab local municipalities and stressed the need for Arabs to be part of the National 
Service.189 One of the major reasons why Sharon considered it very important to integrate Arabs in the 
National Service has to do with the events of 2001 that followed Sharon's unorthodox entry into the al-
Aqsa mosque accompanied by hundreds of security members, which Arabs considered a desecratory act 
of provocation, and led to the emergence of the 2nd Intifada. Afterwards Palestinians in Israel joined the 
protests, and like their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza, their protests were also violently broken up 
and a number of Palestinian Israeli citizens were killed by the Israeli police forces. As a result, the Or 
committee was formed, which aimed at investigating the reasons why Palestinian citizens of Israel 
revolted. Another committee, called the Lapid committee was tasked with researching the Or committee's 
reports and releasing its recommendations based on these reports. One of the recommendations by this 
committee was to integrate Arabs into the National Service to strengthen their relation with and 
guarantee their loyalty to the Israeli state and its symbols.190 
The last in the series of special committees whose objective was to integrate Arabs into the National 
Service is called the Ivri committee, which was appointed by then Minister of Public Security Shaul 
Mofaz. In February 2005, the Ivri committee (officially called "The Committee for the Creation of 
National-Civil Service"), released its recommendations to MP Ariel Sharon, which included: 
1- Making National Service mandatory for Arabs, not voluntary. 
 
188 Mansour and Binziman. Ibid. 
189 Muhannad Mustafa. National Service and Palestinians in Israel. Ibid. P. 24. 
190 Mustafa, Ibid. P. 26. 
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2- Linking it to rights, meaning that whoever doesn't serve will have no rights at all.191 
These recommendations were submitted to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Welfare, and the Minister 
of Defense. Leaders and intellectuals of the Arab public in Israel harshly criticized the report and the 
recommendations, and some said that "it is a military report written by military personnel, and despite its 
use of civil terms, it deals with the topic purely from a military point of view".192 
In August 2007, the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu declared that it had adopted the 
report by the Ivri Committee and approved the establishment of a National Service administration to 
recruit youths who are exempt from the military service. It did not, however, declare that the service 
would be mandatory. It was also announced that the administration of the service, which had been carried 
out by the National Security Council in the past, would be carried out by the Prime Minister’s Office in 
order to dispel fears among the Arab public that it would be run by the Israeli army or the Ministry of 
Defense.193 
Yet thanks to the strong and continued campaigns against the National Service by the Arab activists, 
parties, and NGO's inside Israel, the number of Arabs serving in the National Service remained very low. 
According to the National Service Administration, by October 10, 2010, only 1300 Arab citizens had 
performed a National Service,194 which is even challenged by prominent campaigners against the 
National Service like Baladna Youth organization, which stated that the numbers published by the 
Administration are inflated, and the actual percentage of Arabs serving in the National Service does not 
exceed 1% of the total Arab population.195 
The latest development concerning the National Service took place in July 2013, when a new ministerial 
committee was appointed by the Israeli government called the "Ministerial Committee for the Matter of 
Equal Burden of Military and Civilian National Service", or as it is called "The Perry Committee" since 
it's lead by the Minister of Science and Technology, Yaakov Perry (also formerly the chairmen of the 
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24.11.2013. 
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Israeli General Security Service (Shabak), which strengthens the Arab opposition to the National 
Service). This committee's task was not planning or theorizing, as was the case with the previous 
committees related to the National Service, but rather more of an executive task. Perry declared that the 
committee would work "to create real equality in ‘carrying the burden". 196 Primarily, the committee was 
formed to draft legislation that would increase Jewish ultra-orthodox (Hareidi) participation in the 
National Service since many of them received exemption from military service in order to study at the 
Yeshivas (religious Torah circles).197 But many Israeli officials said that the legislation would also aim to 
include Arab citizens in the would-be mandatory service. Danny Danon, a member of the Knesset and 
who currently serves as Deputy Minister of Defense in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, stated that: "The issue is not only Hareidi IDF service. The Committee should also 
recommend requiring Israeli Arabs to spend some years of National Service in hospitals, schools, or the 
fire department and encourage their loyalty to the State before academic studies".198 
The formation of this committee and its declared objective of legislating the National Service as the first 
step towards enforcing it as a mandatory alternative for those exempt from the army service, was strongly 
condemned by Arab leaders and unions, including the National Union for Arab Pupils' Parents, which 
released a statement calling for the refusal of this committee and its decisions, and the mobilization 
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4.3.2 The Arab parties' Position and Rhetoric on National Service for Arabs 
In the previous chapters, we discussed the Arab parties in Israel and the division among them concerning 
the topics of Israel's Jewish character and Arab representation in the Knesset. However, when it comes to 
Arab participation in National Service, there appears to be a consensus against it and a warning to Arab 
youth against joining the army. Many Arabs see National Service as a lighter version of service in the 
Israeli Army, which they reject outright. Arabs claim that the Israeli Defense Forces are the same forces 
that occupy the lands of their compatriots in the 1967 Palestinian lands, and the same forces that commit 
massacres and wars against them. For this reason and others, Arabs in Israel find it difficult to integrate 
into the Israeli army. When it comes to National Service, Arab Palestinians believe that National Service 
is just the first step towards military service, and that the government aims to "tame" Arabs and "Judaize" 
them and their identity to psychologically prepare them to join the military service.  
The motivations for rejecting the National Service by the Arab public and its political parties are the 
topic of the following pages. The analysis will follow the same pattern we used in the previous chapters. 
The arguments of each party against the National Service will be presented, which will be followed by an 
analysis of these arguments in light of the party's ideological background and Aristotle's classifications of 
rhetorical devices and rhetorical appeals. Since the arguments of all four major Arab parties in Israel 
against the National Service are similar, their discussion in light of Aristotle's rhetorical elements will be 
discussed as one unit rather than separately as in the previous chapters. 
4.3.2.1 The position of the Northern Islamic Movement  
Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, chairman of the Northern Islamic Movement stated, in an article he published about 
National Service:  
What matters to the Israeli establishment200 is that National Service starts in the Arab sector. It 
does not matter what name it calls itself or to which department it belongs: it can belong to the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, or the Ministry of Culture and Sports. National service might first belong to the 
Ministry of Health, and later may be affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then the 
 




Ministry of Public Security, and then the Ministry of Defense, the Israeli army, and the military 
service.201 
Sheikh Salah was hinting at the fact that National Service started under the Ministry of Defense (as 
explained in chapter 3.4.1), and when the people in its administration realized that this would deter Arabs 
from joining, they transferred it for it to be run by the Prime Minister's office.  
In an article about National Service published by the Islamic Movement's research center in Um Al-
Fahim, the writers summarized the Islamic Movement's reasons for opposing National Service. These 
are: 
1- It is the first step towards Arabs serving in the Israeli army. The Islamic Movement argues 
that those who complete National Service are treated like those who complete military service in 
terms of age, incentives and privileges, recognition and certification. In the Movement's view, this 
confirms that the Israeli authorities, through National Service, seek to infiltrate the Arab 
community and influence it from within202. 
2- An attempt to Israelize Arab youth. The Islamic Movement holds that an Arab who serves in 
the state's offices will grow more attached to the state and to symbols of the state. This, according 
to the Movement, will gradually replace Palestinian elements of identity and make volunteers 
more Israeli than Palestinian, which is a major threat to the Palestinian collective identity and 
presence, in that such people would stop sympathizing with other Palestinians (just as Arabs who 
serve in the Israeli army do), and will not take part in the struggle for rights and social justice 
against the state203. 
3- A gate to moral corruption. The Islamic Movement believes the integration of Arab youth into 
Israeli society will expose them to new values and principles, many of which contradict the Arab 
and Islamic moral and cultural values of the Palestinian people, and absorb them into the idea of 
coexistence and integration with the other, without ensuring equality with this other. The Islamic 
Movement fears that Arab youths who serve are vulnerable to being brainwashed and their 
religious morals, and national values corrupted; they may even be recruited by the security 
agencies as collaborators in the Arab sector.204.  
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4- Arabs to do not feel a sense of belonging to the Israeli state. The Islamic Movement stresses 
that Arab Palestinians in Israel do not feel that the state, its symbols and the principles of its 
leaders represent them, and in fact contradict what they believe. For example, the national 
anthem, Hatikva, calls on Jews to return to the land of Zion, a return that took shape in the 1948 
Nakba that resulted in the killing of thousands of Palestinians and the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands. Furthermore, the Movement argue that the symbols used in official emblems 
everywhere do not relate to their national, cultural or religious identities, like the Star of David, 
the menorah (seven-branched candelabra), as well as the flag, and  public holidays, which makes 
Arabs feel even more alienated in this country which they are required to serve205. 
5- Arabs will not receive their rights even if they serve. The Islamic Movement argues that in 
modern democratic states, rights are not conditional upon fulfilling duties, and Arabs must not be 
required to perform National Service to receive their basic rights. Additionally, the Movement 
holds that even if Arab Palestinians agreed to perform National Service, this will never improve 
their conditions, as even Druze citizens who serve in the Israeli army and appear to be fully 
integrated in the state's security and police systems, suffer discrimination and inequality. Lastly, 
the Islamic Movement emphasizes that Palestinians in Israel do not only demand ordinary 
citizenship rights but rights that relate to them being a minority in an occupied land, such as the 
right of return. Thus, the Movement rejects the idea of duties for rights altogether 206. 
6- Performing National Service is recognition of a state that is still oppressing Palestinians. The 
Islamic Movement argues that serving in governmental and state institutions is recognition of this 
state and its authority. The Movement claims that Israel does not deserve such recognition 
because it is still subjecting Arab Palestinians to oppression, treating them in a cruel and unfair 
manner and depriving them of freedoms and rights: demolishing their homes and annexing their 
lands, not recognizing many Arab villages that existed long before the establishment of the state, 
discrimination in budgets allocated to Arab villages and towns, as well as in employment, 
services, and humiliating treatment of Arabs in ports, airports, markets, and checkpoints207. 
The Islamic Movement stresses that a very clear indicator that National Service is just one step away 
from recruiting Arabs into the Israeli military, is the fact that throughout their development, the activities 
of the different committees that have dealt with enlisting Arabs into National Service, have always been 
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supervised and coordinated by non-civil institutes, chief among them being the Israeli National Security 
Council (NSC). Indeed, on the website of the NCS, under the subtitle of "National Service Ivri 
Committee", it is stated that: 
The Ivri Committee consolidated recommendations for the enlistment of youths that are not 
recruited into the IDF and / or National Service. The interim recommendations of the Committee 
were presented to the Prime Minister. The NSC is a permanent member of the Committee and 
coordinated its operations. 208 
The NSC is a major security institution that is defined as "the Prime Minister and the Government’s staff 
forum advising on national security issues".209 This probably explains the concerns of the Islamic 
Movement and other Arab parties in Israel relating to the acceptance of a service that is labelled "civil" 
but is coordinated and managed by staff from the defense and security fields.  
It is clear that the Islamic Movement strongly opposes the integration of Arabs in National Service, and it 
does not do so without offering an alternative. The Movement is known for its "self-reliant project" 
(Mashro'a al-mojtama' al-'islami) in which the Movement promotes a solution for many of the problems 
the Arab minority in Israel faces due to what the Movement considers discriminatory and unfair 
treatment by the Israeli state. The idea is that Arabs in Israel build their own institutional infrastructure, 
whenever that is possible, instead of waiting for the government to fulfil its responsibilities towards 
them. This project has translated into private schools and colleges, medical centers, economic 
development and consultation, and other facilities that the Movement has actually created to fill the gap 
created by the government's failure to provide Arabs with necessary services. The Islamic Movement 
sees that a self-reliant society is also the answer to the issue of National Service. While the Movement 
opposes integration into the Jewish state's system, it encourages the youth to do voluntary work within 
the framework of a non-governmental body that is created and run solely by Arabs. On this point, 
advocate Zahi Nujaidat, spokesperson of the Movement stated at an anti-National Service conference:  
The Islamic Movement runs many voluntary projects throughout the year such as the Negev Aid 
Project where we carry out many voluntary construction and renovation projects of schools, 
houses, mosques, roads and kindergartens. This is part of the Islamic Movement's project for a 
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Self-Reliant Society which we hope to be able to complete in order to fulfil our aspiration and 
build one united and strong society.210 
4.3.2.2 The position of the Southern Islamic Movement  
The position of the Southern branch of the Islamic Movement is identical to that of the Northern branch. 
In a lecture that was given as part of an anti-National Service campaign by the Southern Movement, 
Knesset member Masoud Ghanayim said:  
Our opposition to Arab integration into National Service stems from the doubts we have about 
its objectives, especially as the Ministry of Defense is its incubator, as well as the principles 
upon which it is founded, particularly "sharing the burden", and "rights for duties". We are a 
national minority that has suffered and is still suffering injustice and discrimination; we had 
been deprived of the resource of our lands which have been seized from us, so what burden do 
we need to carry? Rights should be given with no regard to responsibilities, and we pay all the 
taxes we are required to pay anyway. As for service in the army, we are not the only ones who 
reject forcing us to join the army; the state itself does not want us there, and they know why"211 
Sheikh Ibrahem Sarsour, a Knesset member representing the Southern Islamic Movement and the former 
chairman of its parliamentary party released a statement that indicates a position similar to that of his 
colleague Ghanayim, and that of the Northern Movement. The following excerpts taken from the 
statement212 reveal his views on the matter. 
1- Volunteering without doubt has great value in our Arab and Muslim culture, and this can be 
the basis for forming a framework to fulfil this value, but without linking it to the 
government's framework which we utterly reject, whether National Service is voluntary, or 
mandatory as the Minister of Defense wants. 
2- It is clear that this law, in addition to the threat that it poses to the Arab and Islamic identity 
of our youth and the clear plan to tame them, will not contribute to any tangible improvement 
in the quality of life of Arabs or the equality that we have been demanding since the 
establishment of the state. 
 
210 Zahi Nujaidat in a conference in the town of Kofor Kanna. Alarab news website. June 8, 2013. 
<http://www.alarab.net/Article/540600>. Accessed on 02.12.2013.  
211 Masoud Ghanayim. Al-Arab news website. < http://www.alarab.net/Article/470107>. June 8, 2013. 
212 Ibrahem Srarsour. The National Service law is a blatant attempt at challenging our Arab principles. March 20, 2012 
<http://www.alarab.net/Article/443914>. Accessed on 02.12.2013. 
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3- We cannot accept this law [the proposed National Service law] since it will mean that basic 
individual and collective rights will become conditional on this law, which contradicts 
international conventions and logical thought.  
4- We see a great example in the Arab Druze citizens who do not do National Service but rather 
military service, sacrificing their blood and souls for the sake of the state of Israel, and yet 
these sacrifices are completely ignored by consecutive governments, and the Druze are still 
suffering the discrimination and inequality we suffer from. 
These views are the exact same views expressed by the Northern Islamic Movement, as was shown 
earlier in this chapter. This is expected, given that both parties share the same ideological background. 
But what might be unexpected is that the other parties, the Communist Democratic Front for Peace and 
Equality, and the nationalist National Democratic Assembly, hold the same views, with slight differences 
in their reasoning, as we shall see in the following pages. 
 
4.3.2.3 The position of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality  
The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), the political party under which the Communist 
Party operates, has been active against National Service for Arabs since it was proposed for the first time. 
Ayman Odeh, the secretary of DFPE and the chairman of the Committee Against National Service, 
which is a sub-committee under the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens in Israel, wrote many 
publications and participated in numerous campaigns and conferences against National Service. The 
following are extracts from articles he has written and had published online by major Arabic news outlets 
in Israel.  
1- National service for Arabs aims to deprive Arabs of their national rights as the inhabitants of this 
land long before the Israeli state was established. 
2- It also aims to strip the Arab youth of their culture, language, and to undermine their sense of 
belonging to the Palestinian land and the Arab nation. 
3- The "rewards" promised to Arab youth who complete National Service are nothing but 
illusionary, as anyone can get a job instead of doing National Service, and he will earn much 
more than he would earn from the Service, and without sacrificing his national, cultural, and even 
moral values and principles213. 
 
213 Published on Alarab news website. 15.3.2011 <http://www.alarab.net/Article/363481 >. Accessed: 03.12.2013 
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4- National service would increase unemployment among youth, as the capitalists or businessmen 
and directors of organizations would invite National Service "servers" and pay them NIS 600-700 
a month rather than hire workers and employees and pay them a full salary. 
5- We support volunteering, but not politicized volunteering. We rejected the decision to impose 
National Service on us by the Lapid Committee which treated National Service as a first step 
towards integrating Arabs in the police and the military service. We fought against the scheme 
since 2005 when it was initiated by the Ministry of Defense, and we oppose creating committees 
like Lapid and Ivri to discuss the need to make National Service mandatory for Arabs without 
even consulting us and with no Arab participation in these discussions. They discussed the matter 
with the Hareidi Jews for thirty years, and they are refraining from discussing it with us even for 
one day. 
6- They talk about "sharing the burden" and our response is that we are citizens who pay taxes while 
we cannot choose how these taxes are spent. We say that we are the owners of this land whose 
resources have been looted by the state. The state has to compensate us, not make demands from 
us. The state is guilty, indebted, and the one who has to pay214.  
These views expressed by Mr. Odeh are echoed by the chairman of the DFPE, Muhammad Barakih. In an 
interview about the 2012 bill to impose National Service on Arabs published on the internet, Barakih 
said:  
It does not make sense that Israel declares itself a Jewish state then demands Arabs defend its 
borders and the aggressive policy of its government. This is utterly inacceptable: not yesterday, 
not today, and not tomorrow. Arab youth are not offered on Netanyahu's market for recruitment 
to the military, National Service, or anything else. If Israel wants to treat us as equals, it should 
first fix the historical injustice we suffered because of it, and reach a just peace with the 
Palestinian people.215 
In another press release, Barakih said: 
 
 214 Ayman Odeh. "We will challenge the law of mandatory National Service". Published on Alarab news website. 29.6.2012 
<http://www.alarab.net/Article/468563>. Accessed: 03.12.2013.  




The state should approach the Arab public with clean hands and stop attempts to pass new racist 
laws every week. Any talk about equality must be preceded by the abolition of all racist laws 
and legislation that have been enacted over the years.216  
 
4.3.2.4 The position of the National Democratic Assembly  
In an official press release by the secretariat of the National Democratic Assembly (NDA), the following 
was said concerning national service.  
1- The NDA states that the true intention behind the recruitment [of Arabs] for National Service is 
not simply to "serve society" but rather to pave the way towards recruitment in the police and 
military, as stated in the report by the Lapid Committee commissioned to implement the 
recommendations of the Or Committee. The report advised "the government to encourage the idea 
of forming an official national and civil service that Israeli citizens exempt from the army could 
perform voluntarily by volunteering in their community. The government would also work to 
increase the number of volunteers from the Arab sector in the police and army". 
2- The NDA stresses its absolute rejection of the National Service project, as this project mainly 
aims to distort the national identity of Arab youth and create a generation that is alienated from its 
identity, history, and people.  
3- The NDA believes that this project also aims to impose new rules for the political game, by 
linking natural rights with duties, while completely ignoring the policy of political and economic 
oppression of Arabs practiced by governmental institutions. It also ignores the policy of 
expatriation and land confiscation especially in the Naqab (Negev), and it ignores the increase in 
racism both among the [Jewish] people and the political system in Israel. 
4- The NDA points out that the project does not really aim to serve the Arab community but is a 
political scheme that aims to suppress the Arab community and silence its political demands. 
Furthermore, the places where [Arab] volunteers would be used were chosen by the National 
Service Administration, and do not necessarily have anything to do with the Arab community. 
One example of that is when Arab volunteers in the National Service were asked to go to the 
 
216 Alzaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations. Interview with Muhammad Barakih. 08/05/2012 




Naqab area in the south to help various Israeli institutions during the offensive on the Gaza Strip, 
which killed 170 Gaza citizens, including thirty-seven children217. 
The position of the NDA leaders is no different. Dr. Jamal Zahalka, the Knesset member representing the 
NDA came under harsh criticism from Jewish members of the Knesset because of the views he expressed 
regarding National Service during a meeting of the Knesset education committee. Zahalka said:  
Politicians in Israel, who claim that National Service is good for Arabs, are the same politicians 
who oppose every bill that is in the interest of Arabs. They are the same people who seek to 
enact racist and fascist laws. The more an Israeli politician is hostile to Arabs, the stronger his 
support for National Service for Arabs is. This is clear evidence that National Service is not in 
the interest of the Arab people".218 
Zahalka also said that the National Service for Arabs Bill was initiated by the Ministry of Public Security 
and was later transferred to the Prime Minister's office, but this does not change its reality as a security 
plan created to enlist Arab youth in Israeli institutions and detach them from their national affiliation and 
Arab identity. Zahalka said, "any Arab citizen who falls into the trap of National Service is a failure to us 
as leaders, and it must motivate us to work harder to prevent that from happening again. We are 
concerned about the social implications that these youths will have to endure. They have fallen victims to 
deceit"219. 
4.3.2.5 Analysis of the Arab arguments against National Service 
Before delving into rhetorical analysis, I will first summarize the arguments that all Arab parties use 
against National Service for Arab citizens. 
1- Arabs are doubtful about the real intentions behind National Service for Arabs, since the National 
Service project was first created by the Ivri Committee whose chairperson was David Ivry, former 
General in the Israeli Air Force and the director of the Israeli National Security Council. 
Moreover, the Ivri Committee was appointed by the then Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz. These 
facts as seen by Arabs as evidence that National Service for Arabs is in reality far from being 
 
217 Press release by NDA published on Al-Quds news website. 05.12.2012.  http://www.qudsnet.com/news/View/232454>. 
Accessed: 14.12.2013. 
218 Alarab news website. 07.06.2011. <http://www.alarab.net/Article/376879>. Accessed: 03.12.2013 
219 Ibid.  
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merely a civil program for volunteering and that it aims to "Israelize" Arab youth until they are 
ready to serve in the Israeli army. 
2- Arabs cannot serve a state whose principles and symbols contradict theirs. Moreover, Arabs 
cannot serve a state that is oppressing them and their Palestinian compatriots in the occupied 
lands, still confiscating their lands and depriving them of their basic rights.  
3- Performing National Service in the state's institutions is showing loyalty to this state, the same 
state that demolishes Arab homes and the same institutions that discriminate against Arabs in 
budgets and services.  
4- The concept of "sharing the burden" which suggests that Arabs must serve in return for their 
rights is invalid since rights must not be dependent on duties, especially in the case of Palestinians 
in Israel whose land was occupied, their houses demolished, and their resources annexed. 
5- The Arab minority should seek to create its own volunteering programs where the youth will 
serve the Arab community, as part of a larger project to build a self-reliant society. 
6- Serving in Jewish society will also expose Arab youth to new values that contradict their beliefs 
and principles, which might lead to cultural deviance and moral corruption. 
7- Arabs are deprived of their rights, and they will not receive these rights and no justice will be 
done to them even if they agree to perform National Service, because Druze Arabs who serve in 
the Israeli army also suffer discrimination and inequality.  
8- The rewards promised to Arabs who perform National Service are worthless as one can get a 
normal job and earn much more than what he/she would get from national service. 
9- National Service means cheap labor for some employers and directors of organizations who can 
recruit attendants instead of hiring workers, which would increase the rate of unemployment 
among Arab youth.  
10- Volunteering in Israeli institutions as part of a program that was not set by Arabs but rather by 
specialists in security and military shows that National Service is meant to "brainwash" and 
"tame" Arab youth and strip them of their national Palestinian and Arab identity. 
11- National Service is promoted as an act of "volunteering" while in reality volunteers are paid 
monthly. This distorts the concept of real volunteering which is serving the community without 
anticipating a reward or compensation.  
The reasons for rejecting national service are similar among all Arab parties in Israel, with some 
differences as a result of the ideological background of each party. It is noticeable that each party uses 
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terms from its own vocabulary. Thus, the Islamic Movement warns that national service, where Arab 
youths serve in the Jewish sector, is a threat to the Muslim identity of these youths.  
The Communist Party represented by the DFPE, warns that it would be exploited by capitalists and 
businessmen who will use it as a source of cheap labor which would increase unemployment among the 
youth. 
The Nationalist NDA fears that being integrated in the National Service and assimilation in Jewish 
society is a major threat to the Arab and Palestinian national identity of Arab youth.  
The ideological views of each party are reflected in their arguments against National Service, but to a 
much less extent compared to their arguments concerning the two topics discussed in chapters 3.1 and 
3.2. This is explained by the Arab consensus rejecting National Service. Since the arguments that justify 
their positions are similar, so are their positions against it.  
Rhetorical Analysis 
Based on Aristotle, argumentation that relates to the future, and focuses on the good that must be sought 
and the bad that must be ignored, falls under the deliberative branch of rhetoric. On the other hand, 
forensic rhetoric speaks about the past and points out guilt or wrongdoing and who committed it. Lastly, 
epideictic rhetoric is concerned with praise or blame, and that is why it is also called ceremonial 
rhetoric220, but modern rhetoricians have expanded its definition to also include shared values221. 
In our discussion on National Service and the argumentation by the Arab parties for or against it, we 
expect to find forensic arguments that relate to the past and involve references to the injustice that was 
done and point out who has done it, which the orators use to argue for or against National Service. The 
debate around National Service would also include discussion of its advantage and disadvantages, which 
serves to reach a conclusion on whether it is good for Arabs in Israel or not. These would be, in 
Aristotelian terms, arguments in the deliberative axis. In 3.1.2.1, we quoted Higgins who said: 
"…the deliberative rhetoric must exhort or persuade his audience his speech is addressed to a judge of the 
future, and its end is to promote the good and avoid the harmful". This description explains with great 
accuracy what the Arab parties are trying to do concerning National Service. They all agree that National 
 
220 Richard Norquist. "Epideictic rhetoric". <http://grammar.about.com/od/e/g/epideicticterm.htm>. Accessed: 04.12.2013. 
221 See Zosha Stuckey, " Epideictic Rhetoric and the Reinvention of Disability: A Study of Ceremony at the New York State 
Asylum for Idiots”. In Present Tense: A Journal of Rhetoric in Society. 2012. < http://www.presenttensejournal.org/volume-
2/epideictic-rhetoric-and-the-reinvention-of-disability-a-study-of-the-opening-and-closing-ceremonies-at-the-new-york-state-
asylum-for-idiots/>. Accessed: 05.12.2013. 
123 
 
Service, whether voluntary or mandatory, is going to be harmful for the Arab Palestinian minority in 
Israel, and they are attempting to persuade Arab youth not to take that path, by demonstrating its merits 
and detriments. It is a deliberation about the future, how it will be for Arabs in Israel should they decide 
to accept National Service or reject it 
 If we review the eleven arguments that the Arab parties use to undermine National Service and deter 
Arab youth from joining it, we find that arguments 1 - 4 are forensic, while arguments 5 – 11 are 
deliberative. Forensic arguments remind the audience or the readers that the National Service plan for 
Arabs comes in a historical context of oppression, deprivation of rights, and attempts to suppress the 
Arab people in Israel and "tame" them. These arguments relate to the history of the state, the history of 
National Service itself and how it came into being, and also relate to concepts associated with national 
service that make it impossible for Arabs to accept it, like "sharing the burden". Argument 1 states that 
Arabs cannot accept National Service because it was created by military people who have a solid history 
of violence against the Palestinian people and their Arab brothers. Similarly, argument 2 expresses lack 
of enthusiasm to serve a state that was established on the ruins of Palestinian towns and villages, and 
which still discriminates against them in all aspects of life. Argument 3 shows refusal by Arabs to show 
loyalty to the state by serving in its institutions, while the state is not loyal to them. Argument 4 is refusal 
to "share the burden" because, according to Arabs and Arab politicians, rights must not be conditioned 
upon duties, especially in the case of Palestinians, whose rights and resources were annexed by the Israeli 
state. 
Arguments 5 – 11 are deliberative in that they are concerned with the future, and they deal with what is 
in the interest of Arabs in the future regarding National Service. In essence, these arguments explain why 
accepting National Service will bring harm upon Arabs as individuals and as a group, and they propose 
better alternatives to National Service. These arguments warn that National Service will be used to 
"brainwash" and "tame" Arab youth and will distort their Arab and Palestinian identity; it will also 
morally corrupt them; Arabs will not be treated equally even if they serve; financially, the rewards will 
not be worth it; National Service will increase unemployment rate in the Arab sector; paid volunteering 
in the National Service will undermine the real meaning of volunteering; and finally, Arabs should seek 
to create their own volunteering schemes that suit their needs and do not compromise their national 
principles, and their Arab identity and culture as Palestinians.  
Some of the arguments discussed above also have an epideictic aspect. Arguments2, 3, and 4 talk about 
the shared values of Arabs in Israel, and state that Arab youth who perform National Service in the state's 
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institutions that adopt the state's principles, symbols,  and set of values, are likely to be influenced by 
these values and symbols. The arguments also relate to the concepts of "loyalty" and "sharing the 
burden". The risk, according to Arab leaders and activists, is that these values might replace the Arab and 
Palestinian values of the Arab youth in Israel, which is considered a threat to all Arab people in Israel 
who are a minority that seeks to protect its culture and identity, and fight integration and assimilation. 
Epideictic is about shared values, and Arabs leaders believe that the shared values of the Arab 
Palestinians in Israel are threatened by National Service, which adopts and promotes other values, often 
contradictory to what Arabs believe and embrace. 
With regards to the three rhetorical appeals set by Aristotle, we can see that the arguments are either 
based on logos or pathos. Arguments 2, 3, and 4 try to appeal to the audience's emotions. They are a 
reminder of the past and the hardships that Palestinians suffered at the hands of the Israeli state and its 
former military men who are now responsible for National Service. Evoking the emotions of the audience 
and causing it to feel that the pain and misery that they and their ancestors have suffered was caused by 
people, some of whom are now managing National Service, is probably a good idea to deter people from 
joining it. Similarly, the state is still discriminating against Arabs and depriving them of their natural 
rights, not to mention demolishing their houses and confiscating their lands; it is not deserving of their 
loyalty by serving in its institutions, particularly as its symbols and principles, like the "Jewish State" and 
the Tikvah (Israeli National Anthem), contradict theirs.  
On the other hand, arguments 1, and 5 - 11 are arguments that employ logic to appeal to the audience. So 
in 5, the argument is that since Arabs feel discriminated against, and the government's National Service 
scheme for volunteering does not suit them, logically, they should seek to develop their own scheme for 
volunteering and serving the community, if indeed they are interested in promoting the idea of 
volunteering in their community. In 6, the argument is that if the Arab youth spends much time within the 
Jewish community to do National Service there, it is logical to assume that he is going to be vulnerable to 
being influenced by them and might adopt their lifestyle and even their language, values, and views, 
which is of concern to the Arab public and Arab leaders. Concerning the rewards, argument 8 explains 
that a volunteer who joins the National Service for the rewards will not really benefit from them, since 
getting any other normal job will earn him much more than what he would earn from the Service. Lastly, 
in 11, the argument is that real volunteering is unpaid voluntary work done for the sake of the community 
and out of true conviction that an individual should take part in improving the conditions of the 
community he lives in, and sacrifice some of his time and maybe money to do so. It is logical to assume 
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that if voluntary work becomes normally associated with getting paid, that threatens the real action of 
volunteering which should be done without expecting a reward for it, and it might become the norm that 
"voluntary work" should be compensated with money or any kind of reward.  
In these arguments, different rhetorical devices are employed. We see exemplification where Zahalka 
from the NDA gave the example of the Arab National Service volunteers who were asked by the 
directors to go to the Naqab area in the South to assist during the Israeli offensive against Gaza. Zahalka 
did that to show that National Service would threaten the Arab youth's principles and sense of belonging 
to the Palestinian people, when they assist the Israeli government at times of war with their Palestinian 
brothers.  
Another device is comparison and contrast. All Arab parties talked about the Arab Druze who serve in 
the Israeli military, and they compared their poor conditions to show that the situation for Druze who 
serve is the same for Arabs who do not serve, which means that doing National Service will not improve 
things. An analogy is present here too. Arab politicians draw analogies between what Druze are promised 
because they are given the highest-ranking military service, and what Arabs are promised to be given if 
they perform the lower ranking National Service. This reveals that the Druze, who serve in the military, 
suffer the same inequality and discrimination in resources and budgets which leads to the conclusion that 
the conditions of Arabs will not improve, and they will still be deprived of their rights and freedoms even 
if they accept National Service. 
In conclusion, the rhetorical argumentation used by the Arab leaders and activists against National 
Service are varied and versatile. While forensic rhetoric is used to remind Arab youth that the state and 
the men in charge who want them to join the National Service are the ones responsible for the calamities 
that have befallen the Palestinian people in the past; deliberative rhetoric is used to convince the youth 
about what should be done in the future to serve their own and their people's interests.  
It is remarkable that Arab politicians, who address the public and especially the youth and warn against 
the National Service, do not only talk about the collective level but also the personal level. Namely, the 
arguments summarized above touch on the reasons why National Service should be avoided for the sake 
of the Arab people collectively, but also for the person involved individually. The arguments did not only 
relate to collective issues like rights or duties and shared values, but also personal issues like rewards.  
Unlike the two topics we discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2, the rhetoric and arguments used by the 
different Arab parties concerning National Service are very similar. It can be said that the reason behind 
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this is that the other two topics (recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, and participation in the Knesset) 
have aspects to them that are influenced by the ideology that each party embraces. So while the NDA 
perceive the conflict as a conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arab-Palestinian nationalist 
movement, the Islamic Movement sees it largely as a religious conflict between the Jewish people and 
the Muslim nation, and the DFPE sees it as a conflict between an imperialist colonial power against the  
colonized people., Those ideological differences influence certain aspects in each party's position on the 
other two topics, but not on the topic of National Service. That is to say, if we take participation in the 
Knesset as an example, we find that the Islamic Movement deals with it not only from a nationalist point 
of view, but a religious perspective too. Similarly, the Communist Party deals with the topic of 
recognizing Israel as a Jewish State not only from a nationalist perspective, but a communist one too, 
which is why its arguments against it are different from the arguments of the NDA and the Islamic 
Movement. On the other hand, the arguments of all three parties concerning National Service seem to be 
mostly of a nationalist nature rather than religious or class-related. This reaffirms that the positions of the 





5 Conclusions  
 
Based on the period between 1948 and 2013, this thesis analyzed the rhetoric that is used by the major 
Arab parties in Israel to back their positions on key issues that the Arab minority in Israel is currently 
dealing with. The parties involved are the two branches of the Islamist Islamic Movement (the 
parliamentary and the extra parliamentary); the nationalist National Democratic Assembly, and the 
communist Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.  
While every chapter in this thesis ended in a concluding section that summarized the whole chapter, 
additional findings that relate to the research in general can be noted.  
The research reveals a relatively disparate rhetoric, different arguments, and varied methods of 
persuasion practiced by the different Arab parties, even when dealing with topics concerning which the 
positions of all parties are similar.  
We found that the Islamic Movement's attitudes are largely influenced by its Islamist ideology, and that 
its views on the conflict are affected by religious motivations and interpretations. The same applies to the 
NDA and the DFPE, each with its own ideology, intellectuals and considerations. When ideological 
elements are involved, the positions of the three parties are very likely to be different, and when these 
elements are absent, the positions are mostly identical, as is the case with the three party's position on the 
National Service for Arabs.  
In a similar fashion, the reason why there is a disagreement and different positions between the two 
branches of the Islamic movement concerning the first two topics, is that these two topics directly relate 
to participation in the Knesset, which was the major reason behind the split of the Movement in the first 
place. On the other hand, the third topic, the National Service for Arabs, has nothing to do with the state 
or recognizing it by Arabs, and therefore the two branches share the exact same views and even have the 
same explanations for these views.  
When it comes to Aristotle's elements of rhetoric, we found that the arguments presented by the different 
parties employ different rhetorical devices and appeals and fall under the different rhetorical categories. 
The comprehensive use of rhetorical argumentation that largely complies with Aristotle's classifications 
reflects awareness among the Arab political movement in Israel of the importance of using rhetoric not 
only for political gain, but also within the context of struggle against injustice and inequality.  
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The reason why we found that most arguments are logos-based, is that in our analysis we had to rely on 
arguments that appeared in materials that were published in newspapers, magazines, or internet website. 
In other words, we relied on statements that were intended for and accessible to the general public, as 
opposed to statements and arguments expressed in closed meetings attended only by members of the 
party, which are likely to be different from what is declared publicly. Arguments intended for the general 
public can be different from arguments presented to a specific audience with specific expectations and 
needs like the members or supporters of a specific party. Such "public" argumentation needs to appeal to 
everyone, and to guarantee that, perhaps ethos and pathos should be avoided because our assumption is 
that the efficiency of these kinds of arguments is highly dependent on the type of such audience, and they 
are most effective when they are tailored for the specific audience to be addressed. While ethos and 
pathos may work for a specific audience, they may not work for another, and may even create a 
"boomerang" effect222, where the audience will react negatively. Hence, logos or logical reasoning is the 
safest to use when addressing a general audience without having a direct contact with it, as is the case 
with statements, articles, radio shows or TV interviews read or seen by the general public. 
This thesis shows that despite being one national minority that shares the same past, present, and future, 
the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel is far from being politically homogenous. It is evident that the 
ideological principles each party holds greatly shape its rhetoric and arguments and set it apart from the 
other parties in many ways. 
The thesis can serve as the basis for further studies on the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel. Now that it 
is evident that the rhetoric of the Arab minority is very diverse, it is important to carry out a follow-up 
study that would deal with the question of what contributes to such great political division within the 
very small Arab Palestinian minority in Israel. A question that I hope to be answered soon by fellow 
researchers of rhetoric. 
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